NET ZERO LIVING

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June 2022

Centre for **Climate Change** and **Social Transformations**

Research by our climate engagement partnership

Ipsos

Contents

Foreword

We are living in a decisive decade where governments, businesses and individuals need to act now to address the planetary emergency. Urgency is imperative. We need to reach net zero. We need to catalyse action and enable people to take the necessary steps to get us there.

Ipsos and colleagues at the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations (CAST) have formed a **climate engagement partnership** and have been examining and trying to understand public attitudes and behaviours on climate change for many years. We have been following how worried people are, who they think needs to take action, and how likely they are to make the changes we need to mitigate climate change and reach net zero in the UK by 2050.

But we have never asked them about the range of policies to enable net zero living, or importantly why they do or don't support them. We found that the UK public are concerned and claim they know what they need to do. Then why are they not changing their lifestyles in the ways and to the scale that we need?

We wanted to get to the crux of this question and better understand what drives people to support or oppose policies that would enable them to act. What drives them to engage or disengage with them and change their behaviours? Is it only about the climate? Or is it about something else as well?

We found out that it is also about our health and wellbeing, and that of our families and friends. It is about our livelihoods and financial stability. While this study was conducted before the energy and cost of living crisis, its findings resonate all the more today as support for policies drops when the costs are considered. It is about

fairness and a just transition, about making sure that no one is left behind. It is about choosing to live better lives for ourselves and the planet.

This tells us a lot about how to develop better net zero policies that are supported and implemented. Policymakers need to take the time to engage with the public and understand their concerns. Speaking about the co-benefits of these changes can also help to address worries about cost, fairness and transparency, and avoid a backlash later down the line. This will help to bring those who still have their reservations on board, while rallying those who already support such policies.

The public are worried. Now we need to capitalise on this sense of urgency to mobilise behaviour change to address climate change. I hope that this report on Net Zero Living provides insights into how to do so as 2050 draws ever closer.

This report has been written by researchers at Ipsos and CAST as part of our climate engagement partnership. I would like to thank them for the work they have put into this report at all stages of the study. If you would like to discuss any of the issues raised in this report or wish to learn more about what we at Ipsos and CAST do, please get in touch with the authors or myself.

Kelly Beaver MBE
Chief Executive UK & Ireland
Ipsos
kelly.beaver@ipsos.com



Executive Summary

Public concern about climate change has risen in recent years but has not been matched by a significant corresponding shift in behaviours towards more sustainable lifestyles. If the UK is to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to net zero by 2050, a range of policy measures will be necessary to catalyse the move towards low-carbon living, in addition to wider action from government and industry. But how do the public view such policies, and what would help to engage the public further on this vitally important issue?

Effective net zero policies are needed to motivate change in these areas, as well as a better understanding of what the public think about these measures. However, while numerous polls and other studies have examined public support for specific climate policies, no single study has yet provided an in-depth analysis of UK public engagement with a range of net zero policies that involve behaviour change. This report fills that gap.

Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations (CAST) as part of our climate engagement partnership, undertook its first in-depth study of public attitudes to eight net zero policies in August 2021 with headline findings published in October 2021. We have since conducted a more detailed assessment of the survey findings contextualised with a review of academic research regarding public support for new climate-focused policies. This report sets out the findings, assesses how public support changes when different framings are posed illustrating lifestyle and financial implications, considers the most convincing arguments supporting and opposing the policies and analyses the perceived fairness of the policies.

The report presents the key findings of this rich and detailed study and its implications for public policy across government at national and local levels. It will also be of interest to businesses looking to offer more environmentally sustainable products and services. Whilst the survey was conducted at the end of 2021, the findings still have resonance with the cost of living crisis likely to mean that many of the cost implications are more keenly felt.

Key Findings

The UK public are on board with net zero policies. There is widespread public backing for a range of policies that would bring about fundamental transformations in terms of the food we eat, the way we travel, the way we heat and cool our homes, how we consume goods and services, and how we save for retirement. However **public support for net zero policies can be fragile as it can drop sharply when potential lifestyle and - in particular - cost implications are presented.**

The public can also see important co-benefits of net zero policies. Whilst climate change is a pressing concern for many, this alone is generally not sufficient to produce significant behaviour change. However, **when co-benefits such as enhanced air quality, job creation or health improvements are identified, support increases.**

Policies concerning more sustainable forms of transport, energy and consumption are understood as important priorities for climate action, but the public rank the importance of other areas such as dietary change lower.

The public have remarkably low levels of confidence in the fairness of all net zero policies with particular concerns that those on low incomes and other marginalised groups are likely to be negatively impacted. Related to this is the higher support afforded to policies that involve choice and are incentivised rather than coerced. Unsurprisingly, this means that some net zero policies are more contentious than others, and hence more challenging to communicate.

Net zero policies receive different levels of support across different groups in society, with those living in the most deprived areas, those on the right of the political spectrum, and those who are less engaged with climate change issues being less likely to support the policies. There are also marked differences in the policies supported by younger and older people, with older age groups tending to have higher support for policies related to transport and sustainable consumption and younger age groups favouring those related to electric vehicles, dietary change and domestic heating. Women are slightly more supportive of net zero policies than men and are more likely to be convinced by pro-climate arguments.

What does this mean for public policy decision makers?

The fragility of public support for net zero policies, which drops when presented with personal lifestyle and cost implications, means that **policy makers need to understand these concerns and address them as far as possible**, but also communicate the benefits, and co-benefits.

Taking time to understand the public's concerns and how these vary between different societal groups will be essential for developing net zero policies and communications. Policy measures targeting dietary change are less clearly linked to climate change in the public's mind than those targeting transport, energy or material consumption, and communications about food and diet should be tailored accordingly given this different starting point.

Potential cost implications and the influence these have on public support cannot be underestimated, particularly given how worried the public are about the cost of living. **Being open about expected costs early on is essential** to avoid the public losing faith later when cost implications come to light. Another important argument that has often been neglected in net zero policy communication is to be transparent about not only the potential immediate costs, but also the long-term implications of not reducing emissions and the implications on affordability.

The wider benefits of climate policies should also be communicated. The public is more likely to support net zero policies if they can see these policies create cleaner air, improve health, make homes warmer, or create jobs locally. Countering current assumptions, net zero policy support may also be increased if the groups thought to be disadvantaged by them (low-income, ethnic minorities, older people) are instead shown to benefit.

Understanding who the more supportive groups are and engaging these early on should facilitate a multiplier effect on others who are more sceptical. Our research suggests that women are more likely to support net zero policies and focusing engagement on women may help to influence others around them to shift towards sustainable lifestyles.

The key point to highlight to policy makers is the **importance of further engagement with the public to raise awareness of the societal transformations needed to reach net zero**, their benefits and the costs of inaction. This will help to avoid public backlash when policies are implemented. The more public policy and brand decision-makers can engage people with the issue of climate change, the more likely they are to be supportive of net zero policies and to see these as fair.

What can behavioural science tell us about how to engage the public with net zero policies?

This study has highlighted **the importance of further engagement with the UK public to raise awareness of the societal transformations needed** to reach net zero, their benefits and the costs of inaction. Insights from behavioural science can provide valuable pointers for public policy makers about what such public engagement could look like in future.

Public engagement includes: (a) engagement in ***decision-making*** (including policy-making) about how to reach net zero; and (b) engagement in ***delivery*** of action to reach net zero (i.e. 'behaviour change' in its broadest sense, including lifestyle change, technology adoption/ use, policy support, activism and awareness raising). These two forms of engagement are interlinked – involving people in decision-making helps provide the context and rationale for specific behavioural and structural interventions; and fosters collective efficacy and trust.[01]

Key recommendations from a behavioural science viewpoint are summarised below:

- **Engage the public in decision-making about net zero early on** in the policy design through mechanisms such as citizens assemblies, citizens juries and deliberative approaches. Bringing the public into decision-making can create a stronger sense of ownership, fairness and support for the changes required.

- **Communicate the co-benefits and effectiveness of net zero policies** to address concerns about negative lifestyle and financial impacts as appreciating wider and multiple benefits can help build support. By designing climate policies that achieve co-benefits, and communicating these in targeted ways to different publics, public policy makers can build support for transformation.

- Building on existing support for climate action by moving public discourse towards much more far-reaching changes. The current time is a moment of opportunity to mobilise support for more far-reaching social change on net zero, since the UK public already see climate change as an urgent problem to address.

- Addressing fairness concerns and offer transparency as to how policies are implemented and how they will affect all sections of society is crucial for how the public will support net zero policies. Despite high levels of climate concerns, people are very sceptical about how net zero policies will be implemented in a way that does not disadvantage some sections of society disproportionally. Trusted communicators and participatory decision-making can help increase policy fairness.

- Removing behavioural barriers and friction is essential through the use of multiple economic, regulatory and social interventions, making low-carbon choices the easiest and ideally the default can profoundly shift behaviour. As our study shows, financial cost is also important, so economic incentives and disincentives are also critical to ensure green choices are not the preserve of the wealthy.

CHAPTER 1
Introduction

What is net zero and why do we need to act?

We are already feeling the effects of climate change, from rising sea levels to more extreme weather, and these effects will get worse unless we rapidly cut our greenhouse gas emissions. In line with the international 'Paris Agreement' to limit global temperature rise to within 1.5 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the UK has committed to reaching 'net zero' emissions by 2050.[02] Net zero means reducing emissions to as close to zero as possible, with any remaining emissions absorbed by natural carbon sinks (e.g. forests) or technologies (e.g. carbon capture).

So far, progress on reducing emissions has mostly come from decarbonising energy supply (i.e. shifting from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources), but this is not enough to reach our climate targets. We also need to address energy demand – how we use energy and resources – and this requires profound changes across society, including in individuals' behaviours. Households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions through their mobility and travel, home heating, diet, and material consumption.[03] So many of the measures that are needed to reach net zero involve behaviour change by consumers, such as buying electric vehicles and heat pumps, cutting down on red meat and dairy, and reducing waste.[04] For these policies to be workable, there needs to be public buy-in.

Public support for net zero policies

While we have seen concern about climate change rise in recent years, we do not know the extent to which this has translated into support for climate policies, including specific transport, food, finance, energy, and consumption policies that will (or could) affect people's lifestyles and choices. Understanding which policies the public do or do not support, and importantly the factors which shape support, provides policy-makers and businesses with insight into where there is already buy-in for the changes required and where to focus efforts for building support through engagement. This report seeks to provide that insight.

Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformation (CAST) partnered to undertake its first comprehensive study of public attitudes to eight net zero policies. The research involved a representative sample of 5,665 people aged 16+ in the UK between 19 and 25 August 2021. Survey data was collected by Ipsos' UK KnowledgePanel, an online random probability panel. Data is weighted by age, gender, region, Index of Multiple Deprivation quintile, education, ethnicity and number of adults in the household in order to reflect the profile of the UK population.

Headline findings from the research were published in October 2021 with the current report providing a more in-depth review covering the wider context for public policy support, a summary of the survey results, a more detailed look at which arguments were most convincing, the perceived fairness of the policies and a final chapter on findings and their implications for policy makers.

This comprehensive study was designed to include a range of net zero policies. We selected eight actual or potential net zero policies for consideration by the UK, outlined in Figure 1.1. These policies were chosen for the following reasons:

- To cover a range of policy areas and to include both ‘push’ (supportive and incentivising policies) and ‘pull’ (restrictive/coercive) policies.

- To focus on areas where individual level action is required to combat climate change and reach net zero. For example, we chose not to ask about policies for decarbonising industry or shifting our energy mix to 100% renewables because these are outside the remit of individual behaviour change.

- Relevance to the public in that the policies have been considered or enacted within the UK or in other countries meaning that survey participants could easily envisage or relate to them, for example, we already have subsidies for electric vehicles (EV) in the UK. Some were also chosen because they’re highly topical, for example, low traffic neighbourhoods have been introduced in London and other metropolitan areas and have been controversial in some communities.

- To consider a range of policies that covered most aspects of people’s lives. We selected material consumption; transport and mobility; heating and cooling; and green finance policy.

Figure 1.1 - The actual or potential net zero policies explored

Mobility and travel

Creating low traffic neighbourhoods

The government may want to reduce the number of vehicles on the road by creating low-traffic neighbourhoods. This is where cars, vans and other vehicles are stopped from using residential roads as shortcuts. This is done by putting some road closures in place using measures such as bollards or planters. Residents are still able to drive onto their street but it is made more difficult or impossible to drive straight through the area from one main road to the next.

