Beyond populism

2.3.

David Goodhart

that divide Britain

How the EU referendum

12. BRITAIN

Cas Mudde

Daniel Cameron & Clifford Young

08. EUROPE

Europe’s populism problem

20. WORLD

How to be a populist

22. FRANCE

The big disruption

24. USA

The rise of Trump in a changing America

27. INDIA

Betting on humanity

30. LATIN AMERICA

The death of Latin American populism?

33. AUSTRALIA

Hints of chaos

36. NEW ZEALAND

The rise and stall of populism?

The views and opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the position of Ipsos.
Beyond populism

The rise of populism has become a global obsession in the last year, driven by the major upsets in Brexit and Donald Trump’s Presidential election victory, but with echoes in many other countries throughout the world. Of course, populism itself is nothing new; as the articles in this edition make clear, there have been many ‘populist’ movements of varying levels of success and political persuasions over recent decades, particularly in Latin America and, more recently, in western democracies in Europe, the US and Australasia.

Understanding the current wave of populism in its many forms is a crucial lens to help us grasp what is going around the world. But the obvious differences between the movements in different countries demonstrate that what is often called populism is not the single coherent ideology people might believe. Unpacking what we mean by populism – and how governments and others should respond – is far from straightforward.

One thing is clear. There is a very strong sense that regular people feel they are being left behind by establishment and political elites that don’t understand or care about them. As Cas Mudde describes later in this edition, the idea of “the people” vs. “the elite” is perhaps the core theme that runs throughout populist movements. This comes through incredibly strongly in our global research.

It is the majority view in every single country in the study that the economy is rigged to the advantage of the rich and powerful. This is even the case in Sweden, which typically feels more at ease with itself. It is most extreme in Mexico, where 94% think the economic system is rigged, but Spain and Italy come next in the list. These two western European democracies have over 80% of their populations who think the economic system is rigged against them. If people think the economic system is rigged against them, governments don’t fare much better, with half or more in every country agreeing that their government doesn’t prioritise the concerns of people like them.

This view that an elite has stacked the cards in their favour is one we see across different parts of the world, even where they have very different social and political histories.

This mood can be summed up as ‘the system is broken’ – people feeling that traditional political actors don’t care about people like them, that experts don’t understand their lives, and that their economy is rigged. However, the local conditions associated with this unhappiness are often varied, as this edition makes clear.

As Figure 2 shows, in several continental European countries such as France, Italy and Hungary, there is a strong sense of political dissatisfaction, which is also associated with high levels of ‘nativist’ sentiment – a belief, for example, that immigrants take jobs and important social services away from locally born nationals. As Emily Rixs and Matthew Goodwin point out in this journal, this kind of nativist sentiment, exemplified by attitudes to immigration, emerges as perhaps the most important factor in the rise of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote.

However, some other countries with equally high levels of belief that “the system is broken” have much lower ‘nativist’ sentiment – such as the LATAM countries of Mexico and Peru, and also in South Korea.

So what are we to make of all this? Is populism a helpful lens or not? In 2015, before Trump and Brexit, Mark Zuckerberg’s first pick for his new book club was The End of Power: from Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in ‘Charge’ Is Not What It Used to Be by Moisés Naim. Its hypothesis is outlined in more detail in an article by the author in this edition: that power is now easier to get, harder to use and easier to lose. In many ways, this is a good thing. There is a lesser chance of dictators and despots, as people can’t hold on to power for as long, or as deeply as they used to emerge, as perhaps the most important factor in the rise of Donald Trump and the Brexit vote.

This description of less concentration of power among the few seems at odds with other ‘big idea’ books of recent years, including Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century, which outlines the incredible concentration of wealth and economic power at the top of most societies over the last 40 years, a theme echoed in David Goodhart’s distinction between “Somewhere” and “Anywhere” people. But these ideas can be reconciled. Power can become less stable, more fleeting, but still be concentrated, and in some ways more dangerous. As Naim says, the loss of ‘superpowers’ of global authority could mean greater instability.

The combination of these conditions – less stable control of power but growing inequality and alienation – make the darker side of Naim’s thesis, possible paralysis of power or anarchy – in effect, fragmentation – more likely and important to understand.

Our data suggests that while discontent may be common, the factors behind it are many and varied, and several are long-standing and mainstream currents of perception, rather than the sudden change implied by the latest media catchphrase. But that doesn’t mean public opinion should be ignored, just that it can’t be easily packaged into a single soundbite. So what does our data show? To start with the good news, most people still believe in democracy (72% on average), and in 18 out of the 22 countries at least two in three think it’s the ideal form of government (although, less than half in Russia). But that may be as far as the good news goes, as it’s clear that many in many countries are feeling let down by the current system.

**Figure ONE.**

Around the world, people agree that ‘our government does not prioritise the concerns of people like me’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Africa</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S Korea</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GB</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While discontent may be common, the factors behind it are many and varied, and several are long-standing and mainstream currents of perception, rather than the sudden change implied by the latest media catchphrase. This has been shown to be one of the best predictors of support for Brexit. 

- Economic insecurity: Compared with their parents, 54% think they are less likely to have a secure job, and 53% that they are less likely to have a comfortable retirement.

- Fear about the world: 

  - 64% think they are less safe from crime than their parents.
  - 57% think the world is becoming a more dangerous place, and this is higher than 2014.
  - 58% want a strong leader and 47% on average think a revolution is needed.
  - 59% don’t identify with what their country has become, and 50% wish their country would go back to the way it used to be (and rising in countries like France, Belgium, Brazil, India, Germany and Sweden).
  - 82% think the world is becoming a more dangerous place, and this is higher than 2014.
  - 61% support the death penalty – which has been shown to be one of the best predictors of support for Brexit. 

- Anti-immigration feeling: 

  - 54% of adults across 23 countries, online, October 21 – November 4 2016, data is weighted.

Let’s take some common attitudes that are associated with support for so-called ‘populist’ movements and see how they are doing:

- Anti-immigration feeling: 55% on average think there are too many immigrants in their country, and 64% feel that public attitudes are hardening.
- Feeling that your concerns are being ignored: 71% on average agree their government doesn’t prioritise them.
- Feeling instead that the economy is rigged in favour of the rich and powerful: 73% agree.
- Want a strong leader to replace the elected government, and even a revolution: 58% want a strong leader and 47% on average think a revolution is needed.
- Feeling left behind by changes in society: 59% don’t identify with what their country has become, and 50% wish their country would go back to the way it used to be (and rising in countries like France, Belgium, Brazil, India, Germany and Sweden).
- Fear about the world: 82% think the world is becoming a more dangerous place, and this is higher than 2014.
- 57% think they are less safe from crime than their parents.
- Latent authoritarianism: On average, 61% support the death penalty – which has been shown to be one of the best predictors of support for Brexit. [Although to be fair we should point towards majority support for women’s and gay rights too]
- Economic insecurity: Compared with their parents, 54% think they are less likely to have a secure job, and 53% that they are less likely to have a comfortable retirement.

