



Six Conceptions of Nationality

A Global Segmentation Based on Inclusiveness

A Point of View

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Why Segment the Public Based on Their Conception of Nationality?

A Populist Wave Driven by Nativism

Throughout the western world, traditional party demarcations no longer correspond to the dividing lines of the current political debate.

This disconnect largely explains France's sudden and spectacular political reshuffling of 2017, which saw the rise to power of a brand new party, centered around the current President, and the collapse of old parties—and more recently, the emergence of the Yellow Vests protest movement outside the control of any political party.

Other examples abound: Brexit, with both supporters and opponents among Britain's two leading parties; and, of course, the rise to power of “outsider” candidates such as Donald Trump in the United States, Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and the advent of non-traditional or populist parties such as the Five-Star Movement and La Lega in Italy.

As demonstrated by Ipsos's Clifford Young, the recent populist surges in the Americas and in Europe are largely driven by nativism. Young defines nativism as the belief that: one's country would be stronger if immigration stopped; when jobs are scarce, people should prioritize hiring native born over immigrants; and immigrants take important social services away from real nationals.

Beyond Demographics


In order to see where the fault lines of the political landscapes lie, we need to start by looking at what people think—what are their values and vision of the world—and not only at who they are.

Most studies rely on demographic data (age, gender, education, income, geography, etc.) to categorize people in order to understand their political attitudes. Yet, demographics alone do not enable us to fully grasp the current political dynamics. It is particularly helpful to identify and define homogeneous groups according to what their fundamental values are. This can be achieved using a technique called “clusterization.”

Nationality: Who Is In, Who Is Out

To better understand the nature and the prevalence of nativism around the world, Ipsos explored people's views on nationality in terms of how inclusive or exclusive they are in relation to potential "outgroups." Ipsos also sought to identify different visions of nationality, assess the prevalence of each of these visions, profile those who hold them, and test their alignment with political party preference.

Ipsos asked over 19,000 men and women across 25 countries whether they consider members of different religious groups, immigrants with different types of legal and employment status and fluency in the local language, people of different ethnicity, LGBT people, and people with a criminal history as "real" nationals of their country. Based on the answers to the survey, six clusters emerged, each with its own vision of nationality.



The Six Segments: Their Conception of Nationality and Their Profile

Post-Nationalists (15% of the global population surveyed)

- Have a nearly **unconditional, all-inclusive** view of nationality
- **Welcome anyone into the fold** regardless of country of birth, family's region of origin (proxy for ethnicity), religion, sexual orientation/identity, acculturation, and, more often than not, criminal history, lack of legal immigration status or extreme political views.
- Tend to be **young** and **highly educated**.
- Most common in **Canada, the U.S., Australia, Chile, Spain, Sweden** and the **U.K.**

Legalists (15%)

- Their view of nationality is **all-inclusive** when it comes to place of birth, family's region of origin, religion, and sexual orientation/identity, **but** it is

conditioned by full-fledged citizenship and some level of **acculturation**.

- Consider **anyone born in their country** a “real national” as well as any **immigrant** who has been **naturalized** and is **fluent** in the local language.
- Skew **older** (50–64) and more **affluent**.
- Most common in **France, South Africa, Canada, the U.S., Australia** and **Argentina**.

Religists (17%)

- Extend membership to their nation to **anyone born in their country** (irrespective of their parent's country of origin) and to any **immigrant** who has been **naturalized**, is **fluent** in the local language, and is preferably employed, but **only if they belong to the country's dominant religious group** and **do not** espouse **extreme political views**.
- Globally, their demographic and political profile is nearly identical to that of the total population
- Most common in **Mexico, South Korea, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Chile** and **Brazil**.



Distant (24%)

- **Cannot decide or will not express their views** on what defines a real national: tend to answer “**not sure**” about any criteria.
- More likely to have a **lower level of income** and/or **education**.
- Less likely to be older or left-leaning politically.
- Most common in **Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Malaysia, Turkey, Brazil** and the **U.K.**

Cultural Nationalists (12%)

- **Restrict nationality to people born in their country**, regardless of their parent’s country of origin, **often excluding those who are not members of the dominant religious groups**.
- **Exclude all immigrants**, even those who are naturalized citizens fluent in the local language.

- Skew **middle-aged** (35–49) with a **lower education** level and **right-leaning** on the political spectrum.
- Most common in **South Africa, Malaysia, Peru, Argentina, Chile, Brazil** and **Hungary**.

Ethnic Nationalists (17%)

- **Restrict nationality to those born in the country**, from **local stock** and of the **dominant religious group(s)**.
- **Exclude** any **immigrant** (even if naturalized or acculturated), anyone with **roots in any other part of the world** (even if born in the country) or identifies with **any minority religion**—and often not to someone who is LGBT, has a criminal history or extreme political views.
- Skew **middle-aged/older** (35+), with a **lower level of education** and **right-leaning** politically.
- Most common in **Serbia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Hungary, Malaysia, Italy, Germany** and **Poland**.