Frequent flier levies

The government may want to replace current tax on flights (Air Passenger Duty) by a tax that increases as people fly more often. People who only fly once in a year could pay no tax, while people who fly several times per year could pay a large amount of tax. This could mean people replace some flights with alternatves, like trains or ferries, or with video conferencing instead of some business travel.

Electric vehicle subsidies

The government may want to subsidise the purchase of electric vehicles for consumers in order to reduce the number of petrol and diesel cars on the road. The government is ending the sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030 and encouraging a shift to electric vehicles. Putting in place subsidies, would mean electric vehicles become less expensive to buy than they are now. The money to do this may come from increasing fuel duty on petrol and diesel cars.

Home heating

Phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers

The government may want to cut down on the use of fossil fuel energy by banning the sale of new gas boilers in the next few years, for example by 2030. This would mean that when homeowners come to replace their boilers, they would need to buy a different sort of heating system, such as an electric heat pump or hydrogen boiler. This may cost more initially but is likely to be cheaper to run in the longer term.

Material consumption

Changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are

The government may want to replace current tax on products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different products. This would mean products that are produced using high amounts of resources such as energy, water or scarce metals, or products that travel long distances before being sold in a shop would be more expensive than products that are manufactured in more environmentally-friendly ways.

Green finance

Ensuring access to sustainable pension funds

The government may want to increase the public's access to sustainable pension funds. This means that they would increase regulations to ensure that all pension providers include a pension fund option for people to choose from that only used sustainable investments that do not harm people or the planet. This would be the default pension option for the general publc, unless they chose to opt out of it.

Food and diet

Increasing vegetarian/vegan options in public food provisioning

The government may want to reduce the amount of red meat and dairy products people eat, by increasing vegetarian and vegan options in all public sector catering. This would mean that meals served in hospital cafés, school canteens, prisons, police and fire stations, council offices, and across the public sector, would need to include a significant proportion of meat-free and plant-based options. It would reduce but not remove meat and dairy from menus, while it would increase the choice of meat/dairy-free alternatives.

Higher taxes on red meat and dairy products

The government may want to replace current tax on food products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different foods. This would increase the price of red meat and dairy products, and reduce the price of certain other foods (e.g. vegetables, bread).

We also wanted to examine the impact of different ways of framing net zero policies on public support for those policies. To explore this, we developed four different policy framings, which acted as potential arguments for each of the policies tested. The framings were:

- **A 'neutral' framing** which simply described the policy as in Figure 1.1.

- **A 'climate change' framing**, which referenced the climate impact of the policy. An example is the explanation that creating low traffic neighbourhoods would reduce the number of vehicles on roads and as a result the level of carbon emissions in the atmosphere.

- **A 'lifestyle' framing**, which presented some of the health, safety or general lifestyle impacts of the policy. An example is the explanation that frequent flyer levies would reduce the number of flights taken, cutting noise and air pollution for people living near airports and resulting in health improvements for this group.

- **A 'financial' framing**, mentioning the financial impact of the policy. An example is the explanation that EV subsidies would make such vehicles cheaper to buy and that this could be funded by increasing fuel duty for petrol and diesel.

Each survey participant was only presented with four policies, to allow for a more in-depth examination of their views. The four policies were presented to each participant using one of the four framings, with the allocation of framings rotated across participants. The order in which policies were presented was also rotated. Full descriptions for each policy and the framings can be found in Table 1.1 in the Appendix.

After having read a policy description, participants were asked to what extent they supported or opposed this policy. They were subsequently asked to what extent they would still support the policy after being presented with one potential lifestyle and then one financial trade-off that this policy could require: for example, would they still support the phasing out of gas and coal boilers if it meant that they could no longer install these and had to install an alternative heating system instead? After exploring participants' support for each policy in some detail, they were then asked to rank their four allocated policies in order of support.

The remainder of this report is structured as follows:



Chapter 2 covers the wider context regarding public support for net zero policies;

Chapter 5 investigates perceptions of fairness regarding the policies; and



Chapter 3 sets out the main findings from the survey regarding public support, or opposition to different net zero policies and how these views change, if at all, when the potential lifestyle and financial implications of these policies are highlighted;

Chapter 6 provides a summary of the report's findings and implications for public policy and brand decision-makers. It also examines what lessons can be drawn from behavioural science about how the public can be engaged successfully on net zero policies in future.

Chapter 4 considers how convincing a range of specific arguments to encourage policy support are for the public;

Chapter 7 explores what behavioural science tells us about how to engage the public with net zero policies.

CHAPTER 2
Context: Public views on net zero policies

Concern about climate change

Public concern about climate change has grown significantly in recent years and was at a record high in November 2021 (see Figure 2.1). Following the publication of the IPCC's special report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, there have been widespread 'climate emergency' declarations by governmental and other organisations, high-profile protests and school strikes around the world, and an increase in media coverage of the issue, particularly following the UK's commitment to achieve net zero carbon emissions by 2050, the publication of the UK Net Zero Strategy[05] and the COP26 conference in Glasgow. All of this has served to move climate change from the periphery of public concerns to a core worry for most people[06]; although media coverage and public concern have fallen back to lower levels since the end of the COP26 conference (as shown in Figure 2.1).

Public concern about climate change has grown significantly in recent years and was at a record high in November 2021

Figure 2.1 - The importance of Pollution/Environment/Climate Change as the most/other important issue(s) affecting Britain today



Source: Ipsos Issues Index **Base:** Representative sample of c.1,000 British adults age 18+ each month, interviewed face-to-face in home. N.B. April 2020 data onwards is collected by telephone; previous months are face-to-face

The public are also aware of the reality and urgency of climate change. Most people in the UK (67%) now think we are already feeling the **effects** of climate change[07], in contrast to 10-15 years ago when most people saw climate change mainly as a risk for future generations.[08] They also want to see urgent **action** on climate, with over half (54%) saying that the UK needs to reduce its carbon emissions to net zero earlier than 2050. In the run-up to COP26, Ipsos polling[09] found that a sizeable minority of the public (40%) were confident that the UK government would take the actions needed to help combat climate change within the next few years, and three-quarters (76%) thought the UK should do more to tackle it.

A similar picture emerges in other countries. Most people in countries such as Sweden, China and Brazil are worried about climate change, feel personally responsible to act, and agree (up to 84% agreement) that tackling climate change requires drastic changes to current lifestyles and societies.[10] Transport, energy, and air travel are the top areas that both international and UK publics identify as priorities for climate action, with high agreement that - as societies - we should reduce our meat consumption, minimise air travel, reduce consumption and energy use.[11]

Support for net zero policies

Public support for climate policies, and commitment to act, is essential to help the UK reach net zero. Reaching net zero will require profound changes across society, including in individuals' behaviours. Households are responsible for 72% of global greenhouse gas emissions through their mobility and travel, home heating, diet, and material consumption;[12] and many of the measures that are needed to reach net zero therefore involve some behaviour change by consumers, such as buying electric vehicles and heat pumps, cutting down on red meat and dairy, and reducing waste.[13] It will however be challenging to implement the necessary policies without public buy-in, as shown by the Gilets Jaunes protests in response to the escalator carbon tax implemented by the French government.

Concern about climate change does however not automatically lead to behaviour change, which in the academic literature is known as the "value-action" gap[14] or "attitude-behaviour" gap.[15] While the public are prepared to engage in low-impact behaviours such as recycling and switching off lights, high-impact behaviours relating to mobility and travel, home heating, material consumption and food and diet have proven more difficult to change.[16] Effective net zero policies are needed to motivate change in these areas, as well as a better understanding of what the public think about these measures.

Reaching net zero will require profound changes across society, including individual behaviour

Factors that support net zero policies

Existing research provides some powerful insights into how the public responds to a range of net zero policies. Policy attributes can influence whether individual policies are supported, but so can individual or household characteristics.[17] Existing literature identifies some characteristics that help explain why some types of policy are more popular than others and how support might differ across different population groups.

Policies which are seen to be **effective** and **beneficial** for society (e.g. by reducing air pollution) and/or for oneself (e.g. by cutting local traffic congestion) tend to receive more support.[18] At the same time, policies which are seen as **coercive** tend to be less favoured. Coerciveness can include infringements on personal freedoms or financial costs to the individual. For this reason, 'informational' policies (such as public awareness campaigns or energy-saving tips), which preserve individual choice and do not impose a cost, tend to be preferred over taxes or regulations, which limit choice or impose costs.[19] Perceptions of coerciveness may vary across groups, though, and depend on whether those groups feel personally affected or not. For example, people who are car-dependent are more likely to be opposed to measures such as congestion charges or parking restrictions (e.g. CO2 taxes and high frequency car users).[20]

A key policy attribute which has been shown to shape acceptability is fairness. A distinction can be made between distributive and procedural fairness, with distributive **fairness** referring to perceptions of how outcomes are distributed across all involved parties and procedural fairness representing perceptions of how a policy is introduced.[21] Policies which are seen as fair are supported, with perceived fairness being a stronger predictor than perceived effectiveness of a policy.[22] Here, both distributive and procedural fairness are important for environmental policies to be accepted by the public.[23] Overall, the public favour policies that embody the 'polluter pays' principle (i.e. those who are most responsible pay most[24] and protect those who are vulnerable or disadvantaged, such as low-income households), and those policies that have been developed through a process that is considerate of those affected (procedural fairness).[25]

An important individual (and cultural) characteristic of policy support is **trust**, including trust in government, trust in institutions responsible for implementing policy (e.g. regulators), and trust in wider society. For example, several studies have found that people (and countries) who have higher trust in their government are more willing to accept carbon taxes.[26] Trust in government has been shown to be directly linked to policy support, as well as via policy-specific beliefs such as perceived fairness, infringement on freedom and perceived effectiveness of the policies.[27]

Individual **values and beliefs**, such as climate change concern, also tend to influence policy support. For example, environmental values have been found to reduce opposition to coercive 'push' policies, such as congestion charging[28] and carbon taxes.[29] Political orientation has been found to be more relevant in some countries than others with right wing orientation in the US being associated with lower support for publicly financed climate policies, while people who identify with green parties are more willing to pay extra for climate friendly products.[30] Furthermore, **socio-demographic** factors, such as income and rurality, can influence support for policies because these factors influence people's needs and abilities, so therefore impact on the public's perceptions of policy coerciveness and fairness.

CHAPTER 3
Understanding public engagement with net zero policies

The UK cannot achieve net zero without garnering public support for climate policies and willingness to take action, as discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter examines how far the public support such policies across five different areas - how we travel, how we heat our homes, what we buy, what we eat, and how we save for retirement. It also explores how levels of support vary across different groups in society: how much of a difference do factors such as socio-economic status, age, or political party support make when it comes to people's views on net zero policies?

Looking at support for each of the eight net zero policies, generally there is widespread public support for these initially. Most of the policies were supported by the UK public, with a majority in favour of seven of the eight policies presented. The exception was higher taxes on red meat and dairy products, where the public were split on whether they supported this policy or not. Frequent flyer levies received the highest level of policy support, with changing product pricing to reflect the environmental footprint of an item, phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers, and EV subsidies also highly supported.

Some common themes in support can also be seen. Our results show that public support was higher for policies around transport, energy and consumption compared with those for food and diet – such as the least popular policy of higher taxes on meat and dairy products.

Figure 3.1 – Overall policy support (prior to consideration of implications)



Q: To what extent do you support or oppose this?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Of course, any new tax tends not to be popular with the public since it implies increased costs to individuals and may disproportionally affect those with less disposable income. Yet this pattern of lower support for food and diet policies may also reflect a lack of public awareness of carbon emissions associated with our diets and food systems. This is an area where action is needed to better inform, and then engage, the public.

We must also remember that the changes required to reach net zero are not without their challenges or costs. The success of these policies will also depend on whether the public continue to support them even when they may have to change their lifestyle or take on a financial cost. To explore this, we tested how support for the eight policies changes when people are made aware of the potential implications for them personally via 'trade-offs'. We presented two types of trade-offs: lifestyle trade-offs, where they may have to change a particular element of how they live day-to-day, and financial trade-offs, where a policy may have personal costs for them in terms of increased prices or taxes.

Our findings show that support for net zero policy measures typically fell when the public was asked to consider the possible impacts of each net zero policy on them personally. Support for nearly all policies fell after presenting the potential lifestyle implications, with the exception being changing product pricing to reflect

items' sustainability. Once people were made aware of the potential financial implications, support for all policies dropped even further. At this point, changing product pricing was the policy with the highest level of support and the only one to still be supported by a majority of the public.