So there is strong evidence of discontent around the world, but as the list above highlights, it’s not easy to boil that down to a single cause. And, unfortunately, there is no simple answer for what governments should do about it either.

But in all this, we need to bear in mind the positive potential of disruption if it gets us to a more even distribution of power. Already there has been a sea-change in politics away from ignoring or even trying to silence the economic and cultural concerns of the ‘left behinds’. This really is as much about culture as economics: we can predict a lot about people’s overall outlook and mindset simply from knowing their views on the death penalty, whether they think human rights protect the criminal rather than the victim, and whether they believe political correctness really has ‘gone mad’.

David Goodhart describes in a British context, these are the “Somewheres” who tend to be more rooted, less well educated, value group attachments, familiarity and security. By contrast, the “Anywheres” tend to be educated and mobile, they value autonomy, openness and fluidity.

We’re a long way from reconciling these concerns within existing political and economic systems. And as Santosh Desai argues in his article, the “bubbles” we create for ourselves on social media tend to reinforce a more tribal form of identity, which could make reconciling these concerns more challenging rather than less.

So how should governments and business respond to this more dangerous context? The political context looks very unstable, with talk of a “super-cycle of disruption”. It’s hard to tell when you’re in the middle of such a cycle, and we’d be more circumspect about declaring that’s what’s happening quite yet. The articles in this edition raise all sorts of possibilities in different contexts: that the disruption we’ve seen is revealing underlying tensions that have been building for years; that this is a passing phase, that other countries have been through and drawn back from; or that the (sometimes uneasy but fairly stable) liberal consensus of the post-war period was the unusual phase, and we may now be revealing our true colours of entrenched tribalism.

In some commentary, populism can mean nearly anything, and therefore almost nothing. But as Haim argues later, it should be seen more as a political strategy than a coherent ideology: in those narrower terms, there are clearly unifying populist themes. But we think there is also value in looking beyond this too, to the underlying attitudes and beliefs that drive its success – and failure. Looking beyond populism, to the people themselves, will tell us much more about how government and politics need to respond.

Daniel Cameron is a Research Director at Ipsos MORI Social Research Institute.

Clifford Young is President of Ipsos Public Affairs, US.
Europe’s populism problem

Cas Mudde

We have to talk about the p-word. It is truly everywhere these days. You can’t read an article about politics these days without it. Virtually any election or referendum is set up as a struggle between an emboldened populism and an embattled establishment. There is no room for anything else.

Don’t get me wrong, populism is a useful concept with which we can understand contemporary politics in Europe, and far beyond, but only under two strict conditions. First, it must be clearly defined and, second, it should be applied as one of several concepts to understand politics. Unfortunately, this is not the case in most accounts of politics and populism today. The dominance of the populism lens means that we see both too much (populism) and too little (non-populism).

Populism is used in many different ways, mostly devoid of any clear definition, instead broadly referring to non-traditional politics, such as promising everything to everyone or speaking in a folksy way. Neither is specific to populism, and they are both in fact rather widespread in political campaigning more generally. Instead, populism is best defined as an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”, and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.

Populism is both monist and moralist. Populists believe that all people share the same interests and values and that the key distinction between the people and the elite is moral, i.e. “pure” versus “corrupt”. They present politics as a struggle of all against one, one against all, which, ironically, is confirmed by the dominant media narrative of an emboldened populism versus an embattled establishment.

There is no doubt that populism is an important aspect of contemporary politics: populist parties are represented in most European parliaments and populist presidents and prime ministers rule in both European and American countries. But most of these parties and politicians are not just populists; they combine populism with other ideological features. Left populists combine populism with some form of socialism – think of Syriza in Greece or Chavismo in Venezuela – while right populists primarily combine it with authoritarianism and nativism – like Donald Trump in the US or Geert Wilders in the Netherlands.

Before the rise of left populism, right populists would be discussed as “radical right” rather than “populists”, while a combination of the two – populist radical right (or, if you wish, radical right populism) – is most appropriate. This is not just an academic matter, however. Because the media perceive the contemporary challenge to liberal democracy exclusively in terms of populism, they focus predominantly on anti-establishment sentiments by political outsiders. Hence, the media was quick to celebrate the alleged “defeat of populism” after the Dutch elections, because populist outsider Geert Wilders gained much fewer seats than
establishment premier Mark Rutte. What was missed, however, was that both premier Rutte and Christian Democratic leader Sybrand Buma conducted an increasingly authoritarian and nativist campaign. Both presented themselves as defenders of “Dutch values”, including “Christian” Easter eggs and the tradition of Black Pete. They were allegedly under threat from Islam and Muslims, assisted by secular, left-wing fellow travelers.

But whereas most media saw too little in the Dutch elections, they saw too much in the British EU referendum and the US presidential elections. Both are now routinely hailed as populist victories, which is an exaggeration at best and a falsehood at worst. While the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) played an important role in pushing the Leave camp over the 50-percent mark, the push for Brexit was always predominantly a Conservative endeavor. Hence, many Brits didn’t vote against some kind of “corrupt elite”, be it British or European, but rather for re-establishing national sovereignty, as they perceive it, in line with a significant part of the Tory elite.

Similarly, despite all the hype, the 2016 US election was, first and foremost, just another presidential election, in which Republicans voted Republican and Democrats voted Democrat. It might be true that populism motivated some angry white working class men in the “American Heartland” to turn out, which might have swung these states and thereby the whole election, but they constituted at best a tiny minority of the Republican electorate. The vast majority of people who vote for Trump did so for traditional Republican reasons like abortion, immigration, taxes, and, most notably, partisanship.

In short, it is time to put the populism frame back in its correct place. Yes, populism is an important feature of contemporary politics, but not all anti-establishment politics is populism, and populist parties are not just about populism. In fact, to accurately understand politicians like Trump and Wilders, and the challenge they pose to liberal democracy, authoritarianism and nativism are at least as important as populism, if not more. Moreover, while established politicians mainly adopt populism in their campaign rhetoric, authoritarianism and nativism is actually implemented in their policies, as we can see in recent responses to the refugee crisis and (Jihadist) terrorism. If we want to truly understand contemporary politics, and protect liberal democracy, it is time we focus on all aspects of the populist radical right challenge, including from inside the political establishment, not just on the populism of the outsiders.

Cas Mudde is associate professor in the School of Public and International Affairs (SPIA) at the University of Georgia in the US and researcher at the Center for Research on Extremism at the University of Oslo.

Populism considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.
Politics in Britain and other rich democracies has become less stable in recent years—consider Brexit, Trump, the rise of populist parties and the surprise 2017 election result—because of a growing value divide between what I call the people from Anywhere and the people from Somewhere. Anywheres tend to be educated and mobile, they value autonomy, openness and fluidity. They have “achieved identities” based on educational and career success that makes them comfortable, well, anywhere. Somewheres tend to be rooted, less well educated, value group attachments, familiarity and security. They have “ascripted identities” based on place and group belonging and can therefore be more easily comforted by change.

