The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Ipsos MORI.
Foreword

Welcome to this international edition of Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute’s Understanding Society – Beyond Populism. In our recent publications, we have painted a picture of shifts in the public mood, based on our own research and analysis. But for this special edition we have looked externally, to see how a wide range of different experts across many countries are interpreting the patterns we’re seeing - and what they might mean for the future. We’re delighted to bring together in one place some of the most influential voices and latest ideas that are shaping the debate.

Our own major global survey on populist trends highlights the importance of nativism and a sense across a wide variety of countries that the ‘system is broken’. However, we conclude, as others do in this edition, that populism as it’s commonly discussed is more of a political strategy than a coherent ideology. There are certainly common themes – but the key is to understand what lies beneath and beyond in citizens’ beliefs, rather than try to fit all global situations to one common phenomenon.

In the same vein, Cas Mudde, Associate Professor at the University of Georgia reminds us that ‘populism’ is a useful concept in understanding contemporary European politics, but it should be applied as one of several ideas.

In Britain it is the one year anniversary of the EU referendum and we are delighted to have contributions from David Goodhart and Matthew Goodwin outlining their explanations of the ‘leave’ vote. In Goodhart’s view, Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have been caused by a growing value divide between the people from “Anywhere” – the educated and mobile, and the people from “Somewhere” – the more ‘rooted’. He argues that the EU referendum vote was the Somewheres taking their chance to reject the Anywhere worldview.

Goodwin argues that the Remain camp, headed by then-Prime Minister David Cameron, amplified these divisions through an ‘elite-focussed’ campaign that underplayed issues like immigration and erosion of sovereignty, which a large section of the electorate cared deeply about.

Following a politically tumultuous year after the EU referendum and the US Election, all eyes have been on the 2017 French election. Le Monde’s eminent journalist Gérard Courtois, takes us on the campaign trail and tells us how the ‘insurgents’ from both sides of political spectrum, En Marche! and Front National, have turned this French political system ‘upside down’. Courtois documents the fall of Marine Le Pen and argues that Macron’s victory – aided by the left and right – signifies a deep desire for political renewal and economic and social reform.

Moisés Naím, Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment and author, tells us that power is shifting – it is now easier to get, harder to use and easier to lose. Naím highlights some of the ‘ingredients’ he thinks ‘populist’ leaders have in common.

Emily Ekins, Research Fellow at the Cato Institute, examines President Donald Trump’s voters, but also the social shifts in American society that led to the US election. Ekins argues that the ‘political elites’ have long avoided talking about the potential costs of immigration for fear that it may magnify anxiety and heighten polarities? In a country like India, where 283m are estimated to be social media users, Desai explores the shifting common currency of ideas.

And finally, we are delighted to have political accounts from journalists Nick O’Malley from The Sydney Morning Herald and Tracey Watkins, Political Editor and Parliamentary Bureau Chief of Fairfax Media in New Zealand. Both O’Malley and Watkins give us an account of the insurgent parties and political figures that are rising to the fore in mainstream politics, and what this means for the Australian and New Zealand landscapes.

We hope you enjoy reading this special edition of Understanding Society, one year on from a momentous vote in the UK. We do not usually showcase as many different external perspectives in our journal and tend to build more on our own research and analysis. But this is such an important global topic, we think drawing on some of the key thinkers in the area will help inform the debate among our readers. As always, the usual caveat applies – the views expressed here are those of the authors, not necessarily those of Ipsos MORI.

We remain committed to understanding society from the broad range of social and political research we and others conduct, in the belief that this leads to better politics, policy and practice. If you would like to discuss any of the research here, please get in touch.

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Beyond populism

The rise of populism has become a global obsession in the last year, driven by the major upsets in Brexit and Donald Trump’s Presidential election victory, but with echoes in many other countries throughout the world. Of course, populism itself is nothing new: as the articles in this edition make clear, there have been many ‘populist’ movements of varying levels of success and political persuasions over recent decades, particularly in Latin America and, more recently, in western democracies in Europe, the US and Australasia.

Understanding the current wave of populism in its many forms is a crucial lens to help us grasp what is going on around the world. But the obvious differences between the movements in different countries demonstrate that what is often called populism is not the single coherent ideology people might believe. Unpicking what we mean by populism – and how governments and others should respond – is far from straightforward.

One thing is clear. There is a very strong sense that regular people feel they are being left behind by establishment and political elites that don’t understand or care about them. As Cas Mudde describes later in this edition, the idea of “the people” vs. “the elite” is perhaps the core theme that runs throughout populist movements. This comes through incredibly strongly in our global research.

It is the majority view in every single country in the study that the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful. This is even the case in Sweden, which typically feels more at ease with itself. It is most extreme in Mexico, where 94% think the economic system is rigged, but Spain and Italy come next in the list: these two western European democracies have over 80% of their populations who think the economic system is rigged against them.

If people think the economic system is rigged against them, governments don’t fare much better, with half or more in every country agreeing that their government doesn’t prioritise the concerns of people like them.

This view that an elite has stacked the cards in their favour is one we see across different parts of the world, even where they have very different social and political histories.

This mood can be summed up as ‘the system is broken’ – people feeling that traditional political actors don’t care about people like them, that experts don’t understand their lives, and that their economy is rigged. However, the local conditions associated with this unhappiness are often varied, as this edition makes clear.

As Figure 2 shows, in several continental European countries such as France, Italy and Hungary, there is a strong sense of political dissatisfaction, which is also associated with high levels of ‘nativist’ sentiment – a belief, for example, that immigrants take jobs and important social services away from locally-born nationals. As Emily Ekins and Matthew Goodwin point out in this journal, this kind of nativist sentiment, exemplified by attitudes to immigration,
Beyond populism emerges as perhaps the most important factor in the rise of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote. However, some other countries with equally high levels of belief that “the system is broken” have much lower nativist sentiment – such as the LATAM countries of Mexico and Peru, and also in South Korea.

So what are we to make of all this? Is ‘populism’ a helpful lens or not? In 2015, before Trump and Brexit, Mark Zuckerberg’s first pick for his new book club was *The End of Power: from Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be* by Moisés Naim. Its hypothesis is outlined in more detail in an article by the author in this edition: that power is now easier to get, harder to use and easier to lose. In many ways this is a good thing. There is a lower chance of dictators and despots, as people can’t hold on to power for as long, or as deeply as they used to.

This description of less concentration of power among the few seems at odds with other ‘big idea’ books of recent years, including Thomas Piketty’s *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, which outlines the incredible concentration of wealth and economic power at the top of most societies over the last 40 years, a theme echoed in David Goodhart’s distinction between “Somewhere” and “Anywhere” people. But these ideas can be reconciled. Power can become less stable, more fleeting, but still be concentrated, and in some ways more dangerous. As Naim says, the loss of ‘superpowers’ of global authority could mean greater instability. The combination of these conditions – less stable control of power but growing inequality and alienation – make the darker side of Naim’s thesis, possible paralysis of power or anarchy – in effect, fragmentation – more likely and important to understand.

Our data suggests that while discontent may be common, the factors behind it are many and varied, and several are long-standing and mainstream currents of perception, rather than the sudden change implied by the latest media catchphrase. But that doesn’t mean public opinion should be ignored, just that it can’t be easily packaged into a single soundbite.

So what does our data show? To start with the good news, most people still believe in democracy (72% on average), and in 18 out of the 22 countries at least two in three think it’s the ideal form of government. But that may be as far as the good news goes, as it’s clear that many in many countries are feeling let down by the current system.