This is a critical point for public policy decision-makers to be aware of, as ensuring public buy-in for policies will require engagement with the public that is sufficiently powerful to overcome these concerns about the financial and lifestyle implications of the changes required. Figure 3.2 outlines the level of public support for each of the net zero policies across five key themes: transport and mobility, home heating, material consumption, food and diet and green finance, both before and after the lifestyle and financial cost implications are introduced. We then summarise how this varies across different groups in UK society, before setting out the key learnings that decision-makers can gain from our analysis.

The success of these policies will also depend on whether the public continue to support them even when they may have to change their lifestyle or take on a financial cost

Figure 3.2 - Overall policy support - impact of lifestyle trade-offs



Q: If this policy meant that you personally....to what extent do you support or oppose it?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

See Table 1.2 for lifestyle trade-off wording

Figure 3.3 – Overall policy support - impact of financial trade-offs



Q: If this policy meant that you personally...to what extent do you support or oppose it?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

See Table 1.2 for financial trade-off wording

Mobility and travel

Low traffic neighbourhoods (LTNs) have attracted much controversy in the UK in recent years. While they have been rolled out most widely in London, they have also been introduced in other urban areas such as Birmingham.

Our results show that over half (53%) of the UK public supported this policy when it was initially introduced. Older people tended to be more supportive of this policy (58%), as well as those who voted for Labour (65%) or the Liberal Democrats (27%) in the 2019 General Election. Perhaps unsurprisingly, people who are more engaged with climate change issues were another group where support for LTNs was high (67%). Support was also higher in parts of the UK that are not as densely populated (classified by the ONS as 'Countryside Living' (62% support) or 'Town and Country Living'[31] areas (58% support). This may be because people living in these areas are less familiar with the debate around LTNs – particularly arguments against them – as they are less likely to have been affected by a LTN within their local area.

Despite over half supporting the policy initially, support fell to just over a third (36%) when the personal implications of the policy – such as not being able to drive in certain areas – were introduced. At this point, the same proportion of the public opposed

Figure 3.4 – Support for creating low traffic neighbourhoods



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings



LTNs (35%) as supported them. When people were then presented with a financial implication of the policy – potentially paying more council tax – support dropped further to less than a fifth (18%), with well over half (59%) opposing the policy.

When we look at support for LTNs both initially and after highlighting trade-offs, we see that a quarter (25%) of those who initially supported the policy then opposed it after considering the financial trade-off. This switch was particularly among people in middle age groups (29%).* One in twelve (8%) switched to opposing LTNs after viewing the associated lifestyle trade-off. This suggests that the financial cost of LTNs is more off-putting for the public than restrictions on where they can travel.

The introduction of a **frequent flyer levy** was one policy that gathered significant backing from participants in the UK Climate Assembly, coming out as one of its recommendations for decarbonising the UK.[32] Our results show equally high support for this policy; it was the net zero policy that received the highest level of public support overall (68%). This may reflect its perceived fairness, an important predictor of policy support. It may be that the public implicitly associate the levy with the 'polluter pays' principle** recognising that frequent flyers are those on the highest incomes and can therefore afford to pay more, or that aviation is a high emitter of greenhouse gases.***

Support for frequent flyer levies was higher among similar groups as for LTNs. Older people were more supportive of frequent flyer levies (74%), as were those who voted for Labour (76%) or the Liberal Democrats (77%) at the last General Election, and those who are more engaged with climate change issues (81%). However, people from the least deprived households (73%) or rural areas (76%) also supported this policy more strongly.

We also tested support across four different framings of the policy – a neutral framing, a climate change framing, a lifestyle framing and a financial framing.**** While no single framing increased support for frequent flyer levies, those who saw the

* Defined as those aged 35-54.
** That is, that people who fly more should pay more.
*** This is explored further in Chapter 5.
**** Please see introduction for further information on the policy framings shown to participants.

financial framing were more supportive of the policy (72%) than those who saw the neutral framing. This indicates that the economic impact of this policy could play a key role in convincing people to support or oppose it.

As with LTNs however, once trade-offs were introduced, levels of public support for frequent flyer levies dropped. Support almost halved to 35% when people were made aware that the policy could mean they were not able to fly abroad very often. When the financial trade-offs were mentioned – that they could have to pay more to take a flight – public opinion shifted to being split, with 32% supporting and 33% opposing the policy. When looking at support for frequent flyer levies initially versus after mentioning the trade-offs, we see that more people switched from supporting to opposing it after seeing the associated financial trade-off (15%) than did so after seeing the associated lifestyle trade-off (9%).

Subsidies on electric vehicles (EVs) is already a familiar policy for people in the UK. These were available for consumers until June 2022, when the plug-in car grant scheme closed to new orders.[33]

According to our results, EV subsidies received a high level of public support initially (62%). This may be because the public tends to prefer 'pull' (supportive) policy measures such as financial incentives, rather than 'push' (restrictive) measures. This reflects the

Figure 3.5 – Support for frequent flyer levies



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

importance of perceived fairness and personal cost in shaping public support for policies, as explored in Chapter 5. Again, people who voted for Labour (73%), the Liberal Democrats (71%) or – in this case – the SNP (77%) showed higher support for EV subsidies. This was also the case for people who are more engaged with climate change issues (82%), as well as those from the least deprived households (69%). People from the southeast (68%) and larger regional cities across the UK (69%) were particularly supportive of the policy too.

When we compare levels of support depending on the type of framing that was shown, this was higher among those who saw the lifestyle framing (67%). This indicates that the health benefits of decreased air pollution resonate with the UK public as a co-benefit of such a policy. We also see this when looking at convincing arguments for EV subsidies, as detailed in Chapter 4. This may be due to higher awareness of this issue, given the introduction of low emissions zones in recent years in London and Birmingham[34] and publicity regarding the implications of poor air quality for health.

The UK public still supported this policy more than opposing it even if they had a more limited choice when buying a car. Yet, once the financial trade-off of paying more to drive their petrol or diesel car was introduced, more opposed this policy than supported it. In addition, more switched from supporting to opposing the policy after seeing the financial trade-off (15%), than did so after seeing the lifestyle trade-off (7%).

When we compare levels of support depending on the type of framing shown, this is higher among those who saw the lifestyle framing (67%)

Figure 3.6 – Support for electric vehicle subsidies



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

Home heating

Currently, the UK Government is planning to ban the installation of gas boilers in new-build homes from 2025 onwards.[35] However, the net zero policy tested in this study was **phasing out the sale of coal and gas boilers** through a complete ban, including for homeowners replacing their current heating system.

Initially the majority of the UK public were in favour of this policy, with 62% supporting it. Political stance again made a difference to attitudes to this policy; those who voted for Labour (72%), the Liberal Democrats (71%) or the SNP (73%) at the 2019 General Election were more supportive of it. Engagement with climate change issues was another predictor of higher support, with 80% of this group supporting phasing out boilers. When we look at the effect of how the policy was framed, people who saw the financial policy framing were more supportive (68%) than the UK public on average and those who saw the other policy framings. While our study was conducted before the energy crisis that began to be felt in Autumn 2021, these findings likely reflect public concern about the costs of home heating in future and rising energy costs even then.

Support for phasing out coal and gas boilers dropped once the personal lifestyle implications were introduced – i.e. that they personally would not be able to install a new coal or gas boiler in their home. On balance though, the UK public were still willing to make this trade-off at this point, with more supporting the policy than opposing it. Yet, once the financial trade-off of paying more to install an alternative system was introduced, more of the public opposed this policy than supported it. We also see that more people supported and then opposed this policy after seeing the financial trade-off (14%), than did so after seeing the lifestyle trade-off (6%).

As mentioned above, this reflects the UK public's concern over increasing energy costs even before the current energy crisis.

Support for phasing out coal and gas boilers drops once the personal lifestyle implications are introduced – i.e. that they personally would not be able to install a new coal or gas boiler in their home

Figure 3.7 – Support for phasing out the sale of coal and gas boilers



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

Material consumption

For this policy, we asked the UK public how far they would support **changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are**. This policy stands out among the others tested as the only one that was still supported by a majority of the UK public once they had considered the lifestyle and financial cost implications.

Three in five (62%) supported changing product pricing initially, with support **rising** to seven in ten (69%) when the lifestyle implications of this policy were outlined. This is likely to reflect public awareness around waste-related issues such as awareness of and desire to tackle plastic waste. While support fell to half (52%) when the financial trade-offs were introduced, the policy continued to enjoy majority support among the UK public.

Three in five (62%) support changing product pricing initially, with support rising to seven in ten (69%) when the lifestyle implications of this policy are outlined

Figure 3.8 – Support for changing product pricing to reflect the degree to which products are environmentally friendly



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

Labour voters (69%) and Liberal Democrat voters (85%) at the last General Election were more supportive of this policy. This was also seen among the least deprived households in the UK (71%) and people who are more engaged with climate change issues (80%). People in rural areas (67%) and smaller towns (71%) were more supportive of changing product pricing as well. The UK public appear to be attracted by a range of co-benefits associated with this policy when considering their support for it. Among the framings, support was higher among those who saw the lifestyle framing and those who saw the financial framing (both 67%).

When we explore levels of initial support versus support after mentioning the trade-offs, changing product pricing had the smallest number of people (of all the net zero policies) moving towards opposition after seeing the trade-offs. Again, more people supported and then opposed the policy after seeing the financial trade-off (7%), than did so after seeing the lifestyle trade-off (1%).

Food and diet

We are now seeing some local councils such as Oxfordshire County Council begin to explore how to **increase vegetarian and vegan options in public sector food provisioning.**[36]

When we tested this policy, the public initially supported it, with just over half (56%) in favour. Ethnic minorities (68%) were more supportive of increasing vegetarian and vegan options. Political stance, affluence and environmental engagement influenced support for this policy too. Labour voters (68%) or Liberal Democrat voters (70%) at the last General Election more strongly supported the policy, as did those from the least deprived households in the UK (65%) and those who are engaged with climate change issues (76%). We also see a geographical split in support, with people in the south east (63%) and London (72%) being more supportive of increasing vegetarian and vegan options.

Ethnic minorities (68%) are more supportive of increasing vegetarian and vegan options

Figure 3.9 – Support for increasing vegetarian and vegan options in public sector food provisioning



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

There was some willingness to make the personal lifestyle trade-off associated with this policy, with support still greater than opposition on balance. However, if this policy meant that the public would have to pay higher taxes to fund it, a majority would be opposed (51%).

This also plays out when we compare support for increasing vegetarian and vegan options in public sector food provisioning initially versus after mentioning the trade-offs. More people supported the policy initially and then opposed it after seeing the associated financial trade-off (18% of those presented with this policy), than supported and then opposed it after seeing the associated lifestyle trade-off (6%). Ethnic minorities (29%) or those living in ethnically diverse urban areas – including London, Birmingham, Leicester, Luton and Slough – (24%) tended to become opposed to the policy after being introduced to the financial trade-off. This is despite the policy initially enjoying higher levels of support from ethnic minorities.

The second policy related to food and diet that we tested was imposing **higher taxes on red meat and dairy products**. This had the lowest support of all the net zero policies in this study and did not enjoy majority support among the UK public either initially or after trade-offs were presented. Only 47% would support this policy while a third (32%) would oppose it initially, giving it the highest level of opposition to any of the net zero policies we covered. This is unsurprising given that proposed new taxes are generally unpopular with the public.

Figure 3.10 – Support for higher taxes on red meat and dairy products



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

Political stance, affluence and environmental engagement created differences in support for this policy, similar to the other diet-related policy tested of increasing vegetarian and vegan options in public sector catering. Labour voters (57%) or Liberal Democrat voters (66%) at the 2019 General Election were more supportive of higher meat and dairy taxes, alongside those from the least deprived households in the UK (52%) or people who are engaged with climate change issues (68%). Geography also had a role to play in levels of support, with the policy more popular in the south east (55%) and London (60%).

Public opposition to the policy rose further once the lifestyle and financial implications were mentioned. However, we see a smaller reduction in support for higher taxes on red meat and dairy than for other policies when trade-offs are introduced. This may be because the policy itself – as a tax or 'push' measure – already implied some cost to the individual regardless of the trade-offs presented. Previous CAST research[37] has also shown that there is lower public awareness of the need for dietary change to reduce carbon emissions, compared with other perceived priorities such as transport, energy and consumption. This is likely to partly explain these findings.

Unlike the other policies tested, levels of switching from support to opposition for the policy were similar for the lifestyle and financial trade-offs (both 6%).

Green finance

Over half (55%) of the UK public supported ensuring access to sustainable pension funds before trade-offs were mentioned. We see higher levels of support once more among people who voted for Labour (69%) or the Liberal Democrats (70%) at the last General Election. This is also the case among people engaged with climate change issues (74%) and urbanites in regional cities (65%).

