

## Ipsos MORI July 2017 Political Monitor

### Topline Results

24<sup>th</sup> July 2017

Fieldwork: 14<sup>th</sup>- 18<sup>th</sup> July 2017

#### Technical Details

Ipsos MORI interviewed a representative sample of 1,071 adults aged 18+ across Great Britain. Interviews were conducted by telephone: 14<sup>th</sup> – 18<sup>th</sup> July 2017. Data are weighted to match the profile of the population.

Where percentages do not sum to 100 this may be due to computer rounding, the exclusion of “don’t know” categories, or multiple answers. An asterisk (\*) denotes any value of less than half a per cent. Voting intention figures exclude those who say they would not vote, are undecided or refuse to name a party and in the headline figures, are filtered as discussed below. Data are based on all adults unless otherwise stated.

### Voting intention

Voting intention polls between elections are a measurement of how a representative sample of the public think they would vote at a given point in time. Voting intentions should be read in conjunction with other political indicators.

#### **Voting intentions: headline indicator**

Our headline indicator takes into account past voting behaviour (do people always or usually vote in general elections, or say it depends) as well as stated likelihood to vote in an upcoming election (those who say they are at least 9 out of 10 certain to vote). Although we included an additional turnout overclaim adjustment during the 2017 General Election campaign we have gone back to pre-campaign/post-2015 methodology this month. We continually review our methods, and may make further refinements to our methodology in the future.

As previously, please note that this measure is not based on the assumption that this is the group who will vote at the next general election, as this population is not accurately identifiable at this stage of a parliament. Rather, it includes only those voters whose past behaviour and frame of mind is nearest to those who actually vote at elections.

Please also note that the ‘margin of error’ on these figures is c.±3-5% for each figure; this means that a party share figure of 30% could actually fall anywhere between 26% and 34%, though it is more likely to fall at 30% than at the extreme ends of this range. This is especially important to keep in mind when calculating party lead figures.

Q1a **How would you vote if there were a General Election tomorrow?**  
IF UNDECIDED OR REFUSED AT Q1a

Q1b **Which party are you most inclined to support?**

*Base: All 9-10 certain to vote and always/usually/depends vote in General Elections (882)* Q1a/b %

Conservative	41
Labour	42
Liberal Democrats (Lib Dem)	9
Scottish/Welsh Nationalist	3
Green Party	2
UK Independence Party	3
Other	1
<b>Conservative lead (±%)</b>	<b>-1</b>
<i>Would not vote</i>	*
<i>Undecided</i>	3
<i>Refused</i>	1

### Voting intentions: all naming a party

The voting intention figures based on all those giving a voting intention is the measure with the longest pedigree; our regular trends on this basis go back to the 1970s. When turnouts were much higher than is usual today, this offered a good approximation to actual voting behaviour; in more recent years in more recent years however, there have been differing turnout levels among the supporters of the various parties.

Q1a **How do you intend to vote in the General Election? Will you vote...?**  
IF UNDECIDED OR REFUSED AT Q1a

Q1b **Which party are you most inclined to support?**

	%
Conservative	38
Labour	43
Liberal Democrats (Lib Dem)	8
Scottish/Welsh Nationalist	3
Green Party	3
UK Independence Party	2
Other	1
<b>Conservative lead (±%)</b>	<b>-5</b>
<i>Would not vote</i>	4
<i>Undecided</i>	4
<i>Refused</i>	2

## Certainty of voting

Q2 And how likely would you be to vote in the General Election, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 10 means you would be absolutely certain to vote, and 1 means that you would be absolutely certain not to vote?

	%
10 – absolutely certain to vote	76
9	3
8	5
7	2
6	1
5	4
4	1
3	1
2	2
1 – absolutely certain not to vote	5
Don't know	1

## Satisfaction Ratings

### Satisfaction among general public aged 18+

- Q3 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way the Government is running the country?
- Q4 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Theresa May is doing her job as Prime Minister?
- Q5 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way Jeremy Corbyn is doing his job as leader of the Labour party?