**Figure ONE. Around the world, people agree that ‘our government does not prioritise the concerns of people like me’**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>AGREE</th>
<th>DISAGREE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>11%</td>
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<tr>
<td>S Africa</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>12%</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<td>S Korea</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>19%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>17%</td>
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<td>France</td>
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<td>Russia</td>
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<td>Peru</td>
<td>71%</td>
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<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>69%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Argentina</td>
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<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>60%</td>
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<td>Sweden</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>34%</td>
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<td>Japan</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
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Ipsos Global Trends Survey, 17,180 adults across 22 countries, online, 12 Sep – 11 Oct 2016
Let’s take some common attitudes that are associated with support for so-called ‘populist’ movements and see how they are doing:

- Anti-immigration feeling: 55% on average think there are too many immigrants in their country, and 64% feel that public attitudes are hardening.
- Feeling that your concerns are being ignored: 71% on average agree their government doesn’t prioritise them.
- Feeling instead that the economy is rigged in favour of the rich and powerful: 76% agree.
- Want a strong leader to replace the elected government, and even a revolution: 58% want a strong leader and 47% on average think a revolution is needed.
- Feeling left behind by changes in society: 59% don’t identify with what their country has become, and 50% wish their country would go back to the way it used to be (and rising in countries like France, Belgium, Brazil, India, Germany and Sweden).
- Fear about the world: 82% think the world is becoming a more dangerous place, and this is higher than 2014. 57% think they are less safe from crime than their parents.

While discontent may be common, the factors behind it are many and varied, and several are long-standing and mainstream currents of perception, rather than the sudden change implied by the latest media catchphrase.
Beyond populism

which has been shown to be one of the best predictors of support for Brexit. (Although, to be fair we should point towards majority support for women’s and gay rights too.)

- Economic insecurity: Compared with their parents, 54% think they are less likely to have a secure job, and 53% that they are less likely to have a comfortable retirement.

So there is strong evidence of discontent around the world, but as the list above highlights, it’s not easy to boil that down to a single cause. And, unfortunately, there is no simple answer for what governments should do about it either.

But in all this, we need to bear in mind the positive potential of disruption if it gets us to a more even distribution of power. Already there has been a sea-change in politics away from ignoring or even trying to silence the economic and cultural concerns of the ‘left behinds’. This really is as much about culture as economics: we can predict a lot about people’s overall outlook and mindset simply from knowing their views on the death penalty, whether they think human rights protect the criminal rather than the victim, and whether they believe political correctness really has “gone mad”. As David Goodhart describes in a British context, these are the “Somewheres” who tend to be more rooted, less well educated, value group attachments, familiarity and security. By contrast, the “Anywheres” tend to be educated and mobile, they value autonomy, openness and fluidity.

We’re a long way from reconciling these concerns within existing political and economic systems. And as Santosh Desai argues in his article, the “bubbles” we create for ourselves on social media tend to reinforce a more tribal form of identity, which could make reconciling these concerns more challenging rather than less.

So how should governments and business respond to this more dangerous context? The political context looks very unstable, with talk of a “super-cycle of disruption”. It’s hard to tell when you’re in the middle of such a cycle, and we’d be more circumspect about declaring that’s what’s happening quite yet. The articles in this edition raise all sorts of possibilities in different contexts: that the disruption we’ve seen is revealing underlying tensions that have been building for years; that this is a passing phase, that other countries have been through and drawn back from; or that the [sometimes uneasy but fairly stable] liberal consensus of the post-war period was the unusual phase, and we may now be revealing our true colours of entrenched tribalism.

In some commentary, populism can mean nearly anything, and therefore almost nothing. But as Naim argues later, it should be seen more as a political strategy than a coherent ideology: in those narrower terms, there are clearly unifying populist themes. But we think there is also value in looking beyond this too, to the underlying attitudes and beliefs that drive its success – and failure. Looking beyond populism, to the people themselves, will tell us much more about how government and politics need to respond.

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Europe’s populism problem

We have to talk about the p-word. It is truly everywhere these days. You can’t read an article about politics these days without it. Virtually any election or referendum is set up as a struggle between an emboldened populism and an embattled establishment. There is no room for anything else.

Don’t get me wrong, populism is a useful concept with which we can understand contemporary politics in Europe, and far beyond, but only under two strict conditions. First, it must be clearly defined and, second, it should be applied as one of several concepts to understand politics. Unfortunately, this is not the case in most accounts of politics and populism today. The dominance of the populism lens means that we see both too much (populism) and too little (non-populism).

Populism is used in many different ways, mostly devoid of any clear definition, instead broadly referring to non-traditional politics, such as promising everything to everyone or speaking in a folksy way. Neither is specific to populism, and they are both in fact rather widespread in political campaigning more generally. Instead, populism is best defined as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic
Populist parties and prime ministers are represented in most European countries, but most combine populism with other ideological features. Left populists combine populism with some form of socialism, while right populists primarily combine it with authoritarianism and nativism.

Populism is both monist and moralist. Populists believe that all people share the same interests and values and that the key distinction between the people and the elite is moral, i.e. “pure” versus “corrupt”. They present politics as a struggle of all against one, one against all, which, ironically, is confirmed by the dominant media narrative of an emboldened populism versus an embattled establishment.

There is no doubt that populism is an important aspect of contemporary politics; populist parties are represented in most European parliaments and populist presidents and prime ministers rule in both European and American countries. But most of these parties and politicians are not just populists; they combine populism with other ideological features. Left populists combine populism with some form of socialism – think of Syriza in Greece or Chavismo in Venezuela – while right populists primarily combine it with authoritarianism and nativism – like Donald Trump in the US or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands.

Before the rise of left populism, right populists would be discussed as “radical right” rather than “populists”, while a combination of the two – populist radical right (or, if you wish, radical right populism), is most appropriate. This is not just an academic matter, however. Because the media perceive the contemporary challenge to liberal democracy exclusively in terms of populism, they focus predominantly on anti-establishment sentiments by political outsiders. Hence, the media was quick to celebrate the alleged “defeat of populism” after the Dutch elections, because populist outsider Geert Wilders gained much fewer seats than
establishment premier Mark Rutte. What was missed, however, was that both premier Rutte and Christian Democratic leader Sybrand Buma conducted an increasingly authoritarian and nativist campaign. Both presented themselves as defenders of “Dutch values”, including “Christian” Easter eggs and the tradition of Black Pete. They were allegedly under threat from Islam and Muslims, assisted by secular, left-wing fellow travelers.

But whereas most media saw too little in the Dutch elections, they saw too much in the British EU referendum and the US presidential elections. Both are now routinely hailed as populist victories, which is an exaggeration at best and a falsehood at worst. While the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) played an important role in pushing the Leave camp over the 50-percent mark, the push for Brexit was always predominantly a Conservative endeavor. Hence, many Brits didn’t vote against some kind of “corrupt elite”, be it British or European, but rather for re-establishing national sovereignty, as they perceive it, in line with a significant part of the Tory elite.

Similarly, despite all the hype, the 2016 US election was, first and foremost, just another presidential election, in which Republicans voted Republican and Democrats voted Democrat. It might be true that populism motivated some angry white working class men in the “American Heartland” to turn out, which might have swung these states and thereby the whole election, but they constituted at best a tiny minority of the Republican electorate. The vast majority of people who vote for Trump did so for traditional Republican reasons like abortion, immigration, taxes, and, most notably, partisanship.

In short, it is time to put the populism frame back in its correct place. Yes, populism is an important feature of contemporary politics, but not all anti-establishment politics is populism and populist parties are not just about populism.

In fact, to accurately understand politicians like Trump and Wilders, and the challenge they pose to liberal democracy, authoritarianism and nativism...
Yes, populism is an important feature of contemporary politics, but not all anti-establishment politics is populism, and populist parties are not just about populism.

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Anywheres vs Somewheres

How the EU referendum exposed the new fault lines that divide Britain

Politics in Britain and other rich democracies has become less stable in recent years—consider Brexit, Trump, the rise of populist parties and the surprise 2017 election result—because of a growing value divide between what I call the people from Anywhere and the people from Somewhere.