People who saw the financial framing of this policy (60%) were more supportive of ensuring access to sustainable pension funds. This indicates that the prospect of better returns on investments may be an attractive co-benefit to the UK public. It aligns with the sizeable increase in opposition to the policy once the financial implication of seeing a smaller return on pension savings was introduced.

Support fell dramatically once people were asked to consider the lifestyle and then financial impacts of the policy. Indeed, once the financial trade-off of seeing smaller returns on pension savings was introduced, 56% of the public opposed the policy – a similar proportion as supported it initially. This makes it the most opposed net zero policy on balance out of those we tested.

Figure 3.11 – Support for ensuring access to sustainable pension funds



Q: If this policy meant that you personally... to what extent to you support or oppose this?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021
See Table 1.1 for wording of policy framings

When looking at support for the policy initially versus after mentioning the trade-offs, over twice as many people moved to opposing it after seeing the associated financial trade-off (28% of those presented with this policy), than did so after seeing the lifestyle trade-off (11%). We see more people living in ethnically diverse urban areas including London, Birmingham, Leicester, Luton and Slough making the switch after being told that they would have to opt out of a sustainable pension fund if they wanted to save in a regular fund instead (16%).

Policy preferences

After being asked about four of the net zero policies, we then asked people to select which policy they would support the most. EV subsidies were selected by most (Figure.3.12) as their favoured policy (18%), while only 5% most supported access to sustainable pension funds. This may reflect the relative familiarity of EVs and associated subsidies, compared to low awareness and understanding of sustainable pensions.

However, one in nine (11%) of the UK public would not select any of the policies they were presented with as the one they would support the most. Unsurprisingly, we particularly see this among people who are less engaged with climate change issues (33%). This indecision is also higher among Conservative voters at the last General Election (15%) or people from the most deprived households (14%).

Group differences

Support across net zero policies is clearly shaped by **political affiliation**. We see that Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters and those on the left of the political spectrum are consistently more likely to support such policies than Conservative supporters and those on the right. **Engagement with climate change issues** is also a common trait we see among those who are most supportive of these policies. Yet – as discussed in the following chapter – concern about climate change is not enough on its own to foster dedicated support for net zero policies. **Affluence** shapes support for most net zero policies as well. This is most notably seen for policies around transport, consumption and food and diet.

We do see some other key patterns of support among groups that are worth highlighting. While there is no consistent pattern of greater or lesser support depending on **age**, there are some noticeable differences in policy preferences between older and younger people. Older people tend to be more supportive of LTNs,

frequent flyer levies and changing product pricing. In contrast, younger people tend to support EV subsidies, increasing vegetarian/vegan options in public food provisioning and phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers more.

Some policies do also resonate more in **particular areas**. Support for mobility and travel policies – namely creating low traffic neighbourhoods and frequent flyer levies – and changing product pricing is higher in less densely populated areas such as rural areas and small towns. On the other hand, food and diet policies that could promote take-up of plant-based diets had greater support in the south east and London. Support for EV subsidies and ensuring access to sustainable pensions was higher in large regional cities.

Figure 3.12 – Overall policy support - policy participants would support the most



Q: Now thinking about the policies we have asked you to consider. Which of these do you support the most?
NB: Don't know and prefer not to say responses not shown
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Messages for public policy and decision-makers

Three key learnings emerge from our analysis that public policy and decision -makers should consider:

1. **Bear in mind the trade-offs when designing both policies and public engagement.** While the public are generally supportive of policies aiming to transition towards net zero, this support falls once it is highlighted how these policies could affect either their lifestyle or their finances negatively. This sensitivity of public support to the negative impacts of policies for them suggests a need to highlight the co-benefits or avoidance of longer-term costs that the implementation of the policies should achieve.

2. **Talk about the co-benefits.** A reduction of greenhouse gas emissions alone is not enough to create sustained public support for net zero policies. Across the policies that we tested, where how the policy was framed made a difference to levels of support, this was generally to do with lifestyle and economic co-benefits.

3. **Understand where the public stand on policies.** It is critical to be aware of where the public are with different policies before beginning to bring them along in growing engagement and support. Our findings show some consistent patterns in support, such as higher or lower support depending on political outlook. But there is still significant variation in levels of support and the impact of lifestyle and financial trade-offs across the policies. Understanding this in more detail may allow more targeted approaches to building support where it is needed.

CHAPTER 4
Which arguments convince the public for and against net zero policies?

Engaging the public on changes ahead, including what actions individuals can take, will be a fundamental part of the transition to net zero. Public policy and decision-makers need to encourage action by engaging the public on net zero policies, building new and powerful narratives to create a sense of urgency, agency and buy-in. As we have shown in previous chapters, public support for most net zero policies is fragile, and levels of public support vary across different groups in society. This chapter explores how open the public is to persuasion on net zero policies, which arguments resonate with people's values and concerns, and whether some groups in UK society are more open to particular arguments than others.

We looked at the arguments for and against a range of policies that the public find most – and least – compelling. This provides valuable pointers for engaging with the public about net zero policies, including the power of 'co-benefits' such as health benefits, safety benefits or job creation in making a positive case for net zero, and the importance of cost and affordability as factors that can shift public opinion for or against a policy.

The public is generally concerned about climate change, and see it as an important issue, but that concern is not sufficient on its own for people to support net zero policies unwaveringly. For each of the eight policies, we tested how convincing the public found the argument that the policy 'will be an essential action to address climate change'. Our findings show that while environmental concern does play a role, it tends to be a secondary rather than a primary motivator. For almost all the policies, addressing climate change did not emerge as the most convincing argument. The exception was frequent flyer levies, where the public supported the policy on the basis of the direct impact of aviation on climate change.

While environmental concern does play a role, it tends to be a secondary rather than a primary motivator

This was considered a more convincing argument than other potential benefits such as distributing the costs of flying more fairly, making other forms of long-distance transport more competitive, health benefits and job creation.

This is not to say that climate concern is unimportant in mobilising public action on climate change. Our results show that people who are already concerned about climate change are more likely to be convinced of the benefits of net zero policies than those who are not. This is critical given the 'multiplier' effect where individuals often influence others around them by encouraging them to try out different choices, which may then lead to shifts towards more environmentally friendly lifestyles overall. Climate

concern is also an important factor shaping attitudes to lifestyle change; as might be expected, those who are not concerned about climate change also tend to be more convinced by the arguments against different net zero policies than those who are concerned about this issue.

What our findings do indicate though is that policy and decision-makers cannot rely on the public being motivated enough by climate concerns to take action. Rather, communication needs to capitalise on the additional benefits of climate action that resonate with the public. These include health, safety, fairness, active travel and job creation benefits, as detailed later in this chapter.

The public see some policies as more essential climate actions than others, and this reflects the level of overall support for each policy. Most of the UK public support EV subsidies (75%), frequent flyer levies, changing product pricing to reflect the environmental impact of items, and phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers (all 69%). People are less persuaded that changes to the food system and diets, or green pensions, are essential actions to address climate change, although more were convinced that these are essential actions than are not. This probably reflects that many of the public currently do not make the link between dietary change and addressing climate change.[38] On low traffic neighbourhoods (LTNs), the public were split, with roughly equal proportions agreeing that LTNs are an essential action to address climate change.

Since concern about climate change alone is not sufficient to convince the public on net zero policies, what do people find persuasive? In this chapter we look at the arguments the public find compelling both for and against net zero policies across five key areas: transport and mobility, home heating, material consumption, food and diet, and green finance, before summarising how this varies across different groups in UK society. Lastly, we set out the four key messages that climate communicators can take from our analysis.

Mobility and travel

LTNs have been a contentious policy in some local areas. This will relate in part to the fact that the public can see convincing arguments against LTNs, as well as for them. They also have immediate negative impacts for some individuals which may seem of greater importance than the longer-term climate change or health objectives. Overall, LTNs are a challenging policy to communicate: the arguments against the policy were more convincing (68% overall score*****) than the arguments for it (58% overall score).

At least three in five of the public found each of the arguments against LTNs presented convincing: 73%

Figure 4.1 – Arguments against creating LTNs



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

***** The overall score for the arguments for and against each policy was calculated by summing the percentages of the public who found each of the arguments convincing and then dividing by the number of arguments presented.

were convinced by the argument that LTNs will make journey times longer for drivers, 71% by the argument that LTNs will make the main roads even busier, and 69% by the argument that LTNs disadvantage people who rely on private vehicles to get around. Those living in the South of England and the Midlands were more likely to be convinced that LTNs would make journey times longer than those living in the North were, while the argument that LTNs will make the main roads even busier was particularly convincing for Londoners and those in urban areas.

When it comes to communicating about LTNs, the road safety and health benefits of this policy resonate most with the public: 73% find it convincing that LTNs will make areas safer and reduce road traffic accidents, while 70% say the same about LTNs benefiting the health of people who live and work in the area. Active travel benefits also resonate, with three in five (59%) finding it convincing that LTNs will encourage more people to walk and cycle. Benefits to the local economy are seen as less convincing: 39% find it convincing that LTNs will benefit local businesses such as shops and cafes, while 56% say this is not convincing.

The majority of the public were convinced by the argument that **frequent flyer levies** are an essential action to address climate change (69%). Other arguments in favour of this policy on fairness, competition

Figure 4.2 – Arguments in favour of creating LTNs



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

and health grounds are also perceived as convincing by the public: over half agree that it will distribute the costs of flying more fairly (56%), that it will make other forms of long-distance transport such as trains more competitive (54%), and that it will improve the health of people living near airports (53%).

Women overall found the arguments in favour of frequent flyer levies more convincing than men did, and climate change and health benefits resonated most strongly with women (74% and 57% of women were convinced by these arguments respectively, compared with 64% and 48% of men). The argument that this policy will make other forms of long-distance transport more competitive was particularly convincing for young people; 62% of those aged 16-34 found this convincing, compared with 52% of those aged 35-54 and 49% of those aged 55+.

Women overall find the arguments in favour of frequent flyer levies more convincing

Figure 4.3 – Arguments in favour of frequent flyer levies



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Although the arguments for frequent flyer levies are rated as convincing by most, the public are just as convinced by the arguments **against** this policy. Cost concerns resonate strongly with the public and will be important to address: two thirds (65%) were convinced by the argument that frequent flyer levies will make flying more expensive for everyone. While certain groups – older people, those living in the most deprived areas of the UK and Conservative supporters – were particularly likely to be convinced by the cost argument, it had universal resonance.

Moreover, around three in five (59%) found other arguments against the policy on social, economic and democratic grounds convincing, namely that the policy would limit people's ability to see friends and family overseas, lead to job losses in the aviation industry, and that the public may not have been consulted on the policy. Those who had been financially impacted by the pandemic were particularly likely to find the economic argument that the policy will lead to job losses in the aviation industry convincing. Overall, this illustrates that while there are multiple arguments for frequent flyer levies that resonate with people, communicators also need to be aware that people are equally receptive to arguments against this policy.

Figure 4.4 – Arguments against frequent flyer levies



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Unsurprisingly given the inherent financial benefit to individuals of **EV subsidies**, the public found the arguments for this policy, such as improving air quality and cutting the health risks of air pollution, and creating jobs in the electric vehicle sector, more convincing than the arguments against it. The arguments in favour of this policy were rated overall the most convincing by the public of those for any of the eight policies tested. It is nonetheless worth noting that certain groups – the over 55s, Conservative supporters, and those who are not worried about climate change – remained less likely to rate these arguments as convincing.

It is also important to understand which arguments against EV subsidies resonate with the UK public, as these may prove barriers to policy adoption. Chief among these is infrastructure: more than four in five (83%) found the argument that there is not currently adequate infrastructure and charging stations to support this policy convincing.

Figure 4.5 – Arguments for EV subsidies



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

This argument has universal resonance, with groups that otherwise tend to be convinced by the benefits of net zero policies - such as Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters and those who are worried about climate change – finding it almost as convincing as those who are typically unconvinced by net zero policies do.

The cost for those who may be left behind by this policy was also an argument that resonated with the public: two thirds (68%) found the argument that EV subsidies will make it too expensive to run a petrol or diesel car convincing. Women and those living in rural areas were particularly likely to find this argument persuasive. The same proportion (68%) found it convincing that such subsidies will not help people who cannot afford to buy a car.

Two thirds (68%) find the argument that EV subsidies will make it too expensive to run a petrol or diesel car convincing

Figure 4.6 – Arguments against EV subsidies



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Home heating

More of the public were convinced by the arguments in favour of **phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers** (61% overall 'convincing' score) than were convinced by the arguments against the policy (53% score). Chief among the persuasive arguments for the policy were job creation in the renewable heat sector (70% found this convincing), it being an essential action to address climate change (69%), and that it will encourage people to install different home heating systems, such as heat pumps (65%). This is a policy where the public can clearly see a direct economic benefit from the policy action, by creating work for home heating engineers and tradespeople.

