8 key findings from a longitudinal study on attitudes towards immigration and Brexit
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1. The study – and eight key findings

In 2015, Ipsos MORI released the findings of a five-wave longitudinal study, Shifting Ground\(^\text{1}\) exploring how people’s attitudes towards immigration changed before, during and after the 2015 General Election campaign.

Following on from the study, the issue of immigration came into even sharper focus in the run-up to the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. With funding from Unbound Philanthropy, we carried out two additional waves with our panel focusing on immigration and our relationship with the EU. The sixth wave of the study was conducted before the EU Referendum in April 2016 and the final wave was conducted after the vote in October 2016. The final wave comprised a longer questionnaire than previous waves and explored a range of attitudes that could be useful in helping to explain why people voted the way they did in the referendum (full methodology can be found in appendix 1).

This report presents an accumulation of research findings across the study, which uniquely tracked the same people to understand how attitudes changed at an individual level. The key lessons are:

1. People have become MORE positive about immigration in the last few years
2. BUT the majority of people still want immigration reduced
3. Those who are most open to immigration have been most stable in their views
4. There are few demographic or attitudinal differences between those who’ve become more positive or negative about immigration
5. Sovereignty and anti-immigrant feeling drove the EU referendum vote, but this is closely tied to a broader sense of distrust of the system and nostalgia
6. BUT there is not one type of Leave or Remain voter, demographically or attitudinally
7. Brexit has revealed new political fault lines – but other traditional party political divides remain
8. The “system is broken” for a large majority of people – but it is when this sentiment is combined with a sense of personal threat that it affects behaviour

1. People have become MORE positive about immigration in the last few years

Since the start of this study in 2015, our longitudinal panel was asked whether immigration has had a positive or negative effect on Britain, from a scale of 0 (very negative) to 10 (very positive). Over this time the proportion rating the impact of immigration on Britain as positive (scoring 6-10) increased and the proportion saying negative (scoring 0-4), decreased, and those scoring neutral (scoring 5) have remained relatively stable, as shown in the Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Change in views of immigration’s impact

This finding appears to be a continuation of trends seen in other earlier survey series. For example, Ipsos’ Global @dvisor survey in 2011 found 19% said immigration has had a very/fairly positive impact on Britain compared with 35% in 2015. Similarly, data from the British Attitudes Survey (BSA) show an increasing proportion of the public who believe that the impact of immigration on Britain’s economy is positive: in 2002, just 27% of the British public said immigration has been good for the economy but by 2014 this had risen by 14 points to 40%.

The trend from our survey shows a gradual shift to more positive views throughout the series, but a greater change following the EU Referendum. This may reflect a galvanising effect from the Brexit vote on those who already held positive views, or a sense of reassurance among those who were less positive, now that the prospect of reduced immigration seems more realistic with Brexit.

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Furthermore, immigration is now much less likely to be mentioned by people as a top concern in our monthly Issues Index, as shown in Figure 2, above. In its place, Brexit and our relationship with the EU has risen as an issue. Of course, we should not conclude from this that the salience of immigration has significantly receded, given how intertwined the two issues are: a large proportion of those mentioning the EU as a top concern will be focused on its impact on immigration, as we will see.

When looking at the individual level of change for all participants that took part in the full length of the study, we find that although most people held the same view on immigration’s impact on Britain in February 2015 as they did in October 2016, most people who did change opinion became more positive. Roughly two in five (39%) of those who held a negative view of immigration in October 2015, moved to either feeling neutral or positive. Of those who held positive views about immigration in October 2015, 22% switched to saying immigration’s impact was either neutral or negative in October 2016.

These shifts are shown in Figure 3, which tracks how individuals moved from the start to end of the study. The positive change is made up of a fairly equal mix of those who were negative moving to neutral or positive, a similar proportion of neutral respondents in 2015 moving to a positive score, and fewer individuals moving in the opposite direction.
Figure 3: Individual level change on views of immigration

Largest change is people moving from negative to becoming neutral or positive

On a scale of 0 to 10, has migration had a positive or negative impact on the local area where you live? (0-4 “Negative”, 5 “Neutral”, 6-10 “Positive”)

2. ...BUT the public still want immigration reduced

However, the interpretation that immigration remains a key concern for the public despite a more positive view of its impact is reinforced by the fact that a stable and clear majority still want immigration numbers into the UK reduced. In October 2016 (our final wave) we found six in 10 people (60%) overall want to see immigration levels reduced – almost identical to our first wave in February 2015. Indeed, this is a common feature of immigration attitudes in the UK over many decades: despite significant ups and downs in actual migration figures and how top of mind a concern it is, our review of historical attitudes to immigration shows that there are always 60%+ who want immigration reduced3. See Figure 4.

And this picture of stability is mirrored when we look at change at an individual level, tracking the same people and how their views shifted, as shown in Figure 5. There is relatively little movement between the groupings, although there appears to be more churn among the “increased” group. However, this should not lead us to conclude that the pro-migration group is particularly unstable: as we’ll see in later sections, those more open to immigration actually change their views less than other groups.
3. Those who are most to open to immigration have been most stable in their views

Although the preference among the majority for reduced immigration has shifted little over time at the aggregate level, and there have not been major shifts at an individual level, there is still enough movement to want to understand who is changing their attitudes and why. To understand these changes more fully, we conducted a segmentation analysis to break the survey respondents into distinct groups, mirroring other similar analyses by Hope Note Hate and others.\(^4\)

Our aim was to shed light on a key question: which types of people changed their views on immigration the most? This is vital to understand, as communications targeted at the public from campaigners and others have increasingly tended to focus on groups that can be characterised as a “conflicted” or “persuadable” middle – with the reasonable assumption that efforts are more likely to be wasted on reinforcing the support of those who are already convinced, or trying to switch those with firmly entrenched negative views.