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know	Net satisfaction
	%	%	%	±
Government (Q3)	28	64	8	<b>-36</b>
May (Q4)	34	59	7	<b>-25</b>
Corbyn (Q5)	44	45	11	<b>-1</b>

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Base: All party supporters (\*Government is based on Conservative supporters)

	Base	Satisfied %	Dissatisfied %	Don't know %	Net satisfaction ±
Government* (Q3)	373	59	31	10	+28
May (Q4)	373	66	27	7	+39
Corbyn (Q5)	401	75	19	6	+56

## Economic Optimism Index

- Q6 Do you think that the general economic condition of the country will improve, stay the same, or get worse over the next 12 months?

	Improve	14
	Stay the same	28
	Get worse	54
	Don't know	4
<b>Ipsos MORI Economic Optimism Index (EOI)</b>		<b>-40</b>

## Most Capable Prime Minister

- Q7 Who do you think would make the most capable Prime Minister, the Conservative's Theresa May, or Labour's Jeremy Corbyn?

	April 2017 %	May 2017 %	June 1 <sup>st</sup> 2017 %	June 7 <sup>th</sup> 2017 %	July 2017 %
Theresa May	61	56	50	47	46
Jeremy Corbyn	23	29	35	36	38
Neither/none (not read out)	6	7	6	7	8
No Difference (not read out)	1	*	*	1	1
Other (not read out)	1	1	*	*	2
Don't know (not read out)	7	6	8	8	5

**Brexit**

Q8 Do you think each of the following has done a good job or a bad job at handling Britain’s exit from the European Union?

	Good job %	Bad job %	Don't know %
<b>The Government (July 2017)</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>11</b>
March 2017	36	52	12
December 2016	33	53	14
November 2016	37	48	15
<b>Theresa May (July 2017)</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>10</b>
March 2017	49	40	11
December 2016	51	35	14

Q9a Please tell me how confident, if at all, you are that Theresa May will get a good deal for Britain in negotiations with other European Union leaders?

	% David Cameron Feb' 2016	% Theresa May Mar' 2017	% Theresa May Jul' 2017
Very confident	5	11	6
Fairly confident	29	33	30
Not very confident	35	28	31
Not confident at all	27	23	29
Don't know	4	5	3
<b>Confident</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>36</b>
<b>Not confident</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>60</b>

Q9b Please tell me how confident, if at all, you would be that Jeremy Corbyn would get a good deal for Britain in negotiations with other European Union leaders if he was Prime Minister?

	%
Very confident	6
Fairly confident	23
Not very confident	29
Not confident at all	38
Don't know	5
<b>Confident</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Not confident</b>	<b>67</b>

Q10 In the negotiations over Britain’s future relationship with the European Union, how important, if at all, do you think it is for the British government to achieve each of the following, or do you think the government should not try to achieve this?

	Essential %	Very important %	Fairly important %	Not very important %	Not at all important %	Should not try to achieve this %	Don't know %	Essential / very important %
<b>For Britain to make no further contributions to the EU budget after Britain leaves</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>46</b>
For Britain to make no further contributions to the EU budget after Britain leaves (March 2017)	18	25	20	15	6	8	7	43
<b>For Britain to remain in the single market</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>45</b>
For Britain to remain in the single market (March 2017)	15	28	25	14	5	6	7	43
<b>For Britain to have full control over its immigration policy</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>63</b>
For Britain to have full control over its immigration policy (March 2017)	27	34	19	9	3	5	2	61
<b>For there to be a transition period after Britain has left the EU, during which some aspects of EU membership still apply to Britain</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>39</b>

Q11 And as you may know there has been much discussion on what Britain’s relationship with the European Union should be after it leaves. Some say Britain should prioritise having access to the European Single Market while others think Britain should prioritise having control over immigration. What do you think Britain should prioritise?

	Oct '16 %	Jan '17 %	July '17 %
Britain should prioritise having access to the European Single Market	45	44	49
Britain should prioritise having control over immigration	39	42	41
Neither (not read out)	4	3	2
Prioritise having both (not read out)	7	6	4
Don't know (not read out)	5	5	5