Forty years ago, British common sense was Somewhere common sense. Over the past generation or two it has become Anywhere common sense. We Anywheres are mainly graduates and affluent. We are less than 25 per cent of the population, while Somewheres are closer to half, but we dominate politics and society regardless of the party in power.

For example, the “knowledge economy” that has emerged in recent years works well for the highly educated while an hour-glass labour market has wiped out many of the middling jobs that used to give Somewheres status. In post-school education we massively expanded higher education, a world that Anywhere children flourish in, but allowed the technical training and apprenticeships that benefited so many Somewheres to decline.

We created a much more open economy and encouraged mass immigration while ignoring or labelling xenophobic the discomfort felt over rapid ethnic changes across the country. And an anti-domesticity family policy has been driven by the assumption that men and women are not only equal but have the same priority of putting paid work first while the conventional family continues to decline.

We Anywheres care about the world but can be blinded by self-regard. We have run things in our own interests and called it the national interest. Take EU freedom of movement: if you are a lawyer, you can go and work in Berlin for a couple of years and don’t have to compete at home with minimum wage east Europeans, but if you work in a food factory in the north of England, you

Most certainly do. Food manufacturing in Britain now employs about 400,000 people and around 120,000 come from central and eastern Europe.1 This value divide has always been with us but it has acquired greater significance in recent years for two reasons. First, is the simple fact of the greater significance of socio-cultural issues. The old social class and socio-economic divisions of left and right have not disappeared but have been partly eclipsed by issues relating to national identity and sovereignty, ethnicity and immigration, security and pace of change. (Indeed, while there has been divergence between Anywheres and Somewheres on many cultural issues there has been convergence on economic issues.)

Second, the Anywhere-Somewhere balance has shifted significantly in the past 30 years with a big increase in the numbers and influence of the former group, thanks in part to the rapid expansion of higher education.

To many people the Anywhere-Somewhere divide will seem too binary and simplistic. In my book, The Road To Somewhere, I provide more detail and nuance. There are many varieties of Anywhere and Somewhere: the most extreme Anywheres I call Global Villagers (about 5 per cent of the population) and the more extreme Somewheres I call Hard Authoritarians (about 5 to 7 per cent). There is also a large group in the middle I call the In-betweeners, about one quarter of the population.

But the key point here is that I may have invented the labels, but I have not invented the broad value blocs—they are there to see in the British Social Attitudes surveys and countless other opinion and value surveys of recent years.

And there is one opinion survey that perfectly reflects the value blocs I have been describing. For the past few years, the main immigration opinion poll has found 75 per cent of the population finding immigration too high or much too high. It breaks down like this: 50 per cent think it has been too high (the Somewheres), 25 per cent think it has been a little too high (the In-betweeners), another 20/22 per cent think it has been about right (mainstream Anywheres) and 3 to 4 per cent would like it to be even higher (the Global Villagers). The surveys tell us something very interesting. There has been a great liberalisation in cultural attitudes to race, gender and sexuality over the past 40 years (though less so on immigration and welfare). This has been led by Anywheres but has pulled many, though not all, Somewheres along with them. We are all liberal now—at least when it comes to lifestyles.

For that reason, I call the Somewhere worldview “decent populism”. They are not, except for a small rump,
There has been a “great liberalisation” in cultural attitudes to race, gender and sexuality over the past 40 years — though less so on immigration and welfare. When it comes to lifestyle, we are all liberals now.

bigots and xenophobes but remain attached to various group identities, and are still wary of rapid change. Many Somewheres stopped voting in national elections because all the main parties from the 1990s have represented the Anywhere worldview. But they took their chance in the Brexit referendum to say “enough, your Anywhere version of openness is not working for us.”

Although I am critical of the Anywheres and the “liberal overreach” of the past generation—exemplified in the EU by the over-extended Euro and the concept of European Citizenship—I think that both worldviews are perfectly decent in their different ways. And the task of politics for the next generation is to find a new settlement between these two value tribes and thus reduce the likelihood in the future of more Brexit-like shocks.

Achieving that new settlement depends upon the outcome of a debate now going on among the Anywheres between those I call admonished Anywheres, who acknowledge that they have not been listening enough to Somewhere concerns and those, more militant Anywheres, who regard themselves as defending civilization from the barbarians.

Many people, including me, thought that Theresa May with her somewhat socially conservative and left-wing brand of Conservatism—a kind of British Christian Democracy—embodied the admonished Anywhere cause and was best placed to forge some kind of new settlement between Anywheres and Somewheres. Her poor performance and the “fundamentals” of the UK’s referendum result cast doubt on that. Instead, Jeremy Corbyn, almost by accident seemed to bring back to life the flagging Anywhere—Somewhere Labour coalition—in this case of Anywhere students and opponents of Brexit along with enough Somewhere blue collar Labour voters. This is unlikely to be a durable coalition and the likelihood is that Labour will continue to decline as an electoral force, probably facing some kind of Macron-like moderate social democratic rival by the time of the next election. For now, the project of a new settlement between the Anywhere and the Somewhere interest will remain the holy grail of British politics for the next generation.

David Goodhart is Head of the Demography, Immigration, and Integration Unit, and Director of the Integration Hub website at the UK think tank Policy Exchange. He is the author of The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics (2017).
EU membership long before David Cameron even called the referendum. Then, as Britain trundled toward the 2016 referendum, people began to assess the costs and benefits of EU membership. Crucially, a plurality accepted that Brexit would harm the economy, and probably their own finances as well. But most voters also felt that remaining in the EU would increase the risk of terrorism, harm Britain’s cultural life and erode sovereignty, while leaving the EU would mean less immigration. Identity concerns were already trumping economic self-interest. It is likely that Angela Merkel’s decision only a few months before the vote to allow large numbers of refugees into the EU sharpened this concern and entrenched a view that politicians (and the EU) were not in control of an issue that a large section of the electorate cared deeply about. Furthermore, Cameron’s renegotiation with the EU failed to quell these concerns.