Using factor and cluster analysis techniques, the following four groups – see Figure 6 - were identified as having distinct attitudes to immigration (a more detailed description of each segment can be found in appendix 2). As with similar analyses conducted by others, this split the population into roughly equally sized segments, with one clearly anti-immigration group, one open to immigration and around half of the population in the middle two sceptical but less clearly decided groups. And as also seen in other analyses, the distinguishing feature between these two middle groups is that the root of immigration scepticism for one is mostly driven by economic and resource concerns, while the other it is more

\(^4\) http://hopenothate.org.uk/fear-hope-2017-overview/
focused on cultural concerns. It is also notable that it is the ‘Comfortably off and culturally concerned’ that are more negative than the ‘Under pressure’ group, which again echoes the pattern seen in other work.5

**Figure 6: How the population segments by views on immigration**

Using this segmentation, we tested the absolute amount of change in attitudes among these four groups between survey waves to determine which is the most stable in their immigration views over time and which is the most volatile. To do this we created a variable for each group which measures the average change per person on our 0-10 immigration impact question from wave to wave. We then calculated the average amount of absolute change each group experienced over the waves.

One way to understand this is to present the results as a measure of change, indexed against the lowest churn group, using the change in that group as a baseline, see Table 1. In this analysis, it was the ‘Open to Immigration’ group that is most stable. They are most consistent in their opinion and at the individual level, with less movement from wave to wave per person compared to the other three groups. The analysis shows that the ‘Anti-immigration’ group was the most volatile, with 38% more movement than in the ‘Open to immigration’ group, although the amount of change in the ‘Under pressure’ group is very similar (at 34% greater than the open immigration group). The ‘Comfortably off and culturally concerned’ group changed somewhat less, but still significantly more (23%) than the open to immigration group (see appendix 2 for statistical output).

This suggests that in fact it is all groups apart from the most positive on immigration that shift their views the most and most frequently, not just the middle groups. Of course, this covers all types of change in views, including becoming more

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negative about immigration. The next section therefore unpicks the type and direction of changes among individuals in more detail.

Table 1: Amount of change by segment relative to ‘Open to immigration’ group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segment</th>
<th>Amount of additional change in views relative to ‘Open to immigration’ group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigration group</td>
<td>+38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under pressure group</td>
<td>+34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortably off and culturally concerned group</td>
<td>+23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. There are few demographic or attitudinal differences between those who’ve become more positive or negative about immigration

As we’ve seen, the aggregate results from the question on ratings of immigration as positive or negative changed relatively little at an aggregate level. Further, even at an individual level, relatively few switched between a positive (scoring 6-10), negative (0-4) or neutral (5) view. But this hides a greater degree of more minor changes in attitudes.

In fact, between the February 2015 and October 2016 half (49%) of all respondents moved in a positive direction on the 0-10 immigration impact scale. One in five (19%) moved only slightly – one point up the scale – however, three in ten (30%) moved two or more places up the scale becoming more positive about immigration’s impact on Britain. See Figure 7.

And, in the opposite direction, one in five (21%) became more negative about the impact of immigration over the duration of the study, with 12% changing marginally by one point down the scale and nine per cent moved two or more places down the scale. Three in ten (30%) remained stable and did not change their opinion at all.
We can then look at these groups to understand the characteristics of who is shifting.

First, as Table 2 overleaf shows, looking at how our segmentation groups move, we actually see relatively consistent levels of positive changes in attitudes between groups: the Anti-immigration group are slightly less likely to have moved in a positive direction, but only slightly. This is important: the positive shift in views of immigration over this period were not driven by just one or two segments. There is, however, slightly more difference between groups on the proportions who have become more negative, with the Anti-immigration group more likely to have moved in that direction, compared with the Open to immigration group in particular.

However, looking at other demographic and other characteristics, the overall picture is that there are not huge differences in how demographic and attitudinal groups changed. The most notable difference is on how respondents described their financial situation. Three in ten (31%) who said they were currently “living comfortably” on their present income became more positive towards immigration over the course of the study, compared with 23% who are “finding it very difficult” to live on their current income.

The nature of change also does seem to vary slightly with age group, where it’s clear that the youngest and oldest age group were more likely to shift in a positive direction over the duration of the study, compared with the middle age group. A third (33%) of those aged 18-34 years and three in ten (31%) those aged 55+ years moved two places or more becoming more positive about immigration (compared to 23% aged 35-54 years).

There was no statistically significant difference in movement between social grades. For example, the group with the most change in a positive direction were ABs (the highest social classes) with three in ten (30%) becoming at least 2 points more positive while C2s (skilled manual workers) were the group with the least change with 26% becoming more positive.
There was also little difference in attitudinal shifts between Remain and Leave voters. Three in ten of both Remain and Leave voters (30% and 29% respectively) became more positive in their views towards immigration - although 11% of Leave voters became more negative compared to six percent of Remain voters.