Age is an important factor shaping attitudes to this policy, with the under 35s more likely than the over 55s to find these arguments convincing.

More of the public are convinced by the arguments in favour of phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers (61% overall 'convincing' score) than are convinced by the arguments against the policy (53% score)

Figure 4.7 – Arguments for phasing out the sale of gas/ coal boilers



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Figure 4.8 – Arguments against phasing out the sale of gas/coal boilers



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Affordability is a key concern to address when communicating this policy: three quarters (74%) of the public rated the argument that this policy will be too expensive for many people to afford as convincing. As for previous policies, the cost argument against the policy has universal resonance across different groups in society, although older people and Conservative supporters were particularly likely to rate this argument as convincing. Emphasising financial support available for people to make the change will be critical in building public support for this policy.

Reduced choice, the perceived disruption of having a different heating system installed, and not enough skilled tradespeople to install and maintain them, are also arguments against the policy that resonated with over half of the public (60%, 53% and 52% respectively were convinced by each argument).

Affordability is a key concern to address when communicating this policy: three quarters (74%) of the public rate the argument that this policy will be too expensive for many people to afford as convincing

Material consumption

As we have seen, **changing product pricing to reflect an item's carbon footprint** is a policy that receives widespread public support. Reflecting this, a number of key arguments for this policy resonate strongly with the public: three quarters (74%) were convinced by the argument that this would encourage people to buy more environmentally products, while around two thirds were convinced that this will encourage people to value products they already own (69%) and that it will reduce the amount of rubbish that goes to landfill (64%). Affluence makes a difference to attitudes, with those living in the UK's least deprived areas and those who have not been financially impacted by the pandemic more likely to find these arguments convincing than those living in the most deprived areas and those who have been financially impacted by COVID-19.

Affordability is a key argument against this policy in the public's eyes: seven in ten (70%) rated it as convincing that this policy will make some products unaffordable. However, the high overall support for this policy, even if it means that they personally have to pay more for some products, indicates that this is a price the public are willing to countenance. Nonetheless our results suggest that how this policy is introduced is key to its success, as there is a well of public scepticism: over half of the public found it convincing that the public may not have been consulted on this policy (58%) and that it is just a way for the government to raise taxes (50%).

Figure 4.9 – Arguments for changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Figure 4.10 – Arguments against changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Food and diet

Overall, the public find the arguments for the 'pull' (supportive) policy action of **increasing vegetarian and vegan options in public sector catering** more convincing than the arguments against the policy. Most saw it as convincing that the policy will create jobs in the vegetarian and vegan food sector (69%) – although a similar proportion (67%) also perceived a convincing argument against the policy to be that it will lead to job losses in the livestock agriculture sector. Older people were particularly likely to find the job losses argument a convincing argument against the policy.

Around three in five (61%) found the 'nudge' argument that this policy will encourage people to eat more vegetarian and vegan foods convincing, with young people particularly likely to say this is convincing. A similar proportion (61%) felt the health benefits for patients, children and public sector workers were a convincing argument for the policy; women were especially likely to find this argument convincing.

Figure 4.11 – Arguments for increasing vegetarian and vegan food provisioning in public sector catering



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Figure 4.12 – Arguments against increasing vegetarian and vegan food provisioning in public sector catering



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

When it comes to cost, however, the argument against the policy was felt to be more persuasive than the argument for it: more found it convincing that this policy will make red meat and dairy more expensive for everyone (66%) than found it convincing that it will make vegetarian and vegan options cheaper for everyone. The over 55s and those not in full-time work were particularly likely to find the cost argument against the policy convincing. Once again cost emerges as a key issue to address when communicating about net zero policies – and the indication is that the public will require considerable reassurance and support on this point, even for policies that they tend to be in favour of overall.

Looking at the 'push' (restrictive) policy of introducing **higher taxes on red meat and dairy products**, it is unsurprising that the argument the public found most convincing was the financial argument against this policy: four in five (79%) said that the argument that this policy will make red meat and dairy more expensive for everyone was convincing. Any proposed new tax tends not to be popular since it implies increased costs to individuals and may disproportionally affect the less well-off. The cost argument against the policy resonated across the board with different demographic groups, and there was no significant difference between those who are most and least worried about climate change.

Figure 4.13 – Arguments against introducing higher taxes on red meat and dairy products



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Other arguments against this policy also resonate with the public: most find it convincing that it will lead to job losses in the livestock agriculture sector (69%), that the public may not have been consulted on the policy (50%) and that it restricts people's freedom of choice (58%).

That is not to say that arguments for this policy are not also persuasive: most are convinced of the policy's health benefits for people who change their eating habits as a result (62%), that it will create jobs in the vegetarian and vegan food sector (58%), that it will be an essential action to address climate change, and the 'nudge' argument that it will encourage people to eat more plant-based foods.

Certain groups were more likely to find most of the arguments for this policy convincing, namely women, the under 35s and those in Southern England – for example, those living in Southern England find the job creation, climate change and 'nudge' arguments more convincing than those living in the North of England or the Midlands do.

Figure 4.14 – Arguments for introducing higher taxes on red meat and dairy products



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

What is clear is that introducing higher taxes on red meat and dairy is a potentially very divisive policy, which when presented to the public currently is met with considerable opposition. Governments may be reluctant to propose this ‘stick’ measure in light of this, instead focusing on ‘carrot’ policies to encourage people to adopt more climate-friendly lifestyles. There was significant debate about this in the UK ahead of the COP26 climate summit. The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, George Eustice, attracted criticism from Conservative Party politicians, farmers and industry when he mentioned that the government was looking at a new tax system for parts of the food sector producing foods that contribute to green house gas emissions. This policy’s unpopularity among Conservative voters is also apparent in our data; those who voted Conservative at the 2019 General Election were more likely to be convinced by the arguments against the policy, and to be unconvinced by the arguments for it, than the UK public were overall.

Green finance

The public is generally open to persuasion on the policy of **ensuring access to sustainable pension funds**, which may well reflect low awareness of this area. The 'nudge' and convenience arguments for the policy appear to be convincing: around three in five found it convincing that the policy will encourage people to invest in sustainable pensions (60%) and that it will be easier than asking people to switch pensions themselves (58%). These arguments were especially likely to be rated as convincing by Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters and for broadsheet newspaper readers.

Job creation in the sustainable finance sector and this being an essential action to address climate change were also perceived to be convincing arguments by over half of the public (54% and 51% respectively).

Around three in five find it convincing that the policy will encourage people to invest in sustainable pensions (60%) and that it will be easier than asking people to switch pensions themselves (58%)

Figure 4.15 – Arguments for ensuring access to sustainable pension funds



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments in favour of this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

There are also several concerns that could shift public opinion against this policy. Not enough fund accountability, it being difficult for people to understand which provider to choose, job losses in sectors that are not considered sustainable, and a lack of autonomy for individuals ('it is making the financial decision for people') were all arguments that over half of the public rated as convincing. There not being enough accountability on whether a fund is sustainable or not was an argument that the public across the board found convincing, with factors such as political party support and environmental worry (unusually) making no significant difference to how people rated these arguments.

The public is generally open to persuasion on the policy of ensuring access to sustainable pension funds, but there are also several concerns that could shift public opinion against this policy

Our findings indicate that the public have not made up their mind as yet on green pensions, which may suggest that this is an area in which a default 'nudge' policy of transitioning to sustainable pension funds could achieve success.

Figure 4.16 – Arguments against ensuring access to sustainable pension funds



Q: How convincing, or otherwise, do you personally find each of the following arguments against this policy?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Group differences

We have already seen in previous chapters that **political affiliation** shapes support for net zero policies, with Conservative supporters and those on the right of the political spectrum being overall less likely to support such policies than Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters and those on the left. Unsurprisingly, we also find this pattern when it comes to the arguments for and against the policies, with Conservative supporters typically less likely to find the arguments for the policies convincing and Labour or Liberal Democrat supporters more likely to find them convincing.

Looking at how the arguments for and against net zero policies play out in **different types of area** across the UK, those living in large regional cities and the south east tended to find the arguments for net zero policies the most convincing. While there was diversity in terms of which areas were least convinced by arguments in favour of net zero policies, these were often rural areas and traditional mining areas (Central Scotland, northern England and South Wales).

Women were typically more likely than men to be convinced that the policies presented were essential actions to address climate change. This is important for climate communicators to bear in mind, as women often play a role in influencing the behaviours and attitudes of others around them. Additionally, when it comes to food and diet, women in the UK are still more likely to be the primary food shopper in the household and thus are more likely to be the household decision-maker on food choices.

However, women were also often more likely than men to be convinced by a range of arguments against the individual net zero policies, such as the expense or a lack of fairness. Taking EV subsidies as an example, women were more likely than men to be convinced that this policy is essential to address climate change, but also more likely to be persuaded that it will make it too expensive to buy a new petrol or diesel car or that it will not help people who cannot afford to buy a car. Taken together, these findings indicate that women may be more responsive to the type of arguments used for or against net zero policies.

Overall, differences between demographic groups are not as stark for the arguments against net zero policies as they are for the arguments in favour of them. **The arguments against the policies, including on cost grounds, have more universal resonance than the arguments in favour of the policies**. When we look at views on the policy of phasing out gas and coal boilers, for example, the argument is convincing for the public across the board - though older people and Conservative supporters were particularly likely to find this argument convincing. Given this universal resonance of cost as an argument against net zero policies, emphasising financial support available for people to make changes will be critical.

Age shapes public opinion for some net zero policies but not for others. This is apparent when we look at the examples of transport and mobility and food and diet policies. For low traffic neighbourhoods, the over 55s were more likely than their younger counterparts to not be convinced by the arguments for the policy (such as encouraging active travel), and to find the arguments against the policy convincing. Similarly for EV subsidies, the cost arguments against the policy were more convincing for older than for younger age groups. When it comes to higher taxes on red meat and dairy products, younger age groups were more likely than older age groups to find the arguments for this policy convincing. This is likely to relate in part to vegetarian and vegan diets being more prevalent among younger people[39] than among the over 55s.

Given this universal resonance of cost as an argument against net zero policies, emphasising financial support available for people to make changes will be critical

Messages for public policy and decision-makers

What can public policy and decision-makers take from our analysis? Four key messages emerge:

1. **Communicate about cost and what financial support is available.** Cost should not be the elephant in the room. If you do not talk about cost, the public will still be concerned about cost and it is likely to impact negatively on how the policy is received. Cost arguments are universally powerful – our study shows that it is not just a particular demographic, such as those living in more deprived areas or who have been financially affected by COVID-19, who are convinced by such arguments. Rather, cost arguments have universal resonance with the public and are essential for climate communicators to address, both by talking about the short- and long-term costs and by emphasising the costs of the status quo if no change is made.

2. **Talk about the co-benefits.** This may include focusing on health benefits, air quality benefits, job creation or other co-benefits, as appropriate for the policy. While environmental concern is an important factor in how communications about net zero policies are received, this alone will not be enough to catalyse people to make changes to their lifestyles. People need other strong 'reasons to believe'. And these need to be tailored to the policy – for example, job creation is seen as a convincing argument when it comes to phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers, but less so when it comes to frequent flyer levies. The 'no regrets' approach of highlighting the benefits of policies irrespective of their contribution to net zero may be appropriate for some audiences.

3. **Know your counter-arguments.** Our results highlight the concerns that could be powerful in shifting public opinion against individual net zero policies and thus make these more challenging to implement. In some cases, it may be worth reassuring the public explicitly on

these points – particularly if they actually reflect a misperception (myth busting) or adjust the policies to address some legitimate concerns. It is clear that some policies are more contentious, and hence likely to be more challenging to implement successfully, than others. The public are more convinced by the arguments against low traffic neighbourhoods or higher taxes on red meat and dairy products than for them, for example - while they are more persuaded of the arguments in favour of measures such as EV subsidies, changing product pricing, phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers and increasing the provision of plant-based options in public sector catering.

4. **What about women?** Women appear to be slightly more open to the different arguments regarding net zero policies than men – but this cuts both ways, with women more likely to find arguments both for and against many of the net zero policies convincing than men are. This is important when thinking about shifts towards more sustainable lifestyles, given women's role and influence in family and household dynamics. If climate communicators can address some of these concerns and bring more women on board with net zero policies, will those women have a 'multiplier effect' by influencing the behaviours and attitudes of those around them?