It is worth underscoring the point that people accepted Brexit was a risk - a belief Cameron and Remainers sought to amplify through their elite-focused campaign rhetoric. They misjudged that many voters were risk averse and carpet-bombed them with dire warnings and prophecies about the consequences of not voting to indicate how risky they thought leaving would be (on a scale of 0–10 where 10 is ‘very risky’). 54 percent of voters assigned scores of six or greater. Playing on this notion of risk was not necessarily a bad strategy, but it was not enough. simpliciter, it was not the strongest predictor of whether or not somebody voted to Remain. But one of the risk-based strategy was not enough, especially when set alongside the powerful and emotionally resonant case over immigration. Our statistical analysis reveals that people who felt negatively toward immigration, worried about a loss of control to Brussels, and had been left behind economically, were much more likely to minimise the risk of Brexit. These voters felt they had nothing to lose, or were determined to force their identity concerns onto the agenda regardless. By examining emotions, too, we identified another problem for Remainers, who spent too much time trying to amplify the problems of Brexit at the expense of making the positive case for EU membership. After worries about the risks of Brexit, the second strongest predictor of the Remain vote were positive feelings about the EU – a driver that was not maximised by Remainers. Might things have been different if Cameron, George Osborne and Barack Obama had consistently made the positive case for Europe? On June 23 2016, all of these dynamics came together to deliver the vote for Brexit— a choice that reflected a complex mix of calculations, emotions and cues. Immigration was key to the vote for Brexit and ran through this decision. Not only were those who felt negatively about immigration more likely to minimise the risks of Brexit but they were also significantly more likely to turn out and then vote for Brexit in the polling booth. Immigration exerted powerful direct and indirect effects on the vote. The idea that this issue, which gave Leavers an emotional appeal that Remain’s economic pessimism could not match, was not central is misleading. Indeed, weeks before the ballots we argued that Leavers were more likely to show up at the polls because of this enthusiasm gap” – and they did. Though Leavers were divided on how to deal with immigration, our findings also point to the important role of populist leaders, specifically Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage, Johnson had a particularly important effect – if you liked Boris then even after controlling for a host of other factors, you were significantly more likely to vote for Brexit. Farage was less popular among the professional middle-classes but he was more popular among blue-collar voters and left behind voters, underlining how these rival messengers were able to reach into different groups of voters: When, from June 1 2016, the rival Leave camps all put the pedal down on immigration they were firmly in tune with the core driver of their vote. Brexit is a useful example because it shows us how, long before the Great Recession, a values divide had opened up in Western states like Britain. As a consequence, populist politics was pushed to the forefront as social conservatives and authoritarianists increasingly battted it out with typically younger social liberals. As in Britain, voters began to question their traditional allegiances and started to line up with parties that reflected their values more than their economic preferences. This meant that the traditional bond between workers and the social democratic left frayed and became much weaker which, in turn, opened up space for the populists. This helps make sense, for example, of why nearly 70 per cent of Labour-held seats opted for Brexit or why UKIP had recruited the most working-class electorate in relative terms. It also makes it hard to avoid the conclusion that while support for populist politics might ebb and flow, it is most likely here to stay.

Matthew Goodwin is professor of Politics and International Relations at the University of Kent in the UK and author of four books. He is also a Senior Fellow at the international affairs think tank Chatham House.

In their new book Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the EU (2017), Harold D. Clarke, Matthew Goodwin and Paul Whiteley draw on data about more than 350,000 voters to analyse the factors and concerns that led people to vote Leave.
The televised debate was devastating for Le Pen. Confused on elements of her manifesto, including “Frexit”, and out-performed by her opponent, she appeared unable to take on the responsibilities of being president.

of the Front National. For many months, the presence of Le Pen in the second round of the presidential election was seen as inevitable. It now presented itself as an experienced political party, bolstered by its repeated success in European and local elections. But the sudden emergence of Emmanuel Macron upset the election norms even more. In one year, the former deputy secretary general of the Elysée under François Hollande, and short-lived economics minister, had left his post and created his own movement: En Marche! This saw him resign from the government and quickly establish himself as a ‘modern’ and ‘progressive’ candidate, determined to rise above the old rift between left and right and to do what is necessary to reform the country. In some ways, there were echoes here of Tony Blair. “There is no economic policy of the right or the left, there are policies that work and others that do not work.”

So the four-way battle we saw in the first round resulted in the qualification of the two non-conformist candidates – in the “extreme centre” we had Macron (with 24% of the votes), and on the extreme right, Marine Le Pen (on 21.3%). For the traditional parties, a sense of tremendous failure ensued as they surveyed the wreckage: on the right, this election had been seen as “in the bag” at the start of the year. And yet François Fillon failed at the first hurdle, with 20 per cent of the votes. Many saw his project as simply too “liberal”. But it was the scandal over his financial affairs which ruined the candidature of a man who claimed to be “not like the other politicians”. The would-be president was accused of putting his wife and children on the parliamentary payroll, with the matter then being followed up by an official government inquiry. The situation for the socialists was even more catastrophic. Without a firm base in his own party, and poorly prepared for the rigours of a presidential campaign, official candidate Benoît Hamon appeared very quickly to be overtaken by events. Within a few weeks, he had been overtaken and indeed humiliated by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the radical left candidate whose diverse coalition (including what remains of the communists) had a clear determination to break down the socialists. On 23 April, Hamon registered just 6.3 per cent of the votes, the worst score by a socialist since 1969, with his score completely overshadowed by that of Mélenchon (19.5%).

Round Two

The ‘duel’ of the second round therefore saw Macron and Le Pen facing each other. It was won by the En Marche! candidate, who polled 56 per cent of the votes on 7th May. Two phenomena explain this clear victory. On the one hand, even if the ‘Republican front’ against the extreme right was less vigorous than in the past, it still galvanised a large number of voters on the right and left to vote for Macron – or at least not to vote against him. Compounding this was the televised debate between the two candidates, on 3rd May. This was devastating for Le Pen. Confused on elements of her manifesto (for example the proposal for “Frexit” which would have led France out of the euro zone) and out-performed by her opponent, she appeared unable to show that she was ready to take on the responsibilities of being president. The response of the French public was ruthless – during the four days that have separated this debate of the second round of balloting, she lost 6 to 7 points, a spectacular tumble. With one-third of the votes, Le Pen did indeed achieve an unprecedented score, almost double that of her father, Jean-Marie Le Pen, in 2002. But this result was very far from her goal [to pass the 40% mark] and even further from the illusion that she could win the election. Emmanuel Macron has therefore achieved something that very few observers thought was possible: He is now the eighth President of the Fifth Republic. For a young man of 39 years, never previously elected at local or national level, who entered politics barely three years ago and supported by a completely new political movement, it is a remarkable feat. Especially in a country where ascension to the Elysée requires ‘doing your time’. This success is the result of a carefully thought-out strategy: Macron has taken advantage of the deep desire of the French to renew its political class. Finally, in looking to appeal to the ‘right and left as well as to all “progressives”, he has given the French the chance to try a new experience: bringing together a different type of team, and asking them to engage with the economic and social reforms the country needs. Since his election, we have seen some continued momentum. He has appointed a right-wing figure, Édouard Philippe, as prime minister, and formed a government that brings together leaders from the right and the centre, socialists and environmentalists. This is unprecedented in France since General de Gaulle in 1958. What is more, half of the ministers are from civil society (including a business leader, professor of medicine, university president, association official, elite-level athlete), who are all renowned in their field. This is an enormous challenge in a country that is so unaccustomed to coalition governments and which currently exhibits a pessimistic mood.