Table 2: Rate of change of immigration attitudes between February 2015 and October 2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>-2 or more</th>
<th>Between +1 and -1</th>
<th>+2 or more</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anti-immigration group</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under pressure group</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comfortably off and culturally concerned group</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open to Immigration group</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-34</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-54</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55+</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C1</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DE</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remain</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leave</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Living comfortably on present income</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finding it very difficult on present income</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, as we might expect, there is a relationship between changing attitudes and the changing salience of immigration to individuals. When it comes to what people see as the most concerning issue facing Britain, those who became more negative about the effects of immigration were also more likely to say immigration was an issue in October 2016 than they were in February 2015. In February 2015, 19% of those in the increasingly negative group listed immigration as their biggest concern. By October 2016 this had risen to 29%. Conversely, among those who became more positive about immigration over the course of the study, a quarter (26%) said that immigration was their top concern in February 2015, and this figure dropped to 16% by October 2016.

5. Sovereignty and anti-immigrant feeling drove the EU referendum vote, but this is closely tied to a broader sense if distrust of the system and nostalgia

As we’ve just seen, there are no big differences in how views on immigration shifted between Remain and Leave voters over the course of the study – but, as we might expect, there are very marked differences in what they say drove their vote in the EU Referendum.

As Figure 8 shows, the top stated issue in deciding their vote for Remain voters was “the impact on Britain’s economy”, mentioned by 71% of Remain voters, but only 30% of those who voted Leave. The second most mentioned issue for Remain voters was “Britain’s ability to trade with countries in the European Union” - 60% of them stated this was important, compared with nine per cent of Leavers.
For those voting Leave, Britain’s ability to make its own laws was the top stated issue in deciding their vote, cited by three-quarters (74%) - compared with 40% for the population as a whole, and just one in nine (11%) Remain voters. The joint second most mentioned issues reported were “the number of immigrants coming to Britain” and “the cost of EU immigration on Britain’s welfare system”, both on 68% (Remain voters reported 14% and 13% respectively).

Figure 8: Most important issues in deciding referendum vote

This provides a snapshot of what people said drove their voting behaviour, which we can think of as “explicit” drivers. There is another approach to understanding the importance of other attitudes to how people voted, by looking at what other attitudes are most associated with voting a particular way, which can be thought of as more “implicit” drivers.

We can examine the latter through statistical techniques. First, a factor analysis was conducted to test the correlation between the questions we used in the in the survey (how much the variables relate or group - for full list of factors see appendix 3). Following this, a linear multiple regression model was used to understand which of our factors were most associated with how people voted. The results from this are shown in Figure 9 overleaf, with the percentage figure giving an indication of how associated the factor was with how people voted.

The anti-immigration and nativist factor (which is focused on protecting the interests of native-born or established inhabitants against those of immigrants) was by far the most powerful explanatory factor, but distrust in experts also came out as particularly important. This was followed by the factor that grouped opposition to political correctness and a suspicion of human rights, two themes that the factor analysis confirmed were strongly related. There is therefore a clear picture of how important a particular values outlook was to explaining the vote, more so than a direct sense of being “left behind” in economic terms or that the “system is broken” (the latter theme is strong across both Remain and Leave voters, and therefore is a weak discriminator of what drove people’s vote).
Given the importance of this nativism/anti-immigrant sentiment to how people voted, we conducted a further regression analysis to understand what features were most associated with support or opposition to this view, see Figure 10. This shows that a lack of valuing diversity - made up of a belief that it is “not important to listen to many perspectives” and believing a mixed area is not a more enjoyable place to live - was the strongest driver. This is an interesting group of items that clustered together in the analysis, with people who believe in one tending to believe in the other. It suggests that this “valuing diversity” theme is broader than just race, ethnicity or the nature of areas, it also encompasses openness to diversity of ideas and perspectives, pointing to the importance of underlying values in shaping nativist views.

This was followed by opposing political correctness, and being nostalgic about Britain’s past (believing Britain is changing too fast, things in Britain were better in the past). These individuals were also more likely to believe Britain will be in a strong negotiating position post-Brexit. A strong sense of authoritarianism was also a significant contributing factor - a factor created from participants’ answers to ‘for some crimes, I believe the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence’, it is “important to me that the country be safe from within and without’, and ‘we live in an increasingly dangerous world’.

Taken together, these two analyses emphasise the importance of these wider world views and values, more so than the direct economic sense of being left behind.
The importance of a more traditional, past-centred view of Britain is also seen in other questions and how this varies between Leave and Remain voters. For example, when we asked what they value in being British, the Leave group are more likely than Remainers to state that Britain’s history (43% vs 28%), the Royal family (30% vs 17%) and the British Army (25% vs 11%) makes them most proud to be British, as shown in Figure 11. Remainer voters on the other hand, focus more on the NHS, culture and the arts, tolerance and the BBC.
6. BUT there is not one type of Leave or Remain voter, demographically or attitudinally

However, we need to avoid stereotyping all Leave and Remain voters as having one world view – given they each make up around half of the voting public, it’s not surprising that there is in fact a wide variety of perspectives. We explored this through a further segmentation analysis, based around how people voted in the Referendum.

This analysis suggested there were seven clusters of EU Referendum voters who shared significant demographic and attitudinal similarities – three groups where the majority voted Leave, three groups where the majority voted Remain and a final group that was evenly split between Leave and Remain voters. The groups are summarised in Figure 12 (a more detailed description of each segment can be found in appendix 4):
Figure 12: How the population segments according to their EU referendum vote

This segmentation highlights a number of interesting features of both Leave and Remain voters.

For example, the segments reinforce the importance of cultural views and values in driving attitudes and grouping the population. In particular, it is notable that there are a wide range of socio-economic circumstances in the Remain groupings, and the most “Remain” group we have identified actually feel under the most financial pressure, being the most likely to say they are struggling.