Anywhere is educated and mobile, they value autonomy, openness and fluidity. They have “achieved identities” based on educational and career success that makes them comfortable, well, anywhere. Somewhere is more rooted, less well educated, value group attachments, familiarity and security. They have “ascribed identities” based on place and group belonging and can therefore be more easily discomforted by change.

Forty years ago, British commonsense was Somewhere commonsense. Over the past generation or two it has become Anywhere commonsense. We Anywheres are mainly graduates and affluent. We are less than 25 per cent of the population, while Somewheres are closer to half, but we dominate politics and society regardless of the party in power.

From example, the “knowledge economy” that has emerged in recent years works well for the highly educated while an hour-glass labour market has wiped out many of the middling jobs that used to give Somewheres status. In post-school education we massively expanded higher education, a world that Anywhere children flourish in, but allowed the technical training and apprenticeships that benefitted so many Somewheres to decline. We created a much more open economy and encouraged mass immigration while ignoring or labelling xenophobic the discomfort felt over rapid ethnic changes across the country. And an anti-domesticity family policy has been driven by the assumption that men and women are not only equal but have the same priority of putting paid work first while the conventional family continues to decline.

We Anywheres care about the world but can be blinded by self-regard. We have run things in our own interests and called it the national interest. Take EU freedom of movement - if you are a lawyer, you can go and work in Berlin for a couple of years and don’t have to compete at home with minimum wage east Europeans, but if you work in a food factory in the north of England, you
Anywheres vs somewheres – How the EU referendum exposed the new fault lines that divide Britain

most certainly do. [Food manufacturing in Britain now employs about 400,000 people and around 120,000 come from central and eastern Europe].¹

This value divide has always been with us but it has acquired greater significance in recent years for two reasons. First, is the simple fact of the greater significance of socio-cultural issues. The old social class and socio-economic divisions of left and right have not disappeared but have been partly eclipsed by issues relating to national identity and sovereignty, ethnicity and immigration, security and pace of change. (Indeed, while there has been divergence between Anywheres and Somewheres on many cultural issues there has been convergence on economic issues.)

Second, the Anywhere-Somewhere balance has shifted significantly in the past 30 years with a big increase in the numbers and influence of the former group, thanks in part to the rapid expansion of higher education.

To many people the Anywhere-Somewhere divide will seem too binary and simplistic. In my book, The Road To Somewhere, I provide more detail and nuance. There are many varieties of Anywhere and Somewhere: the most extreme Anywheres I call Global Villagers (about 5 per cent of the population) and the more extreme Somewheres I call Hard Authoritarians (about 5 to 7 per cent). There is also a large group in the middle I call the In-betweeners, about one quarter of the population.

But the key point here is that I may have invented the labels, but I have not invented the broad value blocs—they are there to see in the British Social Attitudes surveys and countless other opinion and value surveys of recent years.

And there is one opinion survey that perfectly reflects the value blocs I have been describing. For the past few years, the main immigration opinion poll has found 75 per cent of the population finding immigration too high or much too high. It breaks down like this: 50 per cent think it has been much too high (the Somewheres), 25 per cent think it has been a little too high (the In-betweeners), another 20/22 per cent think it has been about right (mainstream Anywheres) and 3 to 4 per cent would like it to be even higher (the Global Villagers).

The surveys tell us something very interesting. There has been a great liberalisation in cultural attitudes to race, gender and sexuality over the past 40 years (though less so on immigration and welfare). This has been led by Anywheres but has pulled many, though not all, Somewheres along with them. We are all liberals now – at least when it comes to lifestyles.

For that reason, I call the Somewhere worldview “decent populism”. They are not, except for a small rump,
bigots and xenophobes but remain attached to various group identities, and are still wary of rapid change. Many Somewheres stopped voting in national elections because all the main parties from the 1990s have represented the Anywhere worldview. But they took their chance in the Brexit referendum to say “enough, your Anywhere version of openness is not working for us.”

Although I am critical of the Anywheres and the “liberal overreach” of the past generation—exemplified in the EU by the over-extended Euro and the concept of European Citizenship—I think that both worldviews are perfectly decent in their different ways. And the task of politics for the next generation is to find a new settlement between these two value tribes and thus reduce the likelihood in the future of more Brexit-like shocks.

Achieving that new settlement depends upon the outcome of a debate now going on among the Anywheres between those, I call admonished Anywheres, who acknowledge that they have not been listening enough to Somewhere concerns and those, more militant Anywheres, who regard themselves as defending civilization from the barbarians.

Many people, including me, thought that Theresa May with her somewhat socially conservative and left-wing brand of Conservatism—a kind of British Christian Democracy—embodied the admonished Anywhere cause and was best placed to forge some kind of new settlement between Anywheres and Somewheres. Her poor performance in the 2017 election\(^2\) has cast doubt on that. Instead, Jeremy Corbyn almost by accident seemed to bring back to life the flagging Anywhere-Somewhere Labour coalition—in this case of Anywhere students and opponents of Brexit along with enough Somewhere blue collar Labour voters.

This is unlikely to be a durable coalition and the likelihood is that Labour will continue to decline as an electoral force, probably facing some kind of Macron-like moderate social democratic rival by the time of the next election. For now, the project of a new settlement between the Anywhere and the Somewhere interest will remain the holy grail of British politics for the next generation.

David Goodhart is Head of the Demography, Immigration, and Integration Unit, and Director of the Integration Hub website at the UK think tank Policy Exchange. He is the author of The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (2017).
Why Britain voted to leave the EU

Matthew Goodwin

Liberals tend to obsess over individual election outcomes. Across Europe, many recently celebrated when the Dutch populist Geert Wilders failed to win his national election, and when Marine Le Pen failed to cross the finishing line in France. However, individual elections will not change the fact that the underlying currents in public opinion and European party systems continue to cultivate significant space for populist outsiders.

The potency and potential of populism can be seen by looking at the recent vote for Brexit in the United Kingdom, which has now reached its one-year anniversary.

Since nearly 52 per cent of the country opted for Brexit, some have argued that the vote was motivated mainly by concerns over national sovereignty, while others have pointed to an economically ‘left behind’ group of voters, or to intense concerns over immigration that were galvanized through a deliberately populist campaign that urged voters to ‘take back control’.

In a new book, we contribute to this debate, drawing on 12 years’ worth of data from representative national surveys, conducted each month from April 2004 until June 2016. They probed the backgrounds and concerns of more than 150,000 voters, and in June 2016, included a panel design whereby voters were contacted a few days before the vote and right after. This data provides unprecedented insight into the Brexit vote.

Our starting point is an established literature on what shapes public attitudes toward the EU, which stresses the importance of calculations about perceived costs and benefits of being in the EU, the role of risk, emotion, leaders, and public concerns over domestic and ‘identity-related’ issues, such immigration. In short, our argument is that Brexit was not driven by ‘one factor’. The vote to leave the EU reflected what we refer to as a complex and cross-cutting mix of calculations, emotions and cues. Within this, immigration was key.

By tracking public attitudes toward EU membership over the long-term, we see that the ‘fundamentals’ of the Brexit vote did not suddenly appear in 2016 but were ‘baked in’ long ago.

People’s views of the EU were strongly shaped by their assessments of how the main parties had performed on key ‘valence’ issues, but mainly immigration and the economy. If people felt anxious over migration, ‘left behind’ economically, and worried about the control of Brussels, they were significantly more likely to oppose
EU membership long before David Cameron even called the referendum. Then, as Britain trundled toward the 2016 referendum, people began to assess the costs and benefits of EU membership. Crucially, a plurality accepted that Brexit would harm the economy, and probably their own finances as well. But most voters also felt that remaining in the EU would increase the risk of terrorism, harm Britain’s cultural life and erode sovereignty, while leaving the EU would mean less immigration. Identity concerns were already trumping economic self-interest. It is likely that Angela Merkel’s decision only a few months before the vote to allow large numbers of refugees into the EU sharpened this concern and entrenched a view that politicians (and the EU) were not in control of an issue that a large section of the electorate cared deeply about. Furthermore, Cameron’s renegotiation with the EU failed to quell these concerns.