Which brings us to the final goal to obtain; on 11 and 18 June, a majority of deputies to support his actions and implement his proposals. The French political system has turned upside down – the socialists have collapsed, the right is disorientated and divided, the National Front is frustrated by its failure, the radical left is isolated in its opposition and there are numerous rallies in support of the new president. Now that Macron has won the last round, he has turned the page on half a century of French political life. Nobody, except him, could have imagined such an upheaval just a few months ago.

Gerard Courtois is a journalist and Editorial Director of Le Monde.
Power and populism in the new world

EUROPE

How to be a populist

Moisés Naim

Power is shifting—from large, stable armies to loose bands of insurgents, from corporate leviathans to nimble start-ups, from presidential palaces to public squares. It has become harder to wield power and easier to lose it, and the world is becoming less predictable as a result. As people become more prosperous and mobile, they are harder to control and more apt to question authority. Insurgents, fringe political parties, innovative start-ups, hackers, loosely organized activists, upstart citizen media outlets, leaderless young people in city squares, and charismatic individuals who seem to have “come from nowhere” are shaking up the old order. These are the micropowers: small, unknown, or once-negligible actors who have found ways to undermine, fence in, or thwart the megaplayers. The police forces, television networks, traditional political parties, large banks—the large bureaucratic organizations that previously controlled their fields—are seeing their authority undermined.

In recent months, the ascent of leaders and movements denounced by their rivals as “populist” has given the world the false impression that those leaders offer some kind of distinct ideology. So-called populists do run on platforms that challenge the status quo. It is also true that this can lead them to embrace a wide range of positions on crucial issues. The policies promised by Donald Trump and France’s Marine Le Pen cannot be more different than those adopted by Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, or those promoted by Podemos, Spain’s newest political party. Yet all of these leaders are routinely described as populists.

The fact is that populism is not an ideology. Instead, it’s a strategy to obtain and retain power. It has been around for centuries, recently appearing to resurface in full force, propelled by the digital revolution, precarious economies, and the threatening insecurity of what lies ahead.

Even though populist leaders and the countries they rule are vastly different, populism contains the same ingredients everywhere. We can see them in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, Trump’s America, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, or Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines. And despite differences in culture, history, political systems, or the economic circumstances of the countries where populism is now being deployed, populist leaders resort to the same tactics. The policies they favor are as varied as their political tactics are similar.

Criminalize the opposition

Populists often treat those who oppose them not as fellow citizens with different views, but as traitors who don’t deserve to be heard or maintain their full political rights. Consider Venezuela’s Leopoldo López, a charismatic opposition political leader who has been languishing in jail for over three years, or Russia’s Mikhail Khodorkovsky, a businessman whose political ambitions threatened Putin, and who was sent to jail for eight years. Amnesty International considers the detentions of both López and Khodorkovsky to be politically motivated. They are but two examples showing the propensity of populist autocrats to jail their opponents.

In Egypt, Malaysia, or South Africa, opposition leaders are known to have been jailed. Even democratic leaders have at times stated their wish to imprison political rivals. One of the most popular motifs at the height of Trump’s campaign was “lock her up”—a threat to incarcerate Hillary Clinton.

Divide and conquer

The most successful populist leaders are masters at exacerbating socio-cultural division and conflict. They use differences in income, race, religion, region, nationality, or any other rift in society to drive a wedge between different groups, and foment indignation and political outrage. Populists are not afraid to fuel social conflict—indeed, they thrive on it. An indispensable ingredient of the populist recipe is the “us” that embodies the nation, represented by the populist leader who promises to confront the “them,” who have allegedly harmed “the people.”

The late Hugo Chávez used to denounce the opposition as “squaki,” “traitors to the homeland,” and the “bureaucracy.” Italy’s Beppe Grillo, the head of the Five Star Movement, a political party, routinely referred to traditional political and economic elites as “the caste.” Brexiters speak with disdain of “Brussels bureaucrats.” While Donald Trump condemns Washington’s “swamp.” Populists denigrate “the others” not only when they fail, but even when they are successful. They need to feed the forces of political, social, economic, and racial polarization.

Magnify the nation’s problems

Exaggerating a given country’s dire situation is an indispensable rhetorical tactic for the populist. Whose central message is that everything his predecessors did was bad, corrupt, and unacceptable, and that the country urgently needs drastic changes that only he or she can deliver. Trump’s reference to “American carnage” in his inaugural address, or his repeated invocations of the weak economy or the foreign-policy mess that he inherited, are good examples, but far from unique. Putin, for example, lamented the break-up of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical disaster” of the 20th century and stressed its “horrific effects on the Russian nation.” Marine Le Pen and Argentina’s former President Nestor Kirchner also leveled accusations against those who came before them. Claiming the mantle as the only one qualified to undertake the urgent corrections the country needs is a common element in populist propaganda.
Populism is not an ideology—it’s a strategy to obtain and retain power. It has been around for centuries, recently propelled by the digital revolution, precarious economies, and the threatening insecurity of what lies ahead.

**Play up the external threat**

“Wag the dog” is not only the title of a movie—one in which the political advisors of a fawning president fabricate a military conflict against a small country to boost his chances of reelection—but a political tactic with a long, disastrous pedigree. Students of international relations and war even have a name for it: “diversionary wars.” For populists, it is not enough to create an internal enemy; they also need foreign enemies. This external threat can be a country—say, China or Mexico—or a group, like immigrants or Muslims. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, for example, has said “migration is not a solution but a problem... not medicine but poison; we don’t need it and won’t swallow it.” Orbán actually went so far as to build a wall to keep out immigrants. Putin meanwhile accuses the United States and the West of being behind the “Color Revolutions” that shook Eastern Europe in the early 2000s, and the protests that erupted in the streets of Moscow in 2011. Putin also regularly denounces NATO.

**Insist that the foreign enemy has allies at home**

Populists often portray foreign rivals as allies of the domestic opposition. For example, last year’s failed coup attempt against the government in Turkey has been blamed on Fethullah Gulen, a Muslim cleric living in exile in America who enjoys a vast following in Turkey. Turkish authorities also claim US government involvement in sponsoring the coup.

**Glorify the military**

The populist extols the military as often as possible, while also launching major weapons procurement initiatives and boosting defense spending. Trump’s frequent references to military veterans, his commitment to increasing defense spending, and his tough talk on international affairs are nothing new when seen in this light. Other populists around the world have done exactly the same—with Orbán’s government vowing to make one of Europe’s “most decisive” arms out of Hungary’s armed forces, and Putin touting the Russian military as “stronger ... than any potential aggressor.”

**Discredit the experts**

“People in this country have had enough of experts,” Brexit advocate Michael Gove said in response to a report compiled by a group of prestigious economists on the costs Britain could incur by leaving the European Union. For Trump, clear scientific consensus has been irrelevant when it comes to climate change, which he once insisted was a conspiracy invented by China (a claim he later shrugged off as a joke). He has also advanced the claim that autism is caused by vaccines, despite what the American Academy of Pediatrics has called “a robust body of medical literature” disproving it. Experts, though, are part of the “elite” that populists blame for the people’s problems and whose influence they want to curb.