All the ‘clear cut’ Leave groups hold the most nativist and negative views on immigration and are more nostalgic for the past. Their vote to Leave was linked to feelings of cultural anxiety, feeling that Britain is changing in ways they don’t like and that immigrants get priority over welfare and jobs. In a mirror of the “Liberal Striver” group being the most pro-Remain but also feeling the most financially challenged, the most consistently “Leave” group – the “Culturally anxious” are among the most comfortable financially.

However, this is not to say that a sense of economic pressure played no role in how people voted, as this was a clear factor for the other two Leave groups, the “Just About Managing” and the “Left Behind”. It seems that the strongest feelings were driven by cultural anxiety, but, as David Willets has suggested, it took groups of both the ‘excluded and the insulated’ to deliver Brexit. 6

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6 https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/the-hands-on-economy-industrial-policy-thatcherite
7. Brexit has revealed new political fault lines – but many traditional party political divides still remain

We also explored how views varied between Leave and Remain voters in another way, interlocking their referendum vote with their party support, to understand the issues which divide (or unite) Leave and Remain voters, Conservative and Labour voters, and how these fault lines interact. Other literature and commentary has tapped into this notion of voters having more in common with fellow Remain or Leave voters than their party political identity, and the demographic and attitudinal similarities of the Leave voters, and similarities of Remain voters.7 Indeed, in its report looking a EU Referendum a year on, The UK in a Changing Europe suggest that the referendum has produced new political identities based on the Leave-Remain divide8.

Our relatively large sample size in the study allows us to unpick this more, by looking at four groups of respondents: Conservative Remainers, Conservative Leavers, Labour Remainers, and Labour Leavers. When analysing these results, it is important to note that these groups vary significantly in size, as per the distribution of the column furthest to the right in Figure 13. The Conservative Leave group is the largest, so when we look at the overall results, this group has the largest impact on the overall figure. As evident from the chart below, the Conservative voters are distributed more evenly across both camps, whereas Labour voters lean heavily towards Remain. These splits are in line with our other analyses of our monthly political surveys, although we have slightly more Labour Remainers and fewer Labour Leavers than others have found in the British Election Study. However, the differences aren’t large and the analysis is still useful in highlighting relative differences (and, as an aside, makes the point that Labour’s focus on the Leave element of their vote looks somewhat unbalanced).

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This analysis highlights that there are three groups of issues:

- **Issues where people’s EU referendum vote is a greater unifier than party support**: on issues such as nostalgia and immigration, Leavers are united irrespective of whether they vote Labour or Conservative. Leavers are also more likely than Remainers to place more trust in the public to make complex decisions and more likely to be sceptical of experts, regardless of party support.

- **Traditional party lines are still evident on some issues**: on more typical “left-right” economic questions and on the type of society that people want to live in, party lines remain strong. Labour voters (regardless of whether they voted Leaver or Remain) favour a society that is more equal and where differences in people’s income levels are small, whereas Conservative voters support a more individualistic society, again regardless of referendum vote. Labour voters are also more likely to say they have felt the impact of austerity measures, and believe that it is more difficult for someone like them to get ahead in Britain. Labour voters are also more likely to strongly agree that the system is rigged towards the rich and powerful.

- **Issues where party support and referendum vote interact**: a gradient runs from Conservative Leave to Labour Remain on some other issues: opposition to political correctness and support for the death sentence for certain crimes is highest among Conservative Leavers, and lowest among Labour Remainers. Similarly, support for gay marriage is highest in the Labour Remain group and lowest among Conservative Leavers.

We outline these findings in more detail below.
a. The EU referendum vote unites people across the Conservative-Labour divide

There are a number of issues and social attitudes where how people voted in the EU Referendum clearly unites people rather than the political party they support. People who voted Leave are more nostalgic about the past, and feel a sense of unease about the pace of change in Britain today. Those voting Leave are more likely to agree that “things in Britain were better in the past” (53% Conservative Leave, 55% Labour Leave, 31% Conservative Remain, 30% Labour Remain), see Figure 14.

Figure 14: Sense of nostalgia by EU referendum vote and party support

They are also more likely to agree that “Britain today is changing too fast” (51% Conservative Leave, 50% Labour Leave, 38% Conservative Remain, 30% Labour Remain). See Figure 15.
Unsurprisingly, given the findings above, Leave voters are also more likely to agree to the statement “These days I feel like a stranger in my own country”, as shown in Figure 16. Remain voters are much more likely to disagree (72% Labour Remain, 56% Conservative Remain) compared to Leave voters (Labour Leave 33%, Conservative Leave 28%).
Leavers are, also predictably, more concerned about the impact of immigration on the British economy and society. Both Conservative and Labour Leave groups are more likely to feel that “immigrants take away jobs from real Britons” (56% Conservative Leave, 55% Labour Leave, 24% Conservative Remain, 13% Labour Remain), and “immigrants take away important welfare services from real Britons” (Conservative Leave (75%), Labour Leave (62%), Conservative Remain (42%), Labour Remain (19%)). See Figure 17.

**Figure 17: Whether immigrants take jobs from Britons by EU referendum and party support**

Moreover, the two Leave groups are more likely to believe that some groups get unfair priority over them when it comes to some public services, as seen in Figure 18, with similar agree figures for the Leave groups (Labour Leave (66%), Conservative Leave (57%), Labour Remain (30%), Conservative Remain 40%)).
When asked about immigration reduction directly, it is therefore not surprising that both Conservative and Labour Leave groups are more likely to want to see a sharp reduction in immigration levels, see Figure 19. Although no group is in favour of increasing immigration, the Leave groups are far more likely to state that they think immigration should be reduced a lot.
Both Leave groups are also more likely to trust the wisdom of ordinary people rather than experts, compared to both Remain groups, see Figure 20. Whereas over half of the Conservative Leave (58%) and Labour Leave (55%) groups say they would rather put their trust in ordinary people than experts, less than one third of Conservative Remainers (28%) and Labour Remainers (27%) would do so.
Additionally, both Leave groups are more likely to agree to the statement “I generally trust the judgements of the British people, even for complicated political issues”, although the Conservative Leave group is slightly more likely to agree (64%) than Labour Leave (50%). Both Remain groups are less likely to agree, but the Conservative Remain group is more likely to do so compared with the Labour Remain group (35% vs 22% respectively). 9 See Figure 21.