It is worth underlining the point that people accepted Brexit was a risk—a belief Cameron and Remainers sought to amplify through their elite-focused campaign. They recognised that many voters were risk averse and carpet-bombed them with dire warnings and prophecies. When asked ahead of the vote to indicate how risky they thought leaving would be (on a scale of 0-10 where ‘0’ is ‘no risk’ and ‘10’ is ‘very risky’), 54 percent of voters assigned scores of six of greater. Playing on this notion of risk was not necessarily a ‘bad’ strategy—believing Brexit was risky was the strongest predictor of whether or not somebody voted to Remain.

But on its own, the risk-based strategy was not enough, especially when set alongside the powerful and emotionally resonant case over immigration. Our statistical analysis reveals that people who felt negatively toward immigration, worried about a loss of control to Brussels, and had been left behind economically, were much more likely to minimise the risk of Brexit. These voters felt they had nothing to lose, or were determined to force their identity concerns onto the agenda regardless.

By examining emotions, too, we identified another problem for Remainers, who spent too much time trying to amplify the problems of Brexit at the expense of making the positive case for EU membership. After worries about the risks of Brexit, the second strongest predictor of the Remain vote were positive feelings about Europe—a driver that was not maximised by Remainers. Might things have been different if Cameron, George Osborne and Barack Obama had consistently made the positive case for Europe?

On June 23 2016, all of these dynamics came together to deliver the vote for Brexit—a choice that reflected a complex mix of calculations, emotions and cues. Immigration was key to the vote for Brexit and ran through this decision. Not only were those who felt negatively about immigration more likely to minimize the risks of Brexit but they were also significantly more likely to turnout, and then vote for Brexit in the polling booth. Immigration exerted powerful direct and indirect effects on the vote. The idea that this issue, which gave Leavers an emotional appeal that Remain’s economic pessimism could not match, was not central is misleading. Indeed, weeks before the balloting we argued that Leavers were more likely to show up at the polls because of this ‘enthusiasm gap’—and they did. Though Leavers were divided on how to deal with immigration, our findings also point to the important role of populist leaders, specifically Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage. Johnson had a particularly important effect—if you liked Boris then even after controlling for a host of other factors, you were significantly more likely to vote for Brexit. Farage was less popular among the professional middle-classes but he was more popular among blue-collar workers and left behind voters, underlining how these rival messengers were able to reach into different groups of voters. When, from June 1 2016, the rival Leave camps all put the pedal down on immigration they were firmly in tune with the core driver of their vote.

Brexit is a useful example because it shows us how, long before the Great Recession, a values divide had opened up in Western states like Britain. As a consequence, populist politics was pushed to the forefront as social conservatives and authoritarians increasingly battled it out with typically younger social liberals. As in Britain, voters began to question their traditional allegiances and started to line with parties that reflected their values more than their economic preferences. This meant that the traditional bond between workers and the social democratic left frayed and became much weaker which, in turn, opened up space for the populist right. This helps us make sense, for example, of why nearly 70 per cent of Labour-held seats opted for Brexit or why UKIP had recruited the most working-class electorate in relative terms. It also makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that while support for populist politics might ebb and flow, it is most likely here to stay.

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In their new book Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the EU (2017), Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin and Paul Whiteley draw on data about more than 150,000 voters to analyse the factors and concerns that led people to vote Leave.
The big disruption

The French Presidential Election special

The French political system has just been broken into pieces, like an old piece of furniture which, all of a sudden, just simply collapsed. The election campaign of these last few months ahead of the vote for Emmanuel Macron on 7th May to the presidency of the Republic brought the coup de grace. Since the first election of the head of State on the basis of universal suffrage, in 1965, each ballot has been marked by twists and turns. But this year, more than ever, nothing has happened as planned. The usual trappings of national elections under the Fifth Republic have been turned on their head.

First of all, there was the unprecedented decision of the then-President, Francois Hollande, not to stand again. In many ways this was a logical decision when taking in to account his record levels of unpopularity, his track record in power and deep fractures within his political camp.

The second shock to the system came in the primary elections organised by the two major parties of government to select their candidate. On the right, in November 2016, we saw the unfancied former Prime Minister François Fillon, sweeping aside the favourites, ex-President Nicolas Sarkoy and ex-Prime Minister Alain Juppé. A similar upheaval took place on the socialist side: in January, a virtual unknown, Benoît Hamon, who pushed aside former prime minister Manuel Valls, represented the opposition to Hollande.

In any case, the powerful bipolar mechanism often seen in the presidential election had already been eliminated. It was clear to see quite early on that the traditional match between the Republican right and the Socialists - a feature of the last half century - would be challenged by Marine Le Pen, president...
of the Front National. For many months, the presence of Le Pen in the second round of the presidential election was seen as inevitable. It now presented itself as an experienced political party, bolstered by its repeated success in European and local elections.

But the sudden emergence of Emmanuel Macron upset the election norms even more. In one year, the former deputy secretary general of the Élysée under François Hollande, and short-lived economics minister, had left his post and created his own movement: En Marche! This saw him resign from the government and quickly establish himself as a “modern” and “progressive” candidate, determined to rise above the old rift between left and right and to do what is necessary to reform the country. In some ways, there were echoes here of Tony Blair: “There is no economic policy of the right or the left; there are policies that work and others that do not work.”

So the four-way battle we saw in the first round resulted in the qualification of the two non-conformist candidates - in the “extreme centre” we had Macron (with 24% of the votes), and on the extreme right, Marine Le Pen (on 21.3%). For the traditional parties, a sense of tremendous failure ensued as they surveyed the wreckage.

On the right, this election had been seen as “in the bag” at the start of the year. And yet François Fillon failed at the first hurdle, with 20 per cent of the vote. Many saw his project as simply too “illiberal”; but it was the scandal over his financial affairs which ruined the candidature of a man who claimed to be “not like the other politicians”. The would-be president was accused of putting his wife and children on the parliamentary payroll, with the matter then being followed up by an official government inquiry.

The situation for the socialists was even more catastrophic. Without a firm base in his own party, and poorly prepared for the rigours of a presidential campaign, official candidate Benoît Hamon appeared very quickly to be overtaken by events. Within a few weeks, he had been overtaken and indeed humiliated by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the radical left candidate whose diverse coalition (including what remains of the communists) had a clear determination to break down the socialists. On 23 April, Hamon registered just 6.3 per cent of the votes, the worst score by a socialist since 1969, with his score completely overshadowed by that of Mélenchon (19.5%).

Round Two

The “duel” of the second round therefore saw Macron and Le Pen facing each other. It was won by the En Marché! candidate, who polled 66 per cent of the votes on 7th May.

Two phenomena explain this clear victory. On the one hand, even if the “Republican front” against the extreme right was less vigorous than in the past, it still galvanised a large number of voters on the right and left to vote for Macron - or at least not to vote against him.

Compounding this was the televised debate between the two candidates, on 3rd May. This was devastating for Le Pen. Confused on elements of her manifesto (for example the proposal for “Frexit” which would have led France out of the euro zone) and out-performed by her opponent, she appeared unable to take on the responsibilities of being president.

The televised debate was devastating for Le Pen. Confused on elements of her manifesto, including “Frexit”, and out-performed by her opponent, she appeared unable to take on the responsibilities of being president.
second round of balloting, she lost 6 to 7 points, a spectacular tumble.4

With one-third of the votes, Le Pen did indeed achieve an unprecedented score, almost double that of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in 2002. But this result was very far from her goal [to pass the 40% mark] and even further from the illusion that she could win the election.

Emmanuel Macron has therefore achieved something that very few observers thought was possible. He is now the eighth President of the Fifth Republic. For a young man of 39 years, never previously elected at local or national level, who entered politics barely three years ago and supported by a completely new political movement, it is a remarkable feat. Especially in a country where ascension to the Elysée requires ‘doing your time’.