CHAPTER 5
How fair do the public think net zero policies are?

Fairness comprises several dimensions, including distributive and procedural justice. Distributive justice involves people receiving a fair outcome (e.g. equal share of benefits and costs), while procedural justice concerns decisions being made in a fair way (e.g. giving people a say who might be affected). In the survey we asked two questions focused on distributive justice and one on procedural justice. We also asked about who the public think would be impacted, either positively or negatively, by the different policies.

Perceived fairness of net zero policies

Overall, there was l**ow confidence that the net zero policies would be fair** across the three statements, particularly those on procedural fairness (confidence in whether the policies would take into account the views of everyone affected). Confidence in fairness was similarly low across the different policies, although, on average, increasing vegetarian/vegan options in public food provisioning was seen as fairer than the other policies. Lowest overall fairness ratings were received for red meat/dairy taxes, in line with lower levels of support for this policy.

Figure 5.1 - Fairness across policies

Give a fair outcome to everyone affected



Q: How confident, if at all, are you that this policy would give a fair outcome to everyone affected?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Fairness across policies

Take into account the views of everyone affected



Q: How confident, if at all, are you that this policy would take into account the views of everyone affected?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Fairness across policies

Not be biased towards any one particular group



Q: How confident, if at all, are you that this policy would not be biased towards any one particular group?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Who is perceived to be impacted by net zero policies?

We also asked participants who they thought would be positively or negatively impacted by the net zero policies. We considered different socio-demographic groups (young and retired people, men and women, white and minority ethnic groups, and high- and low- income households) for all policies, and specific groups for distinct policies (e.g. residents for LTNs, tourist industry for frequent flyer levies).

Most commonly, people seen to be impacted most by each policy were policy-specific, such as people living near airports and the foreign tourist industry (in the case of frequent flyer levies).

In terms of socio-demographic groups, people from high-income households were perceived to be positively impacted, while **low-income households** were seen to be negatively impacted by the policies. The differences in positive and negative impacts between different age groups, men and women, and different ethnic groups were generally seen as smaller, although, overall, the policies were seen as having more positive impacts on white people than on **ethnic minority groups** and (for some policies) on young people than on **older groups**. Men and women were generally seen as equally impacted by the different net zero policies.

Mobility and travel

Only 30% were confident that low-traffic neighbourhoods (LTNs) would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). This was lower than for all other policies, except red meat/dairy taxes. Similarly, only 35% felt confident that low traffic neighbourhoods would not be biased towards any particular group, and 24% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

Of the groups affected by this policy (Figure 5.2), local residents were by far the most common group thought to be positively impacted (60%); while car owners (56%) were most commonly thought to be negatively impacted. Local businesses were thought to be both negatively (15%) and positively (29%) impacted. There were fewer differences for the socio-demographic groups, although retirees were felt to be more positively (28%) than negatively (19%) impacted, while lower income households were thought to be more negatively (21%) than positively (15%) impacted.

Only 30% are confident that low-traffic neighbourhoods (LTNs) would give a fair outcome to everyone affected

Figure 5.2 - Low traffic neighbourhoods

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Low traffic neighbourhoods

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

For frequent flyer levies, only 34% were confident that they would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 32% felt confident that frequent flyer levies would not be biased against any particular group, and 24% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

The most common groups thought to be positively impacted are people who live near airports (48%) and the UK tourist industry (45%), while overseas tourist industries (50%) are seen as most negatively impacted

Of the groups affected by this policy (Figure 5.3), the most common groups thought to be positively impacted were people who live near airports (48%) and the UK tourist industry (45%), while overseas tourist industries (50%) were seen as most negatively impacted. People from lower income households were thought to be both negatively (31%) and positively (25%) impacted; similarly, higher income groups were seen as both being negatively (24%) and positively (20%) impacted.

Figure 5.3 - Frequent flyer levies

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Frequent flyer levies

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

For EV subsidies, only 34% were confident they would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 34% felt confident it would not be biased towards any particular group, and 29% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

Of the groups affected by this policy (Figure 5.4), the most common groups thought to be positively impacted were people who live in towns and cities (63%) and higher income households (53%), while lower income households (55%) and those living in rural areas (43%) were seen as most negatively impacted. Motorists were thought to be both positively (36%) and negatively (23%) impacted. Young people were thought to benefit more (24%) than older people (20%).

For EV subsidies, only 34% are confident they would give a fair outcome to everyone affected

Figure 5.4 - Groups positively impacted by electric vehicle subsidies



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Groups negatively impacted by electric vehicle subsidies



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanelx **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Home heating

Only 32% were confident that phasing out the sale of gas/coal boilers would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 35% felt confident it would not be biased towards any particular group, and 28% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

Lower income groups (56%) are most commonly thought to be negatively impacted

Of the groups affected by this policy (Figure 5.5), the most common groups thought to be positively impacted were higher income households (44%), boiler manufacturers (43%), and utilities companies (43%); while lower income groups (56%) were most commonly thought to be negatively impacted. Gas installers were thought to be both negatively (39%) and positively (35%) impacted; likewise, homeowners were considered both positively (33%) and negatively impacted (29%).

Figure 5.5 - Phasing out the sale of gase and coal boilers

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Material consumption

Only 34% were confident that changing product pricing to reflect environmental impacts would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 36% felt confident it would not be biased towards any particular group, and 25% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

Of the groups affected by this policy (Figure 5.6), the most common groups thought to be positively impacted were higher income households (39%), businesses (33%), and people working in manufacturing/distribution (30%); while lower income groups (50%) were most commonly thought to be negatively impacted.

Food and diet

Only 38% were confident that increasing vegetarian/vegan public provisioning would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 37% felt confident it would not be biased towards any particular group, and 29% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected. These proportions are **higher** than for any other policy.

Of the groups affected by this policy (Figure 5.7), by far the most common group thought to be positively impacted were people working in the vegetarian/vegan sector (74%); while workers in meat and dairy sectors (68%) were by far the most commonly thought to be negatively impacted. Lower income households were also thought to fare worse than higher income households under this policy: 31% thought lower income groups would be negatively impacted, while 26% thought higher income households would positively benefit. Conversely, younger people (31%) were thought to see more positive benefits than older people (16%).

Only 29% were confident that higher taxes on red meat and dairy products would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 31% felt confident it would not be biased towards any particular group, and 23% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected. These proportions are **lower** than for any other policy.

Only 38% were confident that increasing vegetarian/ vegan public provisioning would give a fair outcome to everyone affected

Figure 5.6 - Changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Similar to the provisioning policy, by far the most common group thought to be positively impacted (Figure 5.8) were people working in the vegetarian/vegan sector (72%); while workers in meat and dairy sectors (69%) were by far the most commonly thought to be negatively impacted. Lower income households were also thought to fare worse than higher income households under this policy: 43% thought lower income groups would be negatively impacted, while 34% thought higher income households would positively benefit. Conversely, younger people (30%) were thought to see more positive benefits than older people (14%).

Most (96%) think that workers in meat and dairy sectors would be negatively impacted

Figure 5.7 - Increasing vegetarian/vegan options in public food provisioning

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Increasing vegetarian/vegan options in public food provisioning

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Figure 5.8 - Higher taxes on red meat and dairy products

Higher taxes on red meat and dairy products

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?

Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Green finance

Only 32% were confident that ensuring access to sustainable pension funds would give a fair outcome to everyone affected (Figure 5.1). Similarly, only 32% felt confident it would not be biased towards any particular group, and 25% that the policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

Looking at groups who would be impacted (Figure 5.9), the most common group thought to be positively impacted were people working in financial services (40%); while workers in unsustainable sectors (42%) were most commonly thought to be negatively impacted. Again, lower income households were also thought to fare worse than higher income households under this policy: 31% thought low-income groups would be negatively impacted, while 33% thought higher income households would positively benefit. Conversely, younger people (30%) were thought to see more positive benefits than older people (15%).

Only 32% are confident that ensuring access to sustainable pension funds would give a fair outcome to everyone affected

Figure 5.9 - Ensuring access to sustainable pension funds

Groups positively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely positive impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Ensuring access to sustainable pension funds

Groups negatively impacted



Q: On which of the following groups do you think this policy would have a largely negative impact?
Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Group differences

Looking at responses across the UK using the ONS area classification (Figure 5.10), it was revealed that there were few differences by geographical grouping, and only few policies were seen as more or less fair in specific area types. For example, 'London Cosmopolitans' (i.e. those located in 12 inner London boroughs with a very high population density and where the population is typically younger than in the UK overall) perceived the policy of increasing vegetarian/vegan foods in public provisioning as more fair than those in other areas did, while those residing in 'Countryside Living' areas (i.e. rural areas with a lower population density and populations on average older than in the UK overall) were most critical of this policy's fairness. In contrast, LTNs were seen as less fair among those living in 'London Cosmopolitan' areas compared to the other areas (Figure 5.11).

Those residing in 'Countryside Living' areas (i.e. rural areas with a lower population density and populations on average older than in the UK overall) are most critical of this policy's fairness

Figure 5.10 - Confidence in fairness of increasing vegetarian/vegan options in public provisioning, by ONS area classification



Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Figure 5.11 - Confidence in fairness of low-traffic neighbourhoods, by ONS area classification



Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

The survey identified differences in fairness ratings between people who are more or less worried about climate change, with policies being perceived as fairer by people who are more worried about climate change (as compared to those who are less worried). This difference is particularly apparent for policies that focus on changing diets, as illustrated in Figure 5.12 for higher taxes on red meat and dairy. It is possible that people who are more concerned about climate change more generally consider the implications of existing policies, with high emission scenarios, and whether the implications of those can be considered as 'fair'.

Notably, even amongst those who are worried about climate change, the majority is still not convinced that the net zero polices can be classified as fair.

Younger people consistently perceive net zero policies to be fairer than older participants (Figure 5.13). This age difference was particularly apparent for judgements about whether policies would give a fair outcome to everyone. The biggest age difference was identified for the provision of more vegan options in public food provisioning, with 58% of those aged 16-24 being confident that this will be fair to everyone affected, compared with 25% of the over 75s. For subsidies for EVs, this difference was 46% of young people compared to 27% who are over 75 perceiving this as fair.

Figure 5.12 - Confidence in fairness of higher taxes for red meat and dairy, by groups who are more worried (very/extremely) versus less worried (fairly/not very/not at all) about climate change



Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Furthermore, results showed that men and those with left-of-centre political orientation tended to see the policies as fairer. For example, 38% of those identifying as politically left-wing perceived the phasing out of gas and coal boilers as providing a fair outcome to everyone affected, as compared to 30% of those identifying as right-wing. The differences between men and women were less substantial, but men consistently rated policies as fairer than women, such as environmental product pricing for which 28% of men and 22% of women reported that this policy would take into account the views of everyone affected.

Figure 5.13 - Confidence in distributional fairness (give a fair outcome for everyone) of all policies, comparing youngest (16-24 years) and oldest (above 75 years) age groups



Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Does fairness affect policy support?

Perceived fairness has been found to predict policy support in previous academic studies, which motivated the closer examination of fairness of net zero policies.

To examine this relationship between fairness and policy support we separated those who rated policies are fair compared to those who were not convinced by the fairness of each policy. We found that indeed people who rated a policy as fair was more supportive of this policy and this was true for all measures of fairness. For example, between 77% and 88% of people who perceived the policy as giving a fair outcome to everyone affected also supported each policy, whilst amongst people who are less convinced of the distributional fairness only 40% to 60% expressed support.

Figure 5.14 - Confidence in distributional fairness (give a fair outcome for everyone) of all policies, comparing people who perceive the policy as fair (distributional fairness vs. no confidence)



Source: Ipsos KnowledgePanel **Base:** c 2,830 UK adults aged 16+ per policy, 19-25 Aug 2021

Messages for decision-makers

Our findings show that net zero policies are **not seen as fair** by most of the UK public, both in terms of outcomes (who is impacted and how) and process (taking into account views of all those affected). Since fairness is important for policy acceptance, there is a clear scope to develop policies that are fairer in terms of procedure and distribution – that is, that do not discriminate against distinct groups or exclude people from the decision-making process.

While there were few consistent patterns as to the specific groups who were seen to be positively or negatively impacted by the policies, in all cases there were seen to be **winners and losers**. For example, for LTNs, residents are seen to benefit at the expense of motorists; while red meat/dairy taxes are seen to benefit those working in the vegetarian/vegan food sector at the expense of those working in the meat/dairy sector. No doubt these unequal impacts of the different policies influence perceptions of their fairness and undermine support for them.