9 Lee Jones describes in the following blog that it is the authority which experts tend to push onto the public which is creating a backlash against them: https://thecurrentmoment.wordpress.com/2017/01/
**Figure 21: Trust in people’s collective judgement by EU referendum vote and party support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leavers have more trust in the British people’s collective judgement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>To what extent do you agree that…. I generally trust the judgements of the British people, even for complicated political issues</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strongly agree</th>
<th>Tend to agree</th>
<th>Neither agree or disagree</th>
<th>Tend to disagree</th>
<th>Strongly disagree</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total GB**

**Conservative Leave**

**Conservative Remain**

**Labour Leave**

**Labour Remain**

b. Traditional party lines are still strong, particularly on economic issues and type of society preferred

Whereas political party lines seem blurred on issues such as immigration, nostalgia, and trust in experts, Labour and Conservative party lines are much more evident on issues such as austerity and how people feel they are managing financially. Labour voters say that they are more likely to have been affected by spending cuts (39% Labour Leave, 40% Labour Remain) compared with Conservative voters (17% both groups). See Figure 22.
Conservative voters are more likely to say they are living comfortably on their present income (39% Conservative Leave, 37% Conservative Remain) in comparison to Labour voters (17% Labour Leave, 24% Labour Remain). See Figure 23.
There is also a clear distinction between Labour and Conservative voters on whether life in Britain is getting worse rather than better. Labour Remainers (64%) are more likely to agree than Labour Leavers (51%) and Labour Leavers are more likely to agree than both Conservative groups (Conservative Leave 38%, Conservative Remainer 36%). Labour voters are also more likely to agree to “it is increasingly hard for someone like me to get ahead in Britain”, regardless of whether they voted Leave or Remain (Labour Leave 49%, Labour Remain 44%), compared to both Conservative groups (Conservative Leave 21%, Conservative Remainer 24%). See Figure 24.

Figure 24: Ability to get ahead in Britain by EU referendum vote and party support

One of the most powerful divisions between Conservative and Labour voters is on the question of whether the British economy is rigged towards the rich and powerful. Half of Conservative Leavers (49%) and two in five Conservative Remainers (39%) agree that the British economy is rigged towards the rich and powerful, whereas four in five Labour voters agree (85% Leave, 82% Remain), with almost half in these two groups strongly agreeing. See Figure 25.
The divide is also noticeable with views on the type of society people want to live in. Labour voters, in particular Labour Remainers, believe that a fair society is one where there are small differences in people’s living standards (70% Labour Remain, 60% Labour Leave, vs. 37% Conservative Remain, 31% Conservative Leave). See Figure 26.
In contrast, Conservative voters are more likely to agree that large differences in income are acceptable as a reward for differences in talent and effort, see Figure 27. A majority of both Conservative groups (63% Leave, 60% Remain) believe this is acceptable, whereas significantly fewer Labour voters believe so (28% Leave and 22% Remain).

**Figure 27: Acceptability of differences in income by EU referendum vote and party support**

![Conservative supporters are more likely to think income inequality is acceptable to reward talent and effort](Diagram)

| Base: SWH Conserv voters who voted leave in the referendum. 466 Conserv voters who voted remain in the referendum, 171 Labour voters who voted leave in the referendum, and 464 Labour voters who voted remain in the referendum, completing an online panel survey between the 13-20th October 2016. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly agree | Tend to agree | Neither agree or disagree | Tend to disagree | Strongly disagree | Don’t know |
| Total GB | 8% | 15% | 14% | 8% | 3% |
| Conservative Leave | 20% | 48% | 15% | 14% | 8% | 3% |
| Conservative Remain | 12% | 24% | 21% | 12% | 3% |
| Labour Leave | 13% | 26% | 29% | 13% | 3% |
| Labour Remain | 17% | 29% | 31% | 17% | 3% |

**c. On some issues, party support and the Brexit vote interact**

On some issues, how people voted in the EU referendum and party allegiance interact, to create a gradient of support or agreement, running from Conservative Leavers at one end to Labour Remainers at the other end. As we have already seen, Conservative voters see income inequality as an acceptable reward for hard work, but there is a noticeable difference between the four groups on whether society should be more individualistic or more collective. The strongest proponents of a more individualistic society are Conservative Leavers, whereas on the other end of the scale are Labour Remainers, who strongly support a more collective society, as illustrated in Figure 28.
A similar pattern emerges on the issue of political correctness. Conservative Leave voters are most likely to oppose political correctness, whereas Labour Remainers are most likely to support it, with Conservative Remainers and Labour Leavers with similar views to each other. See Figure 29.

**Figure 29: Political correctness by EU referendum vote and party support**
There is also a clear gradient on some social attitudes. For example, when asked whether gay marriage should be allowed, just four in ten (42%) Conservative Leavers agree it should be. Conservative Remain and Labour Leave groups again have higher and similar levels of agreement (60% and 57% respectively). Labour Remainers, however, show the strongest agreement with four in five (79%) agreeing that gay marriage should be allowed. See Figure 30.