**Delegitimize the media**

The disdain populists feel for experts is nothing compared to the distaste they have for journalists. In some countries, this leads to incarcerations, beatings, and even assassinations. Journalists, like scientists, obtain information that can clash with the narrative the populist finds most convenient. When this happens, there is no better solution than to disqualify the messenger. While in the United States, Trump routinely accuses the media of disseminating “fake news,” in Ecuador, President Rafael Correa refers to critical media as “ink hitmen.”

The essence of the populist recipe is to undermine the checks and balances that limit populists’ power and hold them accountable. The common wisdom used to be that populists tended to succeed in countries where institutions were too weak to contain them, or where citizens believed that “all politicians were the same” and nothing could be worse than what they had. But the success of populist politicians in some European countries and the United States shows that even mature democracies are no guarantee against populism.

Moisés Naim is a Distinguished Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, Why Being in Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be (2013).

*Populism is not an ideology - it’s a strategy to obtain and retain power. It has been around for centuries, recently propelled by the digital revolution, precarious economies, and the threatening insecurity of what lies ahead.*
The rise of Trump in a changing America

Emily Ekins

The political class has been looking for a silver bullet to solve what appears to have become an unsolvable puzzle—which is behind the surprising rise of Donald Trump? Explanations have tended toward the condescending with theories of authoritarianism, collective narcissism, racism, populism, nativism, and economic anxieties as motivators of Trump support. New empirical research finds, however, that complex attitudes toward immigration, with unclear underlying motivations, are what made the 2016 election distinctive.

To understand the rise of Trump, one must look to the voters who were pivotal in catapulting him to the presidency. 1) His early core primary supporters, a minority of Republican voters2); and 2) and general election voters who switched from voting for Obama in 2012 to Trump in 2016. Without these voters, Trump would not be in the White House today.

Concerns about immigration, in all their complexity, are what make these pivotal voters unique.

Data on Trump’s core primary supporters reveal a distinctive edge compared to traditional Republicans. Surveys have found that Trump’s base is about 20 to 30 points more likely than other Republican voters to favor restricting legal immigration “across the board,” building a border wall, deporting unauthorized immigrants residing in the US, and temporarily banning Muslim immigrants. 2) When it comes to their values, they tend to care more about social cohesion and being loyal to a community and less about being compassionate. 3)

Next, data on “party switchers,” or voters who voted for Obama in 2012 and Trump in 2016, again point to immigration attitudes being paramount. A Democracy Fund Voter Report finds both sets of party switchers largely differed from their party’s candidate’s attitudes toward immigrants. For instance, 64% of Obama-to-Trump voters want to make it harder to legally immigrate to the US compared to 25% of Obama-to-Clinton voters. Romney-to-Clinton voters hold immigration views closer to Clinton voters than Trump voters. Furthermore, statistical models find that support for restricting immigration and opposition to providing citizenship to unauthorized immigrants were most predictive of being an Obama voter who later cast a ballot for Trump.

Why Immigration? Why now?

The United States has experienced a sharp increase in immigration in recent decades, approaching its historic highs from over 100 years ago. US Census data reports that between 1840-1845, of the US population is foreign-born, double that from 1990. 4) Although the US had practically open borders and high immigration in the 19th century, Congress sought to halt it in the 1920s with strict immigration restrictions and quotas. For the next 50 years, Americans were far less likely to know and interact with immigrants. Times have changed, and legal and illegal immigration flows have brought the US foreign-born population back to where it was at its historic height in 1890.

Americans’ feelings about immigration are complex, and thus reactions to immigration and demographic change have not been monolithic. Research from the forthcoming Democracy Fund Voter Report suggests that several different reasons may motivate immigration concerns.

Immigration offers immense benefits—benefits that outweigh the costs. But there are costs. Change is hard. Different cultures with different traditions, holidays, language, and social norms can be difficult to first understand and then become accustomed to. For those particularly attuned to social cohesion and community, especially Trump’s core constituency, immigration presents new challenges. These voters are worried that immigrants may not assimilate into American society. For instance, core Trump supporters are 20 points more likely than other Republicans to be bothered “a lot” by immigrants who don’t speak English. 5)

Economic pessimism and fears over competition for jobs further compound these immigration concerns, particularly among Trump’s early core supporters. The Democracy Fund Voter Report finds that financially hard pressed voters in 2011 were significantly more likely in 2016 to say legal immigration should be further restricted. 6) Perhaps because, as the report finds, Trump’s core supporters feel a lack of personal agency and feel like they are living in a zero-sum world.

In addition to these, there are certainly other factors driving concerns over immigration, including security fears, fairness concerns, as well as blatant ethno-nationalism.

Political elites have long avoided talking about the potential costs of immigration—and for understandable reasons too. Many fear the risk that acknowledging potential costs might magnify them. However, ignoring the feelings and fears that many Americans have allowed such feelings to fester unchecked and untested. By failing to address these concerns productively, a golden-haired billionaire came along and blew the lid off the frustration without sophistication or nuance—and often

Who Would Jesus Deport?

The US had practically open borders in the 19th century, which Congress sought to halt in the 1920s with strict immigration restrictions. For the next 50 years, Americans were far less likely to know and interact with immigrants. Times have changed, and immigration flows have brought the US foreign-born population back to its historic height in 1890.
Financially hard-pressed voters in 2011 were significantly more likely in 2016 to say legal immigration should be further restricted. Why? Trump’s core supporters feel a lack of personal agency and feel like they are living in a zero-sum world.

Political elites have long avoided talking about the potential costs of immigration—and for understandable reasons too. Many fear the risk that acknowledging potential costs might magnify them.

Democracy is a bet that humanity takes on itself, and the stakes are rising like never before. In an earlier age, the political discourse emphasized a restrained and formal practice of democracy: the process was governed by a tight set of protocols and rules, and was presided over with a comprehensive system of checks and balances. Politics was a formally enacted costume drama, as was the case with the judiciary—and it came bound with the fabric of propriety and justice.

But there has been a sea change in the culture of politics as it is practiced on the ground. And India is no exception. The language of politics too has coarsened significantly, and the age of anger has resulted in political choices that, only a few years ago, would seem implausible. Social media has deepened democratic participation by giving voice to the millions who before could only listen. It is estimated that Indian social media users will reach 283m by 2018. But arguably, this method of interaction has also enabled a shallower political discourse.

There is impatience with conventional politics in general, and the anger against an inept regime in part fueled by the rise of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India. Modi is a gifted communicator, and his ability to combine fear and hope and speak to both anger and aspiration has propelled him to power and popularity.

His core constituency imagines itself as the cultural mainstream that was rendered illegitimate in a previous era, and now seeks to assert itself. The rise of casual majoritarianism, where the interests of the dominant social groups are conflated with those of the nation, is in evidence, leading to sharper polarization in the public discourse. There is a comforting if untested notion that all this is a part of an evolutionary process, and that things will improve with time. The digital world is new, and as of now, a wild unregulated space without adequate safeguards and requisite social conventions, including a reward and punishment system. It can be argued that this will inevitably become more rule-bound as we discover the costs of our freedoms, and some of the rabid behaviour on display will be tempered. The rise of populist leaders who feed on anxiety and create divisions have existed before, but history tells us that these are almost always transient phases—a periodic itch that societies scratch furiously, but briefly.