Protect poorer and vulnerable groups

Amongst the demographic groups, higher income groups were more often seen to benefit from net zero policies – not only economic policies, but also regulatory ones (e.g. phasing out gas/coal boilers). This was even the case for policies that would involve higher income households paying more, such as frequent flyer levies (since higher earners fly more). This links to our earlier findings that cost is a critical element of policy support and highlights the importance of explicitly protecting lower earners in net zero policy design.

In addition, white people and younger people were felt to benefit more from net zero policies than ethnic minorities and older people. In the case of ethnicity, this may reflect awareness of a more general disadvantage amongst minority groups (although we found no differences in perceived impacts between men and women). In the case of young people, there may be an awareness amongst the public that this group will tend to see more benefits from net zero policies in the sense that climate change impacts on future generations may be reduced. Indeed, comparing responses from older versus younger participants, young people themselves tend to see net zero policies as being much fairer than do older people. Net zero policy support may be increased if the groups thought to be disadvantaged by them are instead shown to be helped.

Create and communicate co-benefits

More generally, our findings suggest that people are more likely to classify policies as unfair if the impacts are felt 'closer to home', such as expecting negative impacts for themselves or the community they are part of. For example, people living in rural areas see food policies (e.g. meat/dairy taxes) as less fair that those in urban areas; while the opposite is true for urban transport policies (e.g. LTNs). Relatedly, people who are more worried about climate change see net zero policies as fairer – perhaps due to 'motivated reasoning' (i.e. interpreting information in line with existing beliefs or values)[40] or because they consider climate related consequences that are not considered by everyone (i.e. consequences of continuing high emissions). Taken together, these findings highlight the need to design policies with wider and more equal co-benefits – but also the need to effectively communicate these co-benefits. Effective and tailored communication could help to improve how fair the public considers net zero policies to be and reassure them that most net zero policies actually improve, not diminish, wellbeing.[41]

Involve the public in decision-making

The second building block to policy fairness, next to distributional effects of policies, is the procedural aspect of how policies are created and decided upon. Those people who would be affected by net zero policies are thought to have little say in the design or decision-making process which contributes to the overall sense of unfairness. To increase public confidence in net zero policies it would be advisable to give the public a more substantial say in the country's path to reach the net zero targets. Examples of how this active participation could be achieved have already gained popularity, for example through citizens assemblies and juries. Another would be to make sure some of these discussions are brought into public focus and raise public debate about how to reach net zero, which will engender a sense of participation and help foster a sense of fairness.

CHAPTER 6
Key findings and implications for public policy and brand decision-makers

A central finding of this study is that the UK public are on board with net zero policies. There is widespread public backing for a range of policies that would bring about fundamental transformations in the food we eat, the way we travel, the way we heat and cool our homes, how we consume goods and services, and how we save for retirement.

1. **However, public support for net zero policies can be fragile as it sharply drops when potential lifestyle and cost implications are presented.** Cost arguments against net zero policies are particularly powerful in undermining public support. It is not only particular demographic groups, such as those on lower incomes, who are persuaded by such arguments, but the public across the board. This issue is likely to be felt more sharply now with cost-of-living increases.
2. **The public can also see important co-benefits of net zero policies.** Many of the co-benefits of net zero policies are persuasive to the public. And where people see clear local or personal benefits from policies, they tend to think they are fairer. While concern about climate change is an important factor shaping how net zero policies are received, it is generally not sufficient on its own to catalyse behaviour change. Rather, public support can be built by focusing on more tangible benefits such as improved health, air quality or job creation.
3. **The public understands transport, energy and consumption are important priorities for climate action, but rank the importance of dietary change lower.** In line with this, the only policy supported by fewer than half of the public was higher taxes on red meat and dairy products, although this should not be overstated as even this policy receives more support than opposition initially.
4. **There is low confidence that net zero policies will be fair** – especially when it comes to taking into account the views of everyone affected by the policies. Across all policies, there are felt to be winners and losers. Higher income groups, white people and younger people are widely thought to benefit from net zero policies at the expense of poorer people, ethnic minorities, and older people. Fairness is a known factor in enhancing policy support, alongside perceived effectiveness and costs. The more a policy measure is seen as preserving people's choice – for instance, by supporting or incentivising people to make changes, or providing infrastructure that helps them to do so – the fairer people are likely to perceive the policy as, and the more likely they are to support it.

5. **Some net zero policies are more contentious than others, and hence more challenging to communicate.** The public is more easily persuaded by arguments against restrictive policies, such as low-traffic neighbourhoods (LTNs) or taxes on red meat and dairy products. Conversely, people are more easily persuaded by arguments in favour of measures such as electric vehicle subsidies, changing product pricing, phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers and increasing the provision of plant-based options in public sector catering, most of which incentivise and support behaviour change.

6. **Support for net zero policies is lower among some groups than others:** those living in the UK's most deprived areas, those on the right of the political spectrum and those who are less engaged with climate change issues are all less likely to support the policies.

7. **There are some marked differences in older and younger people's policy preferences.** Support for LTNs, frequent flyer levies and changing product pricing is higher among older age groups. In contrast, support for electric vehicle subsidies, increasing vegetarian and/or vegan options in public food provisioning and phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers is higher among young people.

8. **Women are slightly more open to supporting net zero policies than men.** Overall, women are more likely to find arguments both for and against net zero policies convincing than men are.

What does this mean for public policy and brand decision-makers?

1. **A central challenge facing decision-makers is the fragility of public support for net zero policies.** Our results show that public support for net zero policies changes dramatically when the public is asked to consider potential lifestyle and financial costs of net zero policies. Policy and decision-makers should minimise the cost and 'hassle' factors of such policy measures as far as possible, but also focus on communicating the benefits of these more strongly.

2. **Policy and decision-makers need to understand the public's valid concerns about net zero policies and how these play out for individual policy measures.** Looking in-depth at what the public's chief concerns about individual policy measures are, and how these vary for particular groups within the population, provides valuable lessons that help to shape future public engagement. Policy measures targeting dietary change are less salient for the public than those targeting transport, energy or material consumption, for example, and communication about food and diet should be tailored accordingly given this different starting point.

3. **Personal costs are important.** If policy decision-makers do not consider and talk about costs when introducing policies or policy proposals, it is likely to cause problems later when the real cost implications come to light. Cost arguments have universal resonance and are essential for decision-makers to communicate to the public.

4. **Communicate the co-benefits of net zero policies.** The public is more likely to support net zero policies if they can see these policies help to make the air they and their families breathe cleaner, are beneficial to their health, make their homes warmer, or can create jobs locally.

5. **Consider fairness factors in design and communication of net zero policies.** Currently there is low confidence that net zero policies will be fair, and fairness is likely to be an important factor in creating or undermining public support for a policy. There is a need for net zero policies that are designed to be affordable and fair to everyone, and consider the views of those affected. Countering current assumptions, support for net zero policy may be increased if the groups thought to be disadvantaged by them (low-income, ethnic minorities, older people) are instead shown to be helped.

6. **Consider who the influencers are.** Engaging particular groups on net zero policies may have a ‘multiplier effect’ on others. We know that women are more likely to support net zero policies. This could mean that engaging women on these policy measures may help to influence others around them to shift towards more sustainable lifestyles.

7. **Further engagement with the public is needed to raise awareness of the societal transformations needed to reach net zero, their benefits and the costs of inaction.** This will help to avoid public backlash when policies are implemented. The more public policy and brand decision-makers can engage people with the issue of climate change, the more likely they are to be supportive of net zero policies and to see these as fair.

CHAPTER 7
Behavioural science

What can behavioural science tell us about how to engage the public with net zero policies?

Reaching net zero will require profound changes across society, including in individuals' behaviours. This first study from Ipsos and the Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations has highlighted the importance of further engagement with the UK public to raise awareness of the societal transformations needed to reach net zero, their benefits and the costs of inaction. Insights from behavioural science can provide valuable pointers for public policy makers about what such public engagement could look like in future.

Public engagement includes: (a) engagement in *decision-making* (including policy-making) about how to reach net zero; and (b) engagement in delivery of action to reach net zero (i.e. 'behaviour change' in its broadest sense including lifestyle change, technology adoption/ use, policy support, activism, and awareness raising). These two forms of engagement are interlinked – involving people in decision-making helps provide the context and rationale for specific behavioural and structural interventions; and fosters collective efficacy and trust.[42]

Engaging the public in decision-making about net zero

There are a range of mechanisms for involving the public early on in policy design, such as citizens assemblies, citizens juries, and online deliberative polling. These types of deliberative and participatory methods that provide a substantive role for the public in decision-making tend to increase the quality, as well as acceptability of decisions.[43] This is because they provide insights on people's lived experiences that may show whether certain policies are likely to be workable and shed light on different values that may influence acceptance of measures. Also, bringing the public into decision-making can create a stronger sense of ownership and buy-in to the changes required.

For example, citizens assemblies on climate change often propose ambitious measures to reach net zero, in many cases going beyond current policy. In the case of the Climate Assembly UK, this includes an earlier shift to electric vehicles, lower automotive and aviation growth, and a greater reduction in meat and dairy consumption.[44] Identifying solutions which are carefully considered and do not alienate large sections of society is critical for moving forward rapidly to reach net zero.

Communicating the co-benefits and effectiveness of net zero policies

The public does not have a clear understanding of the extent of change required to achieve net zero or of the effectiveness of different behaviour change measures. Our research has highlighted that the public are sensitive to the potential negative implications of net zero policies, both on their wallets and on their lifestyles. However, evidence suggests that communicating co-benefits can help build support. It can be particularly effective to highlight the *multiple* benefits of measures – for example, that cutting down on red meat can benefit health *and* the environment.[45] By designing climate policies that achieve co-benefits, and communicating these in targeted ways to different publics, public policy makers can build support for transformation.

We also know that communicating the effectiveness of policies can increase support – sometimes by over 50%.[46] Given that the public has low awareness of the need to change diets, it may be that communicating the effectiveness of policies to encourage plant-based diets will help foster support for these measures.

Fostering support for transformational change

Information is rarely enough to change behaviour but can be important for building policy support. So, rather than using communication to target specific behaviours ('transactional approaches'), instead campaigns can attempt to alter the 'climate of public debate' to make much more far-reaching changes possible. If there is popular engagement and vocal support for an issue, then this can provide a mandate for bold policy action.[47] This approach has been used successfully by social change movements as diverse as same sex marriage, treatment for people with HIV, the civil rights movement and the toppling of authoritarian regimes such as Slobodan Milosevic's regime in Serbia.[48] The current time is a moment of opportunity to mobilise support for more far-reaching social change on net zero, since the UK public already see climate change as an urgent problem to address.

Removing behavioural barriers and 'friction'

Behavioural science shows that multiple measures (including economic, regulatory, and social interventions) are needed to remove barriers to behaviour change.[49] Much of our behaviour is habitual, so public policy makers can use interventions that enable people to automatically make greener choices. In one study, moving customers onto a renewable energy tariff increased uptake from 3% to 90% even though it cost them more.[50] This shows that making low-carbon choices the easiest and ideally the default can profoundly shift behaviour. As our study shows, financial cost is also important, so economic incentives and disincentives are also critical to ensure green choices are not the preserve of the wealthy.