**Figure 30: Views on gay marriage by EU referendum vote and party support**

Conservative Leavers are also most likely to believe the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for some crimes. When asked how much the statement “I believe the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence for some crimes” described them, over half of respondents (52%) in the Conservative Leave group stated this was “very much like me” or “like me”. This compares with 40% in the Labour Leave group, 32% in the Conservative Remain group, and 16% in the Labour Remain group. This issue is, therefore, somewhere between two categories in our classification: Leave voters have much in common, but Labour Remain voters are significantly different from Conservative Remain voters. See Figure 31.
These findings show that Brexit has not entirely replaced traditional party dividing lines, but has revealed fragmentations within the two main political parties. These will not be new – but the EU Referendum has exposed not only splits within parties but also found common ground between Conservative and Labour supporters. It demonstrates that there are no simple lines of ‘left vs right’ ‘open vs closed’, ‘nativist vs pluralistic’ or ‘somewhere vs anywhere’, but that they interact differently on different issues. Whereas other literature points towards a new split in British politics based on Leave or Remain\[10\] our research suggests something more varied.

\[10\] http://ukandeu.ac.uk/research-papers/eu-referendum-one-year-on/
8. The system is broken for nearly all – but this needs to be combined with personal threat to affect behaviour

Recent research has focused on the hypothesis that there is a growing belief among the public that the economic system does not work for them – whether that be the global economic system or in Britain specifically. The final wave of our research investigated this. As we’ve just seen, there are stark differences along party lines on these issues, with Labour supporters more likely than Conservatives to believe that the British economic system is rigged to favour the rich and powerful. We find however that merely believing – or not believing – that the system is rigged does not seem to drive large variations in other attitudes. Rather, it’s when one believes that the system does not work for them personally that attitudes and behaviour are most affected.

Figure 32: Agreement that system is rigged and extent to which people personally benefit from economic growth

So while the majority (64%) people believe that that the British economy is rigged in favour of the rich and powerful, less than half of that (29%) believe they do not personally benefit from economic growth in Britain (although a significant proportion, 37%, are neutral). See Figure 32. To investigate how these views interact, we have split the sample into two groups – those who believe the economy is rigged yet still personally benefit from economic growth and those who believe the economy is rigged but feel they do not personally benefit from economic growth – and compared their attitudes and behaviours.

As Figure 33 shows, there are differences in the demographic profile of the two groups, in the way we might expect. Specifically, those who believe the system is rigged but do personally benefit from the economy are more likely to be well

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educated, more middle class, and more likely to be living comfortably on their present income - while those who do not personally benefit are less well educated, more working class, and finding it difficult to cope on their present income.

And in terms of attitudes and behaviours, there are some stark differences. In particular, those who also feel they personally do not benefit from economic growth are more likely to have voted Leave in the EU referendum: 50% said they voted Leave compared with 31% of those who think the economy is rigged but personally benefit. See Figure 34.

There is also a significant difference between these two groups when it comes to attitudes towards others receiving unfair priority from public services. Two-thirds (64%) of those who feel they personally don’t benefit from the economy think others receive priority over them compared with 44% of those who think the system is rigged yet personally benefit.

There is also much stronger anti-immigrant sentiment amongst those who feel they don’t personally benefit from growth: only 38% see immigration as positive, compared with 71% of those who benefit from growth. See Figure 34.

**Figure 33: Those who think system is rigged by belief they personally benefit from economic growth**
This again emphasises that the feeling you are benefiting economically remains an important discriminator of attitudes and behaviours – that while cultural concerns may explain more of the strength of feeling in some groups, a sense of progress is still important. But this is not a general sense of the system being rigged or broken, as that is a commonplace view. Rather it’s when an individual feels the system works against them personally that their attitudes and behaviour are most affected.
Appendix 1: Methodology

In 2015, Ipsos MORI released the findings of five-wave longitudinal study, *Shifting Ground* exploring how people’s attitudes towards immigration changed before, during and after the 2015 General Election campaign.

Following on from the study, the issue of immigration came into even sharper focus in the run-up to the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU. With funding from Unbound Philanthropy, we were able to carry out two additional waves with our panel focusing on immigration and our relationship with the EU. The sixth wave of the study was conducted before the EU Referendum in April 2016 and the final wave was conducted after the vote in October 2016. The final wave comprised a longer questionnaire than previous waves and explored a range of attitudes that could be useful in helping to explain why people voted the way they did in the referendum.

Methodology

The research was conducted via the Ipsos MORI online panel with British adults aged 16+ years.

The first wave of the study was conducted with 4,574 respondents (fieldwork completed from 25 February to 4 March 2015) which allowed us to look at smaller sub-groups, including followers of all key political parties. The response rates for subsequent waves of the survey were relatively high, as outlined in the below table. For Wave 6, the panel was topped up with new members enable greater sub-group analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wave number</th>
<th>Fieldwork dates</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Response rate (wave to wave)</th>
<th>Cumulative response rate (wave to wave)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>25 February – 4 March 2015</td>
<td>4,574</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>27 March – 7 April 2015</td>
<td>3,770</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>30 April – 6 May 2015</td>
<td>3,023</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>26 June – 2 July 2015</td>
<td>2,698</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>15 – 19 October 2015</td>
<td>1,941</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6  14 - 25 April 2016  4,002 which comprised two samples: (1) 1,606 who completed Wave 1  (2) Top up new sample of 2,396 83% 35%

7  13-20 October 2016  (1) 2,765 who completed Wave 6  (2) 1,306 who completed Wave 1 69% 29% who completed Wave 1

In total, 1,301 people completed all seven waves of the study.