The question is—left to ourselves, will democracies move towards greater individual freedoms and away from divisions based on religion, race and ethnicity? As the hold of the elite weakens, does the politics of democracy become a purer version of itself or does it degrade to its baser side? This is a very big bet to make. Is the emergence of a more populist and strident form of leadership a pointer to our destination, or is it part of our learning curve? There is enough reason to be pessimistic. Structurally, media (which determines how we see the world by making it visible to us in a particular way) is geared to heighten polarities. Social media resembles an arena where warring tribes engage in relentless hostilities, with escalating rancor. The state is increasingly irrelevant when it comes to dissent—
Left to ourselves, will democracies move towards greater individual freedoms and away from divisions based on religion, race and ethnicity? Does the politics of democracy become a purer version of itself or does it degrade to its baser side?

The era of print made knowledge more easily accessible and freely circulated. It helped shape a common currency of ideas and propelled liberal thought. The coming of television, and now the internet, has meant that we have returned, in some form, to our oral roots.

At its most basic level, the era of print made knowledge more easily accessible and freely circulated. It helped shape a common currency of ideas, some of which were privileged as shared ideals that society must aspire to. The culture fostered by the print world emphasized rationality and logic. It also alienated human beings from the world that they lived in, but this detachment helped foster many of the ideals that have propelled liberal thought. The coming of television, and now the internet, has meant that we have returned in some form to our oral roots.

If we were to accept this axis of analysis, then it could be argued that liberalism and the idea of modernity that drives it is not an inevitable progression based on the human instinct for freedom, but a development contingent on what the dominant media form of the time is.

To reduce complex social and political phenomena to a single variable is rarely meaningful or useful, but in this case, it poses a question that is both provocative and plausible. The question in effect is whether progressive liberal ideals were an accident of media; an interruption that is now petering out. Recent events of the world might not be part of a cycle, but be indicative of a longer term shift towards a more tribal consciousness. It is too soon to imagine what kind of changes lie in store, for the codes of a digitally powered society are still in the process of being formed. But liberalism as we know it might not merely be under attack, but might possibly not survive the changes that we are seeing. The ideals that democracies take for granted might be up for negotiation, not merely for now but for good. It is not a comforting thought, which is why it is worth thinking about.

Santosh Desai is Managing Director of Futurebrands and author of the Times of India blog ‘City city, bang, bang’.

Social media has deepened democratic participation by giving voice to the millions who before could only listen. It is estimated that Indian social media users will reach 283m by 2018.
LATIN AMERICA

The death of Latin American populism?

Structural vs opportunistic populism

Almost a generation after the downfall of Communism, a new specter is haunting Europe, and also the Americas: the specter of populism, which is likely to become, in our epoch, the chief anti-liberal alternative to open markets and republican democracy. Almost everywhere in Western and Central Europe, parties characterized as ‘populist’ are appearing or increasing dramatically their electoral share, and kindred parties govern in Hungary and Poland. In the US, a leader with a populist ideology has captured the nomination of a mainstream party and won the presidential election. Yet in Latin America, populism seems to have receded in the recent past. Argentina elected the centre-right candidate, Mauricio Macri, in 2015. In Venezuela, the opposition dealt a blow to the government of President Nicolas Maduro, the disciple of former President Hugo Chavez, in the 2016 elections. And in 2016, one million Brazilians marched to oust Dilma Rousseff and leftist leaders. However, I argue that the conditions that generate and nourish populism in Latin America and across the world means that it is likely to recur.

In everyday language, the term is used to characterize politicians who appeal to “the people”, especially the workers and the poor. For Latin American specialists, populism describes specific regimes in that region in the second half of the past century (especially those of Juan Peron in Argentina and Getulio Vargas in Brazil) and in the beginning of the current one (Hugo Chavez and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, Cristina Kirchner in Argentina).

More recently, movements and parties in Europe, mostly on the Right but some on the Left, such as the National Front in France, Podemos in Spain, UKIP in Britain, Five Star Movement in Italy, and the Fidesz in Hungary, and Law and Justice in Poland, have been called “populist.” Does it make sense to use the same label for such a disparate array of parties and governments, and in societies whose institutions and culture are so different? It does because there is a common core in the policy agenda or ideology of these movements and parties. This is why the concept has some validity, at least as a heuristic tool. The populist ideological package, Right and Left, South and North, includes two common components:

1) A plebiscitarian conception of democracy, according to which it is the incumbent of the Executive who primarily embodies the popular will. For populists, separation of powers, a basic principle of the liberal conception of government, is a hindrance to this popular will. Therefore, the other branches of government, the Congress and the Judiciary, should submit to this popular will. Therefor, the other branches of government, the Congress and the Judiciary, should submit to the Executive’s objectives or policies, basically legitimating them. Of course, the realization of this project would imply a high level of concentration of power, and ultimately the establishment of an elective authoritarian regime.

2) An anti-globalization stance. The world economy is seen as a threat, rather than as an opportunity. Populists espouse high tariff barriers and other forms of protectionism, incompatible with membership in the WTO, the European Union, or NAFTA. These policies, if implemented in full, would lead to neo-mercantilist forms of state capitalism that promotes exports and limits imports. There are variations but broadly, this package is shared by all these populist parties and regimes, North and South, Right and Left. However, there are important differences among these types. Northern populism (the US and Europe), both on the Right and the Left, is a movement of social defense: it purports to protect the interests of factory workers and other segments of the working class that are perceived to be threatened by international trade and economic globalization.

The goal of southern populism (Latin America), on the other hand, is social inclusion. Its declared aim is to incorporate into the polity excluded or marginal sectors of society – in the mid-20th century, these would have been the “laborers,” today they are the urban poor. The distinction between Left and Right, on the other hand, has to do with immigration and Islam. Right-wing populism, in Western Europe and the US, is strongly opposed to mass immigration, particularly from Islamic countries, and it views the West as engaged in a civilizational conflict with Islam. Populist rightists claim to defend not only workers’ standard of living, but also the nation’s culture, allegedly threatened by the arrival of outsiders whose values are supposedly incompatible with those of the West. These aspects are largely absent in Left-wing populism, both in the North and the South.

We are witnessing a reconfiguration of the party system in the West, based on the emergence of a new central cleavage. Marine Le Pen has stated, during the recent electoral campaign, that the main conflict in France is the one between “patriots” and “globalists”, i.e. between economic and cultural nationalism and economic and political liberalism. She is quite right, as the recent elections in several countries in Europe, the US, and Latin America indicate. Populism is a reaction to the effects of the technological revolution and the intensification of globalization: growing economic inequality, the decline of employment in manufacturing and the weakening of trade unions. The overall outcome is that political climates conducive...
Populist rightists claim to defend not only workers’ standard of living, but also the nation’s culture, allegedly threatened by the arrival of outsiders. These aspects are largely absent in Left-wing populism.