This success is the result of a carefully thought-out strategy. Macron has taken advantage of the deep desire of the French to renew its political class. Finally, in looking to appeal to the ‘right and left as well as to all ‘progressives’, he has given the French the chance to try a new experience: bringing together a different type of team, and asking them to engage with the economic and social reforms the country needs.

Since his election, we have seen some continued momentum. He has appointed a right-wing figure, Edouard Philippe, as prime minister, and formed a government that brings together leaders from the right and the centre, socialists and environmentalists. This is unprecedented in France since General de Gaulle in 1958. What is more, half of the ministers are from civil society (including a business leader, professor of medicine, university president, association official, elite-level athlete), who are all renowned in their field. This is an enormous challenge in a country that is so unaccustomed to coalition governments and which currently exhibits a pessimistic mood.

Which brings us to the final goal: to obtain, on 11 and 18 June, a majority of deputies to support his actions and implement his proposals. The French political system has turned upside down – the socialists have collapsed, the right is disorientated and divided, the National Front is frustrated by its failure, the radical left is isolated in its opposition and there are numerous rallies in support of the new president. Now that Macron has won the last round, he has turned the page on half a century of French political life. Nobody, except him, could have imagined such an upheaval just a few months ago.

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Macron has taken advantage of the deep desire of the French to renew its political class, and has appealed to the right and left, as well as to all “progressives” to engage with the economic and social reforms the country needs.
Power is shifting—from large, stable armies to loose bands of insurgents, from corporate leviathans to nimble start-ups, from presidential palaces to public squares. It has become harder to wield power and easier to lose it, and the world is becoming less predictable as a result. As people become more prosperous and mobile, they are harder to control and more apt to question authority.

Insurgents, fringe political parties, innovative start-ups, hackers, loosely organized activists, upstart citizen media outlets, leaderless young people in city squares, and charismatic individuals who seem to have “come from nowhere” are shaking up the old order. These are the micropowers: small, unknown, or once-negligible actors who have found ways to undermine, fence in, or thwart the megaplayers. The police forces, television networks, traditional political parties, large banks—the large bureaucratic organizations that previously controlled their fields—are seeing their authority undermined.

In recent months, the ascent of leaders and movements denounced by their rivals as “populist” has given the world the false impression that those leaders offer some kind of distinct ideology. So-called populists do run on platforms that challenge the status quo; it is also true that this can lead them to embrace a wide range of positions on crucial issues. The policies promised by Donald Trump and France’s Marine Le Pen cannot be more different than those adopted by Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, or those promoted by Podemos, Spain’s newest political party. Yet all of these leaders are routinely described as populists. The fact is that populism is not an ideology. Instead, it’s a strategy to obtain and retain power. It has been around for centuries, recently appearing to resurface in full force, propelled by the digital revolution, precarious economies, and the threatening insecurity of what lies ahead.

Even though populist leaders and the countries they rule are vastly different, populism contains the same ingredients everywhere. We can see them in Vladimir Putin’s Russia and Trump’s America, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, Viktor Orban’s Hungary, or Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines. And despite differences in culture, history, political systems, or the economic circumstances of the countries where populism is now being deployed, populist leaders resort to the same tactics. The policies they favor are as varied as their political tactics are similar.

Divide and conquer

The most successful populist leaders are masters at exacerbating socio-cultural division and conflict. They use...
differences in income, race, religion, region, nationality, or any other rift in society to drive a wedge between different groups and foment indignation and political outrage. Populists are not afraid to fuel social conflict—in fact, they thrive on it. An indispensable ingredient of the populist recipe is the “us” that embodies the nation, represented by the populist leader who promises to confront the “them,” who have allegedly harmed “the people.”

The late Hugo Chavez used to denounce the opposition as “squalid,” “traitors to the homeland,” and the “oligarchy.” Italy’s Beppe Grillo, the head of the Five Star Movement, a political party, routinely referred to traditional political and economic elites as “the caste.” Brexiters speak with disdain of “Brussels bureaucrats,” while Donald Trump condemns Washington’s “swamp.” Populists denigrate “the others” not only when they falter, but even when they are successful. They need to feed the forces of political, social, economic, and racial polarization.

**Magnify the nation’s problems**

Exaggerating a given country’s dire situation is an indispensable rhetorical tactic for the populist, whose central message is that everything his predecessors did was bad, corrupt, and unacceptable, and that the country urgently needs drastic changes that only he or she can deliver.

Trump’s reference to “American carnage” in his inaugural address, or his repeated invocations of the weak economy or the foreign-policy mess that he inherited, are good examples, but far from unique. Putin, for example, lamented the break-up of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical disaster” of the 20th century and stressed its horrific effects on the Russian nation. Marine Le Pen and Argentina’s former President Nestor Kirchner also leveled accusations against those who came before them. Claiming the mantle as the only one qualified to undertake the urgent corrections the country needs is a common element in populists’ propaganda.

**Criminalize the opposition**

Populists often treat those who oppose them not as fellow citizens with different views, but as traitors who don’t deserve to be heard or maintain their full political rights.

Consider Venezuela’s Leopoldo Lopez, a charismatic opposition political leader who has been languishing in jail for over three years, or Russia’s Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a businessman whose political ambitions threatened Putin, and who was sent to jail for eight years. Amnesty International considers the detentions of both Lopez and Khodorkovsky to be politically motivated. They are but two examples showing the propensity of populist autocrats to jail their opponents.

In Turkey, Egypt, Malaysia, or South Africa, opposition leaders are known to have been jailed. Even democratic leaders have at times stated their wish to imprison political rivals. One of the most popular mottos at the height of Trump’s campaign was “lock her up”— a
Populism is not an ideology—it’s a strategy to obtain and retain power. It has been around for centuries, recently propelled by the digital revolution, precarious economies, and the threatening insecurity of what lies ahead.

Play up the external threat

“Wag the dog” is not only the title of a movie—one in which the political advisors of a faltering president fabricate a military conflict against a small country to boost his chances of reelection—but a political tactic with a long, disastrous pedigree. Students of international relations and war even have a name for it: “diversionary wars.” For populists, it is not enough to create an internal enemy; they also need foreign enemies. This external threat can be a country—say, China or Mexico—or a group, like immigrants or Muslims. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, for example, has said “migration is not a solution but a problem... not medicine but poison; we don’t need it and won’t swallow it.” Orban actually went so far as to build a wall to keep out immigrants. Putin meanwhile accuses the United States and the West of being behind the “Color Revolutions” that shook Eastern Europe in the early 2000s, and the protests that erupted in the streets of Moscow in 2011. Putin also regularly denounces NATO. And Turkey’s Erdogan routinely accuses the “West” of stirring up trouble.

Insist that the foreign enemy has allies at home

Populists often portray foreign rivals as allies of the domestic opposition. For example, Erdogan has explained away last year’s failed coup attempt by blaming it on Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric living in exile in America who enjoys a vast following in Turkey. According to Erdogan, the US government was also involved in sponsoring the coup.

Glorify the military

The populist extols the military as often as possible, while also launching major weapons-procurement initiatives and boosting defense spending. Trump’s frequent references to military veterans, his commitment to increasing defense spending, and his tough talk on international affairs are nothing new when seen in this light. Other populists around the world have done exactly the same—with Orban’s government vowing to make one of Europe’s “most decisive” armies out of Hungary’s armed forces, and Putin toutting the Russian military as “stronger... than any potential aggressor.”

threat to incarcerate Hillary Clinton.
Discredit the experts

“People in this country have had enough of experts,” Brexit advocate Michael Gove said in response to a report compiled by a group of prestigious economists on the costs Britain could incur by leaving the European Union. For Trump, clear scientific consensus has been irrelevant when it comes to climate change, which he once insisted was a conspiracy invented by China [a claim he later shrugged off as a joke]. He has also advanced the claim that autism is caused by vaccines, despite what the American Academy of Pediatrics has called “a robust body of medical literature” disproving it. Experts, though, are part of the “elite” that populists blame for the people’s problems and whose influence they want to curb.