Quotas were applied in the first wave to achieve a representative sample of the population across Great Britain including age, gender and region. Each of the subsequent waves were then weighted to reflect these quotas.

We would like to thank Will Somerville and Unbound Philanthropy for their support through the duration of this project as well as the many other contributors who helped influence and shape our research.

**Further statistical analysis**

The study has created a very rich and detailed dataset, with a unique longitudinal element, allowing us to track changes in attitudes at an individual level, as well as a wide range of question topics over relatively large samples. Our focus has therefore been on mining the data using a variety of statistical techniques to understand underlying relationships. We have conducted:

- Factor analysis to see which themes are most related to the issue of immigration;
- Discriminant analysis to help understand which factors are more important to views
- Logistic regression to develop a model of the most important themes in driving attitudes and behaviour
- Latent class analysis to segment the population according to their voting behaviour in the referendum and attitudes towards immigration.
Appendix 2: change between immigration groups statistical output

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>avediff</th>
<th>Difference of each group when compared to the Open to immigration group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Anti-immigration</td>
<td>1.3939</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mid group1 - comfortable</td>
<td>1.2399</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mid group2 - more pressured</td>
<td>1.3467</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Open to immigration</td>
<td>1.0072</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.2541</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 3: Factors used in segmentation

At the questionnaire design stage for the final waves of the study, we systematically reviewed published work on the drivers of voting for/against Brexit and immigration attitudes. This provided a themed framework to ensure we included questions on what had been identified as the most importance explanations. These were grouped into the following factors:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factor</th>
<th>Constituent questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individualism/self-reliance</td>
<td>I would like to live in a society where the individual is encouraged to look after himself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Large differences in people’s incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in tales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For a society to be fair, differences in people’s standard of living should be small</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nostalgia</td>
<td>Things in Britain were better in the past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Britain is changing too fast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nativism/anti-immigration</td>
<td>Immigrants take away jobs from real Britons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigrants take away important welfare services away from real Britons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>These days I feel like a stranger in my own country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Impact of immigration in Britain is negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Immigration should be reduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authoritarianism</td>
<td>For some crimes, I believe the death penalty is the most appropriate sentence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>It is important to me that the country be safe from within and without</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>We live in an increasingly dangerous world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political correctness/human</td>
<td>Agree that people who take about human rights are mainly interested in protecting rights of criminals not victims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rights</td>
<td>I am opposed to political correctness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disagree that homosexual couples should be allowed to marry each other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuing diversity</td>
<td>It is important for me to listen to people who are different to myself. Even if I disagree with the other person I still want to understand them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Having a mix of people in the area makes it a more enjoyable place to live.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[DISAGREE] I would rather live in an area where people are from the same ethnic background as me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Has friends from different ethnic backgrounds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System is broken</td>
<td>The British economy is rigged to advantage the rich and powerful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Government power in Britain is too centralised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[AGREE] for most people in Britain, life is getting worse rather than better</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distrust experts</td>
<td>[AGREE] I would rather put trust in the ordinary people than the opinions of experts and intellectuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I generally trust the collective judgements of the British people, even for complicated political issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>System doesn’t work for me</td>
<td>Some groups of people get unfair priority when it comes to public services like housing, health services and schools.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Traditional party politicians don’t care about people like me or the area where we live</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Struggling               | [DISAGREE] I personally benefit from economic growth in Britain  
|                        | [DISAGREE] My local area gets its fair share of economic success |
|                        | Extent to which generation will be worse off than parents’ generation  
|                        | Finding it difficult to live on present income  
|                        | It is increasingly difficult for someone like me to get ahead in Britain  
|                        | Pessimistic about future  
|                        | Low life satisfaction |
| Globalisation          | Globalisation is good for Britain  
|                        | Foreign companies have too much control and influence over the economy in Britain  
|                        | Investment by global companies in Britain is essential for our growth |
| Trust in others        | Feel close to people in the local area  
|                        | Trust in people in their neighbourhood. |
Appendix 4: Segments

Two segmentation were carried out from the data collected at wave seven. The first segmentation looked at how the population divide in its views on immigration, and one on how the population varies depending on how they voted in the referendum vote. A technique called Latent Class Analysis (LCA), which is a form of cluster analysis, was used to find similarities in responses to the various attitudinal questions and used to group individuals. The technique established patterns in attitudes and measures the correlation of variables to allocate respondents to a group which they have the highest probability of associating with. Attitudes were divided into various factors (e.g. nativism and authoritarianism) which are identified in Appendix 1 of this report.