At the beginning of March, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) produced an advertisement in which the party’s leader, Bill Shorten, stood among a dozen or so white people against a white background and promised, “A Shorten Labor Government will build Australian first, buy Australian first and employ Australians first.”

The ad not only echoed the tone and sentiment of Australia’s largest right-wing populist party, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, it actually harnessed the name of an even more radical fringe group, the Australia First Party. The ad was targeted at a handful of seats in Queensland in which support for One Nation is threatening the National Party. The National Party is in long-term coalition with the conservative Liberal Party, and should it lose those Queensland seats in the next federal election, the Coalition could lose government.

With its nationalistic ad, one replete with racial overtones, the ALP sought to inoculate itself from losses to One Nation and to exacerbate the Coalition’s woes. It was a clumsy move though. One Nation might be popular among working class voters in Queensland, but targeting advertising is difficult these days. The ad spread virally via social media and the response to it was scathing, particularly in inner-city seats in which the Labor Party is now threatened from the left by The Greens. “You’re a disgrace @billshortenmp. You should apologize and resign for this racist bulls**t. Disgusting.” tweeted one refugee advocate in a not untypical response. The key senate crossbencher Derryn Hinch told ABC radio, “It could be an ad for the Ku Klux Klan.”

Soon Shorten was back-peddling. “I’m not in the business of making television ads,” he blustered to Australian Associated Press. He apologised and the ad was withdrawn, but not before it revealed much about the power of right-wing populism in Australia.
The populist right in Australia remains fragmented and poorly-led. Hanson is the closest thing it has to a figurehead, and while she retains the authenticity politicians crave, she has never demonstrated the political effectiveness of, say, Marine Le Pen. There are other factors that so far seem to be holding the rise of the right in check. Australia, like New Zealand, was spared the worst of the financial devastation that swept the world in 2008. And its two major parties remain relatively stable. (People forget that Trump won because he took over the Republican Party; Australian parties are less vulnerable to that sort of hijacking.) But from the fringes, the populist right has already helped shape the policies and messaging of Australia’s two major parties. Hanson knows this too. “Good to see the PM is finally acting on the suggestions I made to him about the citizenship test,” she tweeted merrily after Turnbull announced his changes.

Nick O’Malley is Senior Writer at The Sydney Morning Herald in Australia.

As Hanson celebrates the success of the Brexit campaign and the rise of Donald Trump, the major parties fear that the wave of populism that has shifted mainstream politics around the world will alter the Australian landscape.

The populist right in Australia remains fragmented and poorly-led. Hanson is the closest thing it has to a figurehead, and while she retains the authenticity politicians crave, she has never demonstrated the political effectiveness of, say, Marine Le Pen.

There are other factors that so far seem to be holding the rise of the right in check. Australia, like New Zealand, was spared the worst of the financial devastation that swept the world in 2008. And its two major parties remain relatively stable. (People forget that Trump won because he took over the Republican Party; Australian parties are less vulnerable to that sort of hijacking.)

But from the fringes, the populist right has already helped shape the policies and messaging of Australia’s two major parties. Hanson knows this too. “Good to see the PM is finally acting on the suggestions I made to him about the citizenship test,” she tweeted merrily after Turnbull announced his changes.

Nick O’Malley is Senior Writer at The Sydney Morning Herald in Australia.

The populist right in Australia remains fragmented and poorly-led. Hanson is the closest thing it has to a figurehead, and while she retains the authenticity politicians crave, she has never demonstrated the political effectiveness of, say, Marine Le Pen.

There are other factors that so far seem to be holding the rise of the right in check. Australia, like New Zealand, was spared the worst of the financial devastation that swept the world in 2008. And its two major parties remain relatively stable. (People forget that Trump won because he took over the Republican Party; Australian parties are less vulnerable to that sort of hijacking.)

But from the fringes, the populist right has already helped shape the policies and messaging of Australia’s two major parties. Hanson knows this too. “Good to see the PM is finally acting on the suggestions I made to him about the citizenship test,” she tweeted merrily after Turnbull announced his changes.

Nick O’Malley is Senior Writer at The Sydney Morning Herald in Australia.
NEW ZEALAND

The rise and stall of populism?

Why New Zealand politics is business as usual

When surveying the results of the UK referendum and the US election, New Zealand’s incumbent National government of nearly nine years must be nervously wondering if time is up. The anti-establishment vote is on the rise. Yet, the centre right National Party appears to be on course for a rare fourth term. Has the new state of global flux robbed the electorate of their appetite for risk? The polls have National on 40-plus percent support. Their nearest rivals, the centre-left Labour Party, are marooned with under 30 percent support. But, the centre left are putting money on Peters giving NZ First as a coalition partner. Now that National since 2008, when Key ruled out doing a deal with in the past, and putting him in the likely position of kingmaker on election night. Peters, who leads the fourth largest party in Parliament, is polling in double digits, almost 20 points higher than the Greens and NZ First. He has refused to say which party he favours doing a deal with. However, he has stood on an anti-immigration platform at successive elections, arguing that wealthy foreigners are crowding out young first home buyers. Peters, who has stood on an anti-immigration platform at successive elections, arguing that wealthy foreigners are crowding out young first home buyers, is a second-time leader who led the party to its worst ever defeat in 2002. Nevertheless, as Finance minister, he got the books back in the black, steered the country’s finances through earthquakes and the global financial crisis and is seen by voters as a safe pair of hands. That could be the most potent message in an election overshadowed by a new world order of uncertainty and the rise of protectionism, which threaten exporters and jobs in an island nation dependent on trade. The centre right National Party appears to be on course for a rare fourth term. Has the new state of global flux robbed the electorate of their appetite for risk?

The centre right National Party appears to be on course for a rare fourth term. Has the new state of global flux robbed the electorate of their appetite for risk?

The rise and stall of populism? – Why New Zealand politics is business as usual

New Zealand has been immunised against the current ‘disruptions’ taking place in political systems across the world because it has been down this road before.
REFERENCES

11. Trump received 36% of the vote in the early GOP primaries. David Leip Election Data 2016 Primary Vote Totals
19. https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/818
27. https://www.pundit.co.nz/content/poll-of-polls
33. http://mironline.ca/contagious-liberalism-administration-frances-for-right-discourse/
34. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/europe-39790175
35. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4448735.stm
37. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/europe-39791175
38. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/europe-39791175
41. Trump received 36% of the vote in the early GOP primaries. David Leip Election Data 2016 Primary Vote Totals
42. https://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab01.html
43. https://www.vox.com/2016/2/5/11910964/donald-trumpmorality
49. https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/818
52. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4480745.stm
57. https://www.pundit.co.nz/content/poll-of-polls