Delegitimize the media

The disdain populists feel for experts is nothing compared to the distaste they have for journalists. In some countries, this leads to incarcerations, beatings, and even assassinations. Journalists, like scientists, obtain information that can clash with the narrative the populist finds most convenient. When this happens, there is no better solution than to disqualify the messenger. While in the United States, Trump routinely accuses the media of disseminating “fake news,” in Ecuador, President Rafael Correa refers to critical media as “ink hitmen.”

The essence of the populist recipe is to undermine the checks and balances that limit populists’ power and hold them accountable. The common wisdom used to be that populists tended to succeed in countries where institutions were too weak to contain them, or where citizens believed that “all politicians were the same” and nothing could be worse than what they had. But the success of populist politicians in some European countries and the United States shows that even mature democracies are no guarantee against populism.

The rise of Trump in a changing America

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Emily Ekins

The rise of Trump in a changing America

The United States has experienced a sharp increase in immigration in recent decades, approaching its historic highs from over 100 years ago. US Census data reports that between 13-14% of the population is foreign born. The political class has been looking for a silver bullet to solve what appears to have become an unsolvable puzzle—what’s behind the surprising rise of Donald Trump? Explanations have tended toward the condescending with theories of authoritarianism, collective narcissism, racism, populism, nativism, and economic anxieties as motivators of support. New empirical research finds, however, that complex attitudes toward immigration, with unclear underlying motivations, are what made the 2016 election distinctive.

To understand the rise of Trump, one must look to the voters who were pivotal in catapulting him to the presidency: 1) His early core primary supporters, a minority of Republican voters and general election voters who switched from voting for Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016. Without these voters, Trump would not be in the White House today. Concerns about immigration, in all their complexity, are what make these pivotal voters unique.

Data on Trump’s core primary supporters reveal a distinctive edge compared to traditional Republicans. Surveys have found that Trump’s base is about 20 to 30 points more likely than other Republican voters to favor restricting legal immigration “across the board,” building a border wall, deporting unauthorized immigrants residing in the US, and temporarily banning Muslim immigrants. When it comes to their values, they tend to care more about social cohesion and being loyal to a community and less about being compassionate.

Next, data on “party switchers,” or voters who voted for Obama in 2012 and Trump in 2016, again point to immigration attitudes being paramount. A Democracy Fund Voter Report finds both sets of party switchers largely differed from their party’s candidate’s attitudes toward immigrants. For instance, 64% of Obama-to-Trump voters want to make it harder to legally immigrate to the US, compared to 25% of Obama-to-Clinton voters. Romney-to-Clinton voters hold immigration views closer to Clinton voters than Trump voters. Furthermore, statistical models find that support for restricting immigration and opposition to providing citizenship to unauthorized immigrants were most predictive of being an Obama voter who later cast a ballot for Trump.

Why immigration? Why now?

The United States has experienced a sharp increase in immigration in recent decades, approaching its historic highs from over 100 years ago. US Census data reports that between 13-14%
The US had practically open borders in the 19th century, which Congress sought to halt in the 1920s with strict immigration restrictions. For the next 50 years, Americans were far less likely to know and interact with immigrants. Times have changed, and legal and illegal immigration flows have brought the US foreign-born population back to where it was at its historic height in 1890.

Americans’ feelings about immigration are complex, and thus reactions to immigration and demographic change have not been monolithic. Research from the forthcoming Democracy Fund Voter Report suggests that several different reasons may motivate immigration concerns.

Immigration offers immense benefits—benefits that outweigh the costs. But there are costs. Change is hard. Different cultures with different traditions, holidays, language, and social norms can be difficult to first understand and then become accustomed to. For those particularly attuned to social cohesion and community, especially Trump’s core constituency, immigration presents new challenges. These voters are worried that immigrants may not assimilate into American society. For instance, core Trump supporters are 20 points more likely than other Republicans to be bothered “a lot” by immigrants who don’t speak English.17

Economic pessimism and fears over competition for jobs further compound these immigration concerns, particularly among Trump’s early core supporters. The Democracy Fund Voter Report finds that financially hard-pressed voters in 2011 were significantly more likely in 2016 to say legal immigration should be further restricted. Why? Perhaps because, as the report finds, Trump’s core supporters feel a lack of personal agency and feel like they are living in a zero-sum world.

In addition to these, there are certainly other factors driving concerns over immigration, including security fears, fairness concerns, as well as blatant ethno-nationalism.

Political elites have long avoided talking about the potential costs of immigration—and for understandable reasons too. Many fear the risk that acknowledging potential costs might magnify them. However, ignoring the feelings and fears that many Americans have allowed such feelings to fester unchecked and untested. By failing to address these concerns productively, a golden-haired billionaire came along and blew the lid off the frustration without sophistication or nuance—and often
Financially hard-pressed voters in 2011 were significantly more likely in 2016 to say legal immigration should be further restricted. Why? Trump’s core supporters feel a lack of personal agency and feel like they are living in a zero-sum world.

Political elites have long avoided talking about the potential costs of immigration—and for understandable reasons too. Many fear the risk that acknowledging potential costs might magnify them.
Betting on humanity – Is democracy the ghost in the machine of our digital age?

Democracy is a bet that humanity takes on itself, and the stakes are rising like never before. In an earlier age, the political discourse emphasized a restrained and formal practice of democracy; the process was governed by a tight set of protocols and rules, and was presided over with a comprehensive system of checks and balances. Politics was a formally enacted costume drama, as was the case with the judiciary - and it came bound with the fabric of propriety and justice.

But there has been a sea change in the culture of politics as it is practiced on the ground. And India is no exception. Elements of it have grown a little murkier. The interests of each have intertwined, and politics has become an entrenched system that is highly resistant to challenge. The language of politics too has coarsened significantly, and the age of anger has resulted in political choices that, only a few years ago, would seem implausible. Social media has deepened democratic participation by giving voice to the millions who before could only listen. It is estimated that Indian social media users will reach 283m by 2018. But arguably, this method of interaction has also enabled a shallower political discourse.

There is impatience with conventional politics in general, and the anger against an inept regime in part fueled by the rise of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India. Modi is a gifted communicator, and his ability to combine fear and hope and speak to both anger and aspiration has propelled him to power and popularity. His core constituency imagines itself as the cultural mainstream that was rendered illegitimate in a previous era, and now seeks to assert itself. The rise of casual majoritarianism, where the interests of the dominant social groups are conflated with those of the nation is in evidence, leading to sharper polarization in the public discourse.

There is a comforting if untested notion that all this a part of an evolutionary process, and that things will improve with time. The digital world is new, and as of now, a wild unregulated space without adequate safeguards and requisite social conventions, including a reward and punishment system. It can be argued that this will inevitably become more rule-bound as we discover the costs of our freedoms, and some of the rabid behaviour on display will be tempered. The rise of ‘populist’ leaders who feed on anxiety and create divisions have existed before, but history tells us that these are almost always transient phases, a periodic itch that societies scratch furiously, but briefly.

The question is - left to ourselves, will democracies move towards greater individual freedoms and away from divisions based on religion, race and ethnicity? As the hold of the elite weakens, does the politics of democracy become a purer version of itself or does it degrade to its baser side? This is a very big bet to make. Is the emergence of a more populist and strident form of leadership a pointer to our destination, or is it part of our learning curve?

There is enough reason to be pessimistic. Structurally, media (which determines how we see the world by making it visible to us in a particular way) is geared to heighten polarities. Social media resembles an arena where warring tribes engage in relentless hostilities, with escalating rancor. The state is increasingly intolerant when it comes to dissent -
surveillance and pre-emptive action is on the rise in India\textsuperscript{20} and worldwide. Media, the market and politics are all pointing in the same direction. Each increasingly privileges the desires of people and caters uncritically to these. The big ideas that defined democracies—equality, justice, freedom of expression are all under attack—not from non-democratic forces but from the instruments and processes that are highly democratic.