The analysis from the immigration segmentation shows that the population splits into four groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Segmentation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Anti-immigration group (28% of the population)** | • Mean score 3.52 - most likely to say immigration has had a negative impact on Britain  
• Least likely to say they personally benefit from economic growth in Britain  
• Most nostalgic group and feel that Britain is changing too fast  
• Older group; 57% are aged over 55 years  
• This group contains more working-class people than other clusters (34% C2DE).  
• Over a third (37%) of this group is retired, has more unemployed people than other groups.  
• Contains the highest number of UKIP supporters  
• Voted heavily Leave in the EU referendum. |
| **Mid-group – feels under pressure (25% of the population)** | • Holds similar levels of positivity about immigration as the comfortably off group - mean score 6.34.  
• Second most likely group to think immigrants get priority over native population  
• Along with the ‘open to immigration’ group they are most likely to be affected by austerity  
• Least optimistic about the future  
• Youngest age group; 40% aged between 18-34.  
• Relatively well educated; 50% have a degree or higher  
• 32% are in social grades C2DE.  
• Voted slightly more Remain than Leave. |
| **Mid group – comfortably off (23% of the population)** | • Mean score 6.59 – fairly positive about immigration’s impact on Britain  
• Least likely to say they are struggling financially  
• Are fairly optimistic about the future  
• High levels of trust in others  
• The second least nostalgic group  
• Do not think large differences in income are a problem in society.  
• Oldest of all the clusters; 60% aged over 55  
• Highest proportion of retired people (42%).  
• Well-educated group (half have a degree or above)  
• More middle-class (79% are ABC1s).  
• Politically, this group is heavily Conservative  
• Evenly split over the EU Referendum vote |
| **Open to immigration (24% of the population)** | • Mean score 8.76 – most positive about immigration’s impact on Britain  
• Least nostalgic group  
• Most positive about diversity  
• Most likely to trust experts.  
• Just as likely as the anti-immigration group to think that life in Britain is getting worse rather than better  
• Relatively young- 36% aged 18-34 years  
• Most well-educated group with almost three in four having a degree level education or higher.  
• One in five in this group is renting their home privately (Group with highest proportion of private renters)  
• Votes strongly Labour  
• Voted largely Remain in the EU Referendum |
In the second segmentation we identified groups based on how they voted in the referendum on EU membership. The segmentation analysis shows that:

- What distinguishes the groups is the extent to which people feel culturally anxious about the effects of immigration whether or not they feel personally threatened by immigration in terms of jobs and access to welfare services.

- People’s views on immigration are related to how people voted in the EU referendum; those more open to immigration voted heavily to Remain in the EU whereas the opposite is true of the anti-immigration group.

The referendum vote segmentation findings show:

- We have identified seven groups; three Leave groups, one ‘equally-split’-group and three Remain groups;

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Culturally anxious leavers (10% of the population)</th>
<th>Just about managing leavers (18% of the population)</th>
<th>‘Left-behind’ leavers (15% of the population)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strongest Leave group, 93% Leave, 6% Remain</td>
<td>• 71% Leave, 19% Remain</td>
<td>• 66 % Leave, 28% Remain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Dominated by Conservative supporters (62%), and the group with most of UKIP supporters (28%)</td>
<td>• Lower levels of education</td>
<td>• Disparate group; mixture of Conservative, Labour, UKIP supporters and those who are undecided about which way to vote in a General Election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Is older (large number of retired people) and relatively well-off</td>
<td>• Large amount of clerical and service workers</td>
<td>• Most likely to say that the system doesn’t work for them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Generally satisfied with life</td>
<td>• Not hugely affected by austerity</td>
<td>• Second highest score in feeling they are financially struggling in life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most likely to hold authoritarian values</td>
<td>• Low levels of trust in neighbours and experts</td>
<td>• Lowest income group among leavers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Least likely to have contact with immigrants of different ethnicities</td>
<td>• They hold nativist and anti-immigration views</td>
<td>• Low levels of life satisfaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most negative about impact of immigration in Britain</td>
<td>• They hold some ‘closed off’ views e.g. they don’t feel the need to listen to others</td>
<td>• Do not feel they have benefited from economic growth and they have been affected by austerity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 9 in 10 in this group said the number of immigrants coming into Britain was the biggest issue influencing their vote in the EU referendum.</td>
<td>• Second highest group on the anti-globalisation factor</td>
<td>• Scores highest on the nostalgic factor and second highest score on nativism and anti-immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Most strongly anti-globalisation group</td>
<td>• Confident that Britain will be in a strong position post Brexit</td>
<td>• Least negative about globalisation of all Leave groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• They are most proud about Britain’s history</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Evenly split (15% of the population)
- 54% Leave, 44% Remain
- Strongly Conservative (85%).
- Older, retired, financially comfortable
- Scored lowest on ‘struggling and dissatisfied with life’ factor
- Not affected by austerity
- Optimistic that post Brexit Britain will be able to negotiate a good trade deal
- Pro-globalisation
- Scores lowest on the ‘system is broken’ factor.
- Least anti-government group
- Not as negative about immigration as the clear-cut Leave groups

### Disengaged Remainers (16% of the population)
- 58% Remain, 20% Leave and 19% did not vote
- Lowest levels of political participation/engagement
- This group has a younger age profile; 46% under 35 years.
- Low levels of trust in people in the local area.
- Not too optimistic about their future
- Lower than average levels of life satisfaction
- They did not rate any of the EU issues as important
- They didn’t rate many factors that made them proud of Britain
- They are relatively positive about immigration.

### Comfortable Remainers (15% of the population)
- 90% Remain, 9% Leave
- Very politically engaged group – 90% say they always vote
- 62% support either Labour or Lib Dems
- Older age profile
- High levels of trust in people from local area
- They are a well-off group financially
- High satisfaction with life
- Least nostalgic group
- Positive about immigration and globalisation
- Least likely group to believe that the system doesn’t work for them
- They don’t feel threatened by immigration

### Liberal strivers (11% of the population)
- 94% Remain, 3% Leave
- High levels of political engagement
- Strong labour support; 59% Lab, 13% Lib 8% Green
- Young group; 49% aged under 35 years
- Medium levels of income; feel they haven’t benefited from economic success.
- Most trusting of experts
- Scores highest (above the Left behind leavers) on the ‘struggling and dissatisfied with life’ factor
- Least nativist group
- Hit by austerity and less optimistic about the future
- Most positive about immigration