Key Takeaways

- **Very different conceptions of nationhood exist—and coexist within countries**

Across the world, and often within each country, perceptions of nationality range from very restrictive to all-inclusive. At one end of the spectrum is the Ethnic Nationalists view that excludes anyone who is foreign-born, of foreign descent, or affiliated with any religious group other than the dominant one(s). At the other end is the Post-Nationalist conception of nationality, which is extended to anyone living in the country without any restriction. The other four segments have views of nationality that show varying degrees of openness to specific outgroups.

- **Actual views on national identity are not as clear-cut as represented in public debates**

While on a global scale, the debate on identity is often framed as a battle between two opposing conceptions of national identity (the Ethnic Nationalists' view on the one side and the Post-Nationalists' on the other), our research shows that these two groups only represent about one-third of the entire population of the 25 countries surveyed. The vast majority of people actually fall between these polar opposites and hold a differing mix of criteria.

- **History does matter**

The six different conceptions of nationality are not evenly distributed across the countries we studied. Our research shows that people's definition of nationhood is largely reflective of each country's particular culture. Indeed, in almost every country, one or two definitions of who qualifies as a "real" national dominate:

- In the U.S., Post-Nationalists (28%) and Legalists (25%) represent more than half of the population. Religists account for a fairly high

proportion as well (17%). In contrast, few Americans qualify as Cultural Nationalists (5%) or Ethnic Nationalists (4%). This indicates that America is still deeply marked by its history as a country of immigrants, often with a strong religious conviction, and founded on strong principles, including the rule of law.

- By contrast, in France, a long-secularized country marked by an ideology of Republicanism, Religists make up only a tiny minority (8%, the third smallest proportion among all countries surveyed). Legalists (31%) represent the largest group, surpassing any other group by more than 10 points.

- The picture could not be more different in neighboring Germany—a country that has known the most extreme form of nationalism in the first half of the 20th century, where citizenship was ruled by *jus sanguinis* ("right of blood") until recently, and that has taken in over a million refugees since 2015. The largest segments in Germany are Distant (25%), Ethnic Nationalists (21%), and Religists (19%). The proportion of Germans in each one of these groups is higher than the global average.

- **Even in these tumultuous times, America is still the shining city on the hill**

Despite President Trump's anti-migrant rhetoric, the U.S. has the lowest share of true Cultural Nationalists (5%) and Ethnic Nationalists (4%) in the world. Combined, the two most inclusive segments (Post-Nationalists and Legalists) make up more than half of the U.S. population (53%) compared to 30% worldwide and less than 10% in Saudi Arabia, Japan, Turkey, and Malaysia. Moreover, Post-Nationalists and Legalists combined make up majorities of Democrats (59%) and Independents (58%), and nearly half of Republicans (47%).



- **Liberal democracies remain a bulwark of inclusiveness**

Liberal democracies remain, by far, the countries with the most open-minded populations when it comes to their views on nationality. Despite raging debates about immigration and national identity, the U.S. and Canada (with 57% of Post-Nationalists or Legalists) rank as the countries with the most inclusive conception of nationality in the world.

France, comes in fourth, despite the performance of the extreme-right National Front's candidate Marine Le Pen during the last presidential election. In several other western democracies, including Great Britain, Spain and Australia, true "Ethnic Nationalists" for whom only native-born Christians from local stock qualify, represent less than 15% of the population.

- **Europe beware, history can strike back**

Yet, despite 70 years of liberal transformation and integration under the umbrella of the European

Union, a large proportion of Europeans fall in the least inclusive groups. The percentage of true Ethnic Nationalists in Hungary (35%), Italy (21%), Poland (21%), and Germany (21%) is far from negligible. It is actually higher than in Russia (17%), which is more often described as a "nationalist" country.

These findings help explain the recent election results in Hungary and in Italy, where Prime Minister Matteo Salvini's popularity is driven, in part, by his tough position on immigration.

Over the past few years, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party has emerged as a new political force to be reckoned with. Yet, its share of votes in recent elections is only about half the percentage of Ethnic Nationalists and Cultural Nationalists combined in Germany. This suggests that, with its very tough stance on immigration and cultural issues, the AfD has the potential to widen its appeal in future elections.

Political Party Supporters' Conception of Nationality: A Tale of Two Countries

In the survey from which this segmentation is drawn, respondents from the United States and France were asked about their political party preference. This allowed us to identify the vision of nationality that prevails among supporters of each one of the two countries' political parties.