The effect of media can be imagined in another way too. Theorist Tom Pettit coins the term ‘Gutenberg Parenthesis’ to describe the last 500 years—from the invention of the Gutenberg printing press up until the advent of the Internet.\textsuperscript{21} He argues that the internet represents a return to a more oral consciousness. The authority of the printed word, represented at its pinnacle in the form of the book, is eroding as more oral codes of communication are gaining dominance. We are “going forward to the past” in terms of media and its impact on society. While Pettit sees this as an overthrow of the tyranny of structure as imposed by formalized ideas of knowledge, his formulation could be used to imagine other possibilities.

The era of print made knowledge more easily accessible and freely circulated. It helped shape a common currency of ideas and propelled liberal thought. The coming of television, and now the internet, has meant that we have returned, in some form, to our oral roots.

Left to ourselves, will democracies move towards greater individual freedoms and away from divisions based on religion, race and ethnicity? Does the politics of democracy become a purer version of itself or does it degrade to its baser side?
At its most basic level, the era of print made knowledge more easily accessible and freely circulated. It helped shape a common currency of ideas, some of which were privileged as shared ideals that society must aspire to. The culture fostered by the print world emphasized rationality and logic. It also alienated human beings from the world that they lived in, but this detachment helped foster many of the ideals that have propelled liberal thought. The coming of television, and now the internet, has meant that we have returned in some form to our oral roots.

If we were to accept this axis of analysis, then it could be argued that liberalism and the idea of modernity that drives it is not an inevitable progression based on the human instinct for freedom, but a development contingent on what the dominant media form of the time is.

To reduce complex social and political phenomena to a single variable is rarely meaningful or useful, but in this case, it poses a question that is both provocative and plausible. The question in effect is whether progressive liberal ideals were an accident of media; an interruption that is now petering out. Recent events of the world might not be part of a cycle, but be indicative of a longer term shift towards a more tribal consciousness. It is too soon to imagine what kind of changes lie in store, for the codes of a digitally powered society are still in the process of being formed. But liberalism as we know it might not merely be under attack, but might possibly not survive the changes that we are seeing. The ideals that democracies take for granted might be up for negotiation, not merely for now but for good. It is not a comforting thought, which is why it is worth thinking about.

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Social media has deepened democratic participation by giving voice to the millions who before could only listen. It is estimated that Indian social media users will reach 283m by 2018.
The death of Latin American populism?

Structural vs opportunistic populism

Almost a generation after the downfall of Communism, a new specter is haunting Europe, and also the Americas: the specter of populism, which is likely to become, in our epoch, the chief anti-liberal alternative to open markets and republican democracy.

Almost everywhere in Western and Central Europe, parties characterized as “populist” are appearing or increasing dramatically their electoral share, and kindred parties govern in Hungary and Poland. In the US, a leader with a populist ideology has captured the nomination of a mainstream party and won the presidential election.

Yet in Latin America, populism seems to have receded in the recent past. Argentina elected the centre-right candidate, Mauricio Macri. In Venezuela, the opposition dealt a blow to the government of President Nicolas Maduro, the disciple of former President Hugo Chavez, in the 2015 elections. And in 2016, one million Brazilians marched to oust Dilma Rousseff and leftist leaders. However, I argue that the conditions that generate and nourish populism in Latin America and across the world means that it is likely to recur.

In everyday language, the term is used to characterize politicians who appeal to “the people”, especially the workers and the poor. For Latin American specialists, populism describes specific regimes in that region in the second half of the past century (especially those of Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil) and in the beginning of the current one (Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, Cristina Kirchner in Argentina).

More recently, movements and parties in Europe, mostly on the Right but some on the Left, such as the National Front in France, Podemos in Spain, UKIP in Britain, Five Star Movement in Italy,
Fidesz in Hungary, and Law and Justice in Poland, have also been called “populist.” Does it make sense to use the same label for such a disparate array of parties and governments, and in societies whose institutions and culture are so different? It does because there is a common core in the policy agenda or ideology of these movements and parties. This is why the concept has some validity, at least as a heuristic tool. The populist ideological package, Right and Left, South and North, includes two common components:

1) A plebiscitarian conception of democracy, according to which it is the incumbent of the Executive who primarily embodies the popular will. For populists, separation of powers, a basic principle of the liberal conception of government, is a hindrance to this popular will. Therefore, the other branches of government, the Congress and the Judiciary, should submit to the Executive’s objectives or policies, basically legitimating them. Of course, the realization of this project would imply a high level of concentration of power, and ultimately the establishment of an elective authoritarian regime.

2) An anti-globalization stance: The world economy is seen as a threat, rather than an opportunity. Populists espouse high tariff barriers and other forms of protectionism, incompatible with membership in the WTO, the European Union, or NAFTA. These policies, if implemented in full, would lead to neo-mercantilist forms of state capitalism that promotes exports and limits imports.

There are variations but broadly, this package is shared by all these populist parties and regimes, North and South, Right and Left.

However, there are important differences among these types. Northern populism [the US and Europe], both on the Right and the Left, is a movement of social defense: it purports to protect the interests of factory workers and other segments of the working class that are perceived to be threatened by international trade and economic globalization.

The goal of southern populism (Latin America), on the other hand, is social inclusion. Its declared aim is to incorporate into the polity excluded or marginal sectors of society – in the mid-20th century, these would have been the ‘laborers’, today they are the urban poor.

The distinction between Left and Right, on the other hand, has to do with immigration and Islam. Right-wing populism, in Western Europe and the US, is strongly opposed to mass immigration, particularly from Islamic countries, and it views the West as engaged in a civilizational conflict with Islam. Populist rightists claim to defend not only workers’ standard of living, but also the nation’s culture, allegedly threatened by the arrival of outsiders whose values are supposedly incompatible with those of the West. These aspects are largely absent in Left-wing populism, both in the North and the South.

We are witnessing a reconfiguration of the party system in the West, based on the emergence of a new central cleavage. Marine Le Pen has stated, during the recent electoral campaign, that the main conflict in France is the one between “patriots” and “globalists”, i.e. between economic and cultural nationalists and economic and political liberals. She is quite right, as the recent elections in several countries in Europe, the US, and Latin America indicate.

Populism is a reaction to the effects of the technological revolution and the intensification of globalization; growing economic inequality, the decline of employment in manufacturing and the weakening of trade unions. The overall outcome is that political climates conducive
Populist rightists claim to defend not only workers’ standard of living, but also the nation’s culture, allegedly threatened by the arrival of outsiders. These aspects are largely absent in Left-wing populism.

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At the beginning of March, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) produced an advertisement in which the party’s leader, Bill Shorten, stood among a dozen or so white people against a white background and promised, “A Shorten Labor Government will build Australian first, buy Australian first and employ Australians first”.

The ad not only echoed the tone and sentiment of Australia’s largest right-wing populist party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, it actually harnessed the name of an even more radical fringe group, the Australia First Party. The ad was targeted at a handful of seats in Queensland in which support for One Nation is threatening the National Party.

The National Party is in long-term coalition with the conservative Liberal Party, and should it lose those Queensland seats in the next federal election, the Coalition could lose government. With its nationalistic ad, one replete with racial overtones, the ALP sought to inoculate itself from losses to One Nation and to exacerbate the Coalition’s woes.

It was a clumsy move though. One Nation might be popular among working class voters in Queensland, but targeting advertising is difficult these days. The ad spread virally via social media and the response to it was scathing, particularly in inner-city seats in which the Labor Party is now threatened from the left by The Greens.

“You’re a disgrace @billshortenmp. You should apologize and resign for this racist bulls**t. Disgusting” tweeted one refugee advocate in a not untypical response. The key senate crossbencher Derryn Hinch told ABC radio, “It could be an ad for the Ku Klux Klan.”

Soon Shorten was back-peddling. “I’m not in the business of making television ads,” he blustered to Australian Associated Press. He apologised and the ad was withdrawn, but not before it revealed much about the power of right
Pauline Hanson has long been the champion of right wing populism in modern Australian politics. She rose to prominence during the 1996 federal election when she was dis-endorsed by the Liberal Party for comments she made about indigenous Australians, and to infamy when she was elected and voiced her fear that Australia was at risk of being “swamped by Asians” during her first speech to parliament.25

Hanson’s party dissolved over the coming years as she faced legal battles over election expenses but returned to prominence in 2016. Hanson celebrated the success of the Brexit campaign and the rise of Donald Trump, as major parties feared that the wave of populism that has been shifting mainstream politics around the world would alter the Australian landscape.

One Nation won 4.3 percent of the primary vote in July 2016, and 9.2 per cent in her home state of Queensland. Hanson and three other One Nation candidates were elected, giving them the balance of power.

As the Western Australia state election approached in March this year, analysts believed that Hanson’s party might take a handful of lower house seats, but the chaos that has always attended her organisation crippled her campaign.

Some candidates quit while others were revealed to hold longstanding views that rendered them unelectable, even on the fringes of political thought. One wanted to see a separate white South African state, another offered cures for cancer and homosexuality, and a third fretted about gays using Nazi mind-control techniques in their campaign for marriage equality.

In the end, One Nation secured just three upper house seats and none in the lower house. The result was panned across the nation as a fiasco and many commentators began to speculate the rise of the populist right in Australia had been blunted.

However, Phil Dorling, from the progressive think tank, The Australia Institute, believes it is too soon to write off the movement. He argues that the WA result was in fact a considerable victory for One Nation. In the paper, entitled One Nation in Western Australia: Epic fail or huge win?, Dorling writes that many commentators failed to note that One Nation had run candidates in only around half the state’s seats, so its vote has been underplayed proportionally.26

Compared with One Nation’s result in the 2016 federal election, the party has effectively doubled its vote in just seven months. “Doubling of support and the election of three new parliamentary representatives [compared with zero representation previously] can hardly be described as a ‘disaster’ or an ‘epic fail’.”

“One Nation now has four parliamentary offices in Western Australia (one senator’s office and three legislative councillors’ offices) with staff, administrative resources and travel entitlements. As a consequence, One Nation in Western Australia will be much better placed to campaign in the next federal election.”

Dorling expects the party to perform well during its next electoral test in its home state of Queensland.

It is impossible to imagine that the Labor Party - whose former leaders Paul Keating and Bob Hawke famously led Australia’s integration into the global economy - would have considered such an effort unless One Nation had put parts of Queensland into political play.
That impact on policy is already being felt, and this brings us back to that disastrous ALP ad.

The government is stepping in to protect jobs in South Australia with a $50 billion effort to build submarines domestically. Also, it has moved to cut back on a controversial working visa scheme and has toughened up controversial citizenship tests in line with One Nation policy.

Furthermore, it can be argued that the government has acquiesced to the right by watering down the racial discrimination laws,27 and maintaining its opposition to gay marriage, it commonly blames the high cost of housing in Australian capital cities on foreign investment rather than domestic tax breaks.

Meanwhile, as the hint of chaos continues to play about One Nation, other groups are forming, ready to siphon Hanson's support should the party collapse. Senator Corey Bernardi abandoned the Liberal Party to form the Australian Conservatives. So far it has secured defections from the religious right party Family First and the anti-Islam group Australian Liberty Alliance.

The populist right in Australia remains fragmented and poorly-led. Hanson is the closest thing it has to a figurehead, and while she retains the authenticity politicians crave, she has never demonstrated the political effectiveness of, say, Marine Le Pen.

There are other factors that so far seem to be holding the rise of the right in check. Australia, like New Zealand, was spared the worst of the financial devastation that swept the world in 2008. And its two major parties remain relatively stable. (People forget that Trump won because he took over the Republican Party, Australian parties are less vulnerable to that sort of hijacking.)

But from the fringes, the populist right has already helped shape the policies and messaging of Australia's two major parties.

Hanson knows this too. “Good to see the PM is finally acting on the suggestions I made to him about the citizenship test,” she tweeted merrily after Turnbull announced his changes.

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NEW ZEALAND

The rise and stall of populism?

Why New Zealand politics is business as usual

When surveying the results of the UK referendum and the US election, New Zealand’s incumbent National government of nearly nine years must be nervously wondering if its time is up. The anti-establishment vote is on the rise. Yet, the centre right National Party appears to be on course for a rare fourth term. Has the new state of global flux robbed the electorate of their appetite for risk?

The centre right National Party appears to be on course for a rare fourth term. Has the new state of global flux robbed the electorate of their appetite for risk?

National’s support. On the contrary, it could start working in its favour by satisfying the mood for change without a change of Government.

National’s new leader, former finance minister Bill English, has already replaced Key as the preferred prime minister. English, a former Southland farmer and Treasury man, is a second-time leader who led the party to its worst ever defeat in 2002. Nevertheless, as Finance minister he got the books back in the black, steered the country’s finances through earthquakes and the global financial crisis and is seen by voters as a safe pair of hands.

That could be the most potent message in an election overshadowed by a new world order of uncertainty and the rise of protectionism, which threaten exporters and jobs in an island...
nation dependent on trade. Despite nearly nine years in power, National and English still have political capital in the bank. They turned a decade of deficits into a streak of uninterrupted economic growth, a feat that is almost unique among Western nations. Their focus on reducing national debt has also played well to a risk averse electorate.

In spite of this, much of the growth has been fuelled by record immigration levels – something that is perceived negatively in the post-Brexit and Trump era. A weakening economy across the Tasman in Australia means that expats are returning too. This in turn has put pressure on housing, particularly in New Zealand’s biggest city, Auckland. In 2017, it ranks as having the 4th least affordable housing market in the world. Furthermore, in 2012, the New Zealand government launched the widely celebrated Better Public Services reform agenda in 2012, but the infrastructure has yet to keep up with the rapid pace of growth.

This situation has put wind under the wings of populist leader Winston Peters, who has stood on an anti-immigration platform at successive elections, arguing that wealthy foreigners are crowding out young first home buyers. Peters, who leads the fourth largest party in Parliament, is polling in double digits, putting him in the likely position of kingmaker on election night.

He has refused to say which party he favours doing a deal with in the past, and holds a long standing grudge against National since 2008, when Key ruled out NZ First as a coalition partner. Now that Key has resigned, most commentators are putting money on Peters giving National the numbers to govern after the September 23rd election.

Yet he remains an unlikely lightning rod for the anti-establishment - as a former Treasurer and Foreign minister and member of two former coalition governments, his is one of the most recognisable faces in New Zealand politics. Still, the vote is more likely to go to the Green Party, the third largest party in Parliament which is currently level pegging with NZ First on most polls. Labour would likely need both the Greens and NZ First to stitch together a coalition post-election but the two parties are diametrically opposed on key issues including immigration.

The emergence of a party, The Opportunities Party, was another attempt to tap into the populist movement, but has so far failed to get traction. Led by eccentric economist Gareth Morgan, it has launched a series of populist and high profile policies but did poorly in its first electoral outing, a by-election campaign.

It can be argued that New Zealand has been immunised against the current ‘disruptions’ taking place in political systems across the world. This is because it has been down this road before. The 1980s and 1990s were a time of major economic reforms that caused mass layoffs and the decimation of heavily subsidised industries. Also, in 1996, MMP (Mixed Member Proportional voting) replaced First Past the Post as the electoral system.

The proposal was a response to waning public trust in their politicians and stopped the two main parties from dominating at the exclusion of others. It can be argued that the MMP system has operated as an electoral safety valve ever since. Still, after a year of political earthquakes, no one is ruling out any shock results.

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