United States: Consensus and Polarization in the Land of *E Pluribus Unum*

Main lessons

- **Americans agree on the core, but are sharply divided on the specifics**

Compared to people from many other countries, Americans seem to have a fairly unified view on the concept of nationality. Indeed, the vast majority, including Republicans, are either Post-Nationalists, Legalists or Religists. Contrary to most other countries, only 10% of the U.S. can be categorized as Cultural Nationalists or Ethnic Nationalists for espousing a strongly restrictive conception of nationality. On the whole, Americans tend to agree that anyone born in the country or who has become a U.S. citizen is an American, regardless of their ethnic origin and, for most people, regardless of their religion. Yet, Americans are deeply divided on the specifics, e.g., whether and how to legalize the status of millions of undocumented immigrants who, often, have lived in the country for many years. The extent to which Americans disagree on who is a real American has very profound implications—more so than in countries where views on nationality are more varied.

- **A highly polarizing issue**

To a large extent, the two main political parties are increasingly defined around their stance toward immigration and national identity—and positioning themselves around the Post-Nationalist vs. Legalist/Religist divide. Indeed, attitudes toward immigration are now a better predictor of Americans' political party preference than attitudes pertaining to the role of government in the economy and to social issues that traditionally differentiated conservatives from liberals. A manifestation of how political polarization has inflamed the conversation about nationality has been the inability of the U.S. Congress to pass any comprehensive immigration reform legislation despite repeated attempts.

What does it mean for the two political parties?

- **While many Republicans hold other views, a majority of them are Legalists or Religists**

Only 12% of Republicans qualify as pure Cultural Nationalists or Ethnic Nationalists. Actually, twice as many (23%) are Distant—reflective of a lack of strong views about nationality. However, the Republican party is increasingly aligning itself with a Legalist/Religist conception of nationality, which is held by just over half of its supporters. Hence, Trump's continued mentions of "the Wall" at the border with Mexico and his administration's efforts to rescind the DREAM Act (legislation providing a path to citizenship to undocumented immigrants brought to the country as children), to curb immigration from Muslim countries, and to turn away asylum seekers from Central America.


- **Democrats are more homogeneous**

Among Democrats, nearly half (45%) are Post-Nationalists while only 15% are Legalists. It is likely that the dominance of a Post-Nationalistic

vision among Democrats is a reaction to the Trump administration's statements and policies (e.g., the separation of children from their parents who entered the country as asylum seekers). Indeed, the Democratic Party has been vocal in positioning itself as a reliable defender of immigrants' rights—and is regularly criticized by Republicans for playing “identity politics.” By espousing too clearly a Post-Nationalist view of nationality, the Democratic Party runs the risk of alienating a large part of society with a more legalistic mindset, including many Independents.

- **The Independents are key**

Americans who do not identify with either the Democratic or Republican Party show a wider range of views on nationality. Independents are just as likely as Republicans to be Legalists (34%) and are more likely than Republicans to be Religists (22%). Surprisingly, they are less likely to be Distant (17%) than supporters of either party. In order to reach out to Independents, each party will need to soften their stance.



France: Integrationists vs. Assimilationists


Main lessons

In 2009, then President Nicolas Sarkozy created a stir when he stated that a national debate on “French identity” was necessary. As a result, nationality became a wedge issue. Some politicians have tried to avoid the subject altogether, while others have adopted increasingly tough positions on immigration (and on Islam). However, our data show that there is no real consensus on what “being French”

is, even if a plurality in France are either Post-Nationalist or Legalist. On the right of the political spectrum, only a minority hold the traditional Republican integrationist view, while a majority hold an assimilationist view.

What does it mean for the different political parties?

Combined, Ethnic Nationalists and Cultural Nationalists represent one quarter of the electorate, which roughly corresponds to far-right leader Marine Le Pen's score in the first round of the 2017 Presidential



election. It is therefore possible that any expansion of her political space would not be possible without adopting a more open view on nationality.

The truly open “Post-Nationalists” represent 20% of the French public. It is therefore possible that, by shifting from a very open attitude toward immigration to a more restrictive one during the 2017 Presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron was able to appeal to the 31% of Legalists. While Legalists are very inclusive, they also condition nationality to full-fledged citizenship and some level of acculturation (mainly speaking French).

Only about one in ten Americans who identify with the Republican Party actually have a non-inclusive view of nationality. It is the case for a much larger proportion of French voters who are aligned with Les Républicains, the mainstream right-wing party which Sarkozy led: 21% of them are Ethnic Nationalists, and 22% are Cultural Nationalists. While supporters of all other parties are quite united in their vision of nationality, supporters of Les Républicains are almost evenly divided between those who have an open vision of French nationality, and those who have closed vision of it. Therefore, the national identity issue could prove the most difficult one to solve for Les Républicains’ leader Laurent Wauquiez, as he attempts to rebuild his party. One could conceive that La République en Marche (the party behind Macron with a majority in the National Assembly) could further expand to the right and/or that Marine Le Pen’s party, recently renamed Le Rassemblement National (the National Rally), could try to absorb the party’s Ethnic Nationalists and Cultural Nationalists.

For more details about the segmentation, go to <https://www.ipsos.com/en/six-conceptions-nationality>

For the full results of the survey from which this segmentation was drawn, go to <https://www.ipsos.com/en/who-and-not-real-american-real-brazilian-or-real-chinese>

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