CHAPTER 8
Appendix

Table 1.1:
Summary of policy framings

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Creating low traffic neighbourhoods	The government may want to reduce the number of vehicles on the road by creating low-traffic neighbourhoods. This is where cars, vans and other vehicles are stopped from using residential roads as shortcuts. This is done by putting some road closures in place using measures such as bollards or planters. Residents are still able to drive onto their street, but it is made more difficult or impossible to drive straight through the area from one main road to the next.	The government may want to reduce the number of vehicles on the road by creating low-traffic neighbourhoods. This is where cars, vans and other vehicles are stopped from using residential roads as shortcuts. This is done by putting some road closures in place using measures such as bollards or planters. Residents are still able to drive onto their street, but it is made more difficult or impossible to drive straight through the area from one main road to the next. This would help to tackle climate change, as petrol and diesel vehicles are a major contributor to carbon emissions. Reducing the number of vehicles on our roads will reduce the level of carbon emissions in our atmosphere.	The government may want to reduce the number of vehicles on the road by creating low-traffic neighbourhoods. This is where cars, vans and other vehicles are stopped from using residential roads as shortcuts. This is done by putting some road closures in place using measures such as bollards or planters. Residents are still able to drive onto their street, but it is made more difficult or impossible to drive straight through the area from one main road to the next. This would help to improve the health of people living and working in the area, as fewer vehicles on our roads will reduce the level of air pollution and could encourage people to take exercise by walking or cycling rather than travelling by car. It could also reduce the amount of traffic – and accidents – on our roads.	The government may want to reduce the number of vehicles on the road by creating low-traffic neighbourhoods. This is where cars, vans and other vehicles are stopped from using residential roads as shortcuts. This is done by putting some road closures in place using measures such as bollards or planters. Residents are still able to drive onto their street but it is made more difficult or impossible to drive straight through the area from one main road to the next. This would benefit local businesses, as customers are able to access shops more easily on foot, and local cafes may be able to use street space for outside tables.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Frequent flyer levies	The government may want to replace current tax on flights (Air Passenger Duty) by a tax that increases as people fly more often. People who only fly once in a year could pay no tax, while people who fly several times per year could pay a large amount of tax. This could mean people replace some flights with alternatives, like trains or ferries, or with videoconferencing instead of some business travel.	The government may want to replace current tax on flights (Air Passenger Duty) by a tax that increases as people fly more often. People who only fly once in a year could pay no tax, while people who fly several times per year could pay a large amount of tax. This could mean people replace some flights with alternatives, like trains or ferries, or with videoconferencing instead of some business travel. This would help to tackle climate change, as flying is a very polluting form of transport and fewer planes in the air will significantly reduce the level of carbon emissions in our atmosphere.	The government may want to replace current tax on flights (Air Passenger Duty) by a tax that increases as people fly more often. People who only fly once in a year could pay no tax, while people who fly several times per year could pay a large amount of tax. This could mean people replace some flights with alternatives, like trains or ferries, or with videoconferencing instead of some business travel. This would help to cut noise and air pollution for people living near airports, by reducing the number of flights taken. This would mean health improvements for these local communities.	The government may want to replace current tax on flights (Air Passenger Duty) by a tax that increases as people fly more often. People who only fly once in a year could pay no tax, while people who fly several times per year could pay a large amount of tax. This could mean people replace some flights with alternatives, like trains or ferries, or with videoconferencing instead of some business travel. This would help to make other forms of long-distance transport such as trains or ferries more competitive and affordable. This would also create jobs in the local UK tourist sector if more people choose to holiday locally instead of traveling abroad.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Electric vehicle subsidies	The government may want to subsidise the purchase of electric vehicles for consumers in order to reduce the number of petrol and diesel cars on the road. The government is ending the sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030 and encouraging a shift to electric vehicles. Putting in place subsidies, would mean electric vehicles become less expensive to buy than they are now. The money to do this may come from increasing fuel duty on petrol and diesel cars.	The government may want to subsidise the purchase of electric vehicles for consumers in order to reduce the number of petrol and diesel cars on the road. The government is ending the sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030 and encouraging a shift to electric vehicles. Putting in place subsidies, would mean electric vehicles become less expensive to buy than they are now. The money to do this may come from increasing fuel duty on petrol and diesel cars. This would help to tackle climate change, as driving a car powered by fossil fuels, like petrol or diesel, causes a large amount of carbon emissions. Electric vehicles can reduce these emissions and help significantly cut drivers' carbon footprint.	The government may want to subsidise the purchase of electric vehicles for consumers in order to reduce the number of petrol and diesel cars on the road. The government is ending the sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030 and encouraging a shift to electric vehicles. Putting in place subsidies, would mean electric vehicles become less expensive to buy than they are now. The money to do this may come from increasing fuel duty on petrol and diesel cars. This would help to improve air quality in towns and cities because petrol and diesel vehicles cause air pollution that affect adults' and children's health. Electric vehicles cause less air pollution, so reduce the risks of asthma, heart disease and lung cancer for people living and working in towns and cities.	The government may want to subsidise the purchase of electric vehicles for consumers in order to reduce the number of petrol and diesel cars on the road. The government is ending the sale of new petrol and diesel cars by 2030 and encouraging a shift to electric vehicles. Putting in place subsidies, would mean electric vehicles become less expensive to buy than they are now. The money to do this may come from increasing fuel duty on petrol and diesel cars. This would help to cut motorists' bills, as electric vehicles are much cheaper to run than petrol or diesel cars. By increasing the sales of these vehicles, this policy would also help reduce how much it costs to make electric vehicles so prices go down further, and others can afford them.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Increasing vegetarian and vegan options in public food provisioning	The government may want to reduce the amount of red meat and dairy products people eat, by increasing vegetarian and vegan options in all public sector catering. This would mean that meals served in hospital cafés, school canteens, prisons, police and fire stations, council offices, and across the public sector, would need to include a significant proportion of meat-free and plant-based options. It would reduce but not remove meat and dairy from menus, while it would increase the choice of meat/dairy-free alternatives.	The government may want to reduce the amount of red meat and dairy products people eat, by increasing vegetarian and vegan options in all public sector catering. This would mean that meals served in hospital cafés, school canteens, prisons, police and fire stations, council offices, and across the public sector, would need to include a significant proportion of meat-free and plant-based options. It would reduce but not remove meat and dairy from menus, while it would increase the choice of meat/dairy-free alternatives. This would help to tackle climate change, as red meat and dairy are the most polluting types of food to produce, while the production of vegetarian and vegan foods tends to emit much lower levels of greenhouse gases.	The government may want to reduce the amount of red meat and dairy products people eat, by increasing vegetarian and vegan options in all public sector catering. This would mean that meals served in hospital cafés, school canteens, prisons, police and fire stations, council offices, and across the public sector, would need to include a significant proportion of meat-free and plant-based options. It would reduce but not remove meat and dairy from menus, while it would increase the choice of meat/dairy-free alternatives. This would help to improve the health of hospital patients, school children, and public sector workers, as cutting down on red meat and eating more vegetarian and vegan foods can cut the risk of heart disease and certain types of cancer.	The government may want to reduce the amount of red meat and dairy products people eat, by increasing vegetarian and vegan options in all public sector catering. This would mean that meals served in hospital cafés, school canteens, prisons, police and fire stations, council offices, and across the public sector, would need to include a significant proportion of meat-free and plant-based options. It would reduce but not remove meat and dairy from menus, while it would increase the choice of meat/dairy-free alternatives. This would help to make vegetarian and vegan food producers more competitive and create jobs in this sector. By providing an initial customer base for these products, it could also help reduce their price so others can afford them.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Higher taxes on red meat and dairy products	The government may want to replace current tax on food products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different foods. This would increase the price of red meat and dairy products and reduce the price of certain other foods (e.g., vegetables, bread).	The government may want to replace current tax on food products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different foods. This would increase the price of red meat and dairy products and reduce the price of certain other foods (e.g., vegetables, bread). This would help to tackle climate change, as red meat and dairy are the most polluting types of food to produce; while the production of vegetarian and vegan foods tends to emit much lower levels of greenhouse gases.	The government may want to replace current tax on food products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different foods. This would increase the price of red meat and dairy products and reduce the price of certain other foods (e.g., vegetables, bread). This would help to improve the health of people who change their eating habits as a result, as cutting down on red meat and increasing vegetarian and vegan alternatives in people's diets can cut their risk of heart disease and cancer.	The government may want to replace current tax on food products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different foods. This would increase the price of red meat and dairy products and reduce the price of certain other foods (e.g., vegetables, bread). This would help to make vegetarian and vegan food producers more competitive and create jobs in this sector. By providing an initial customer base for these products, it could also help reduce their price so others can afford them.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are	The government may want to replace current tax on products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different products. This would mean products that are produced using high amounts of resources such as energy, water or scarce metals, or products that travel long distances before being sold in a shop, would be more expensive than products that are manufactured in more environmentally friendly ways.	The government may want to replace current tax on products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different products. This would mean products that are produced using high amounts of resources such as energy, water or scarce metals, or products that travel long distances before being sold in a shop, would be more expensive than products that are manufactured in more environmentally friendly ways. This would help to tackle climate change, as reducing the sale of products that use a lot of energy or materials will reduce the level of carbon emissions in our atmosphere.	The government may want to replace current tax on products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different products. This would mean products that are produced using high amounts of resources such as energy, water or scarce metals, or products that travel long distances before being sold in a shop, would be more expensive than products that are manufactured in more environmentally friendly ways. This would help to preserve resources that are becoming rarer. It would also help reduce the amount of rubbish going to landfill by encouraging more recycling of materials by businesses and people.	The government may want to replace current tax on products by a tax that will vary according to the negative environmental impacts of different products. This would mean products that are produced using high amounts of resources such as energy, water or scarce metals, or products that travel long distances before being sold in a shop, would be more expensive than products that are manufactured in more environmentally friendly ways. This would help to make locally manufactured and recyclable products more competitive and create jobs in this sector. By providing an initial customer base for these products, it could also help reduce their price so others can afford them.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers	The government may want to cut down on the use of fossil fuel energy by banning the sale of new gas boilers in the next few years, for example by 2030. This would mean that when homeowners come to replace their boilers, they would need to buy a different sort of heating system, such as an electric heat pump or hydrogen boiler. This may cost more initially but is likely to be cheaper to run in the longer term.	The government may want to cut down on the use of fossil fuel energy by banning the sale of new gas boilers in the next few years, for example by 2030. This would mean that when homeowners come to replace their boilers, they would need to buy a different sort of heating system, such as an electric heat pump or hydrogen boiler. This may cost more initially but is likely to be cheaper to run in the longer term. This would help to tackle climate change, as heating systems powered by fossil fuels are one of the most significant sources of carbon emissions. Renewable energy alternatives, like electric heat pumps, are very low carbon and more efficient at producing energy.	The government may want to cut down on the use of fossil fuel energy by banning the sale of new gas boilers in the next few years, for example by 2030. This would mean that when homeowners come to replace their boilers, they would need to buy a different sort of heating system, such as an electric heat pump or hydrogen boiler. This may cost more initially but is likely to be cheaper to run in the longer term. Technologies like electric heat pumps require very little maintenance and tend to be more reliable and safer than gas boilers. In addition, heat pumps are versatile since they can be used to provide cooling in warmer weather, as well as heating in the winter.	The government may want to cut down on the use of fossil fuel energy by banning the sale of new gas boilers in the next few years, for example by 2030. This would mean that when homeowners come to replace their boilers, they would need to buy a different sort of heating system, such as an electric heat pump or hydrogen boiler. This may cost more initially but is likely to be cheaper to run in the longer term. Technologies like electric heat pumps are much cheaper to run than gas boilers, so can significantly cut householders' energy bills. This can particularly help poorer households who spend a larger proportion of their income on energy bills.

Policy	Neutral framing	Climate change framing	Health, safety or comfort framing	Economic framing
Ensuring access to sustainable pension funds	The government may want to increase the public's access to sustainable pension funds. This means that they would increase regulations to ensure that all pension providers include a pension fund option for people to choose from that only used sustainable investments that do not harm people or the planet. This would be the default pension option for the general public, unless they chose to opt out of it.	The government may want to increase the public's access to sustainable pension funds. This means that they would increase regulations to ensure that all pension providers include a pension fund option for people to choose from that only used sustainable investments and did not harm people or the planet. This would be the default pension option for the general public, unless they chose to opt out of it. This would help to tackle climate change as many pensions are invested in companies that have a negative effect on the environment, such as fossil fuels and deforestation. By making sustainable pensions a default option for the public, investments in initiatives that harm the planet would decline, and investments that were better for the planet would increase.	The government may want to increase the public's access to sustainable pension funds. This means that they would increase regulations to ensure that all pension providers include a pension fund option for people to choose from that only used sustainable investments and did not harm people or the planet. This would be the default pension option for the general public, unless they chose to opt out of it. Most people are not aware of the impact their pensions have on people or the planet. Even when sustainable pensions are provided as an option, people may not be aware enough to opt in. By making sustainable pensions a default option, it would ensure more people would sign up without the hassle, energy, time and knowledge required to do this themselves.	The government may want to increase the public's access to sustainable pension funds. This means that they would increase regulations to ensure that all pension providers include a pension fund option for people to choose from that only used sustainable investments and did not harm people or the planet. This would be the default pension option for the general public, unless they chose to opt out of it. This would help to make better returns on investments, as sustainable investments have recently been shown to outperform standard investment options. Sustainable investments are therefore the more financially sound choice as they show the greatest return.

Table 1.2:
Policies and associated trade-offs

Policy	Lifestyle trade-off	Financial trade-off
Creating low traffic neighbourhoods	If this policy meant that you personally were not able to drive in certain areas – unless you lived or worked there – to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay more council tax to what extent would you support or oppose it?
Frequent flyer levies	If this policy meant that you personally were not able to take flights abroad very often, to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay more to take a flight, to what extent would you support or oppose it?
Electric vehicle subsidies	If this policy meant that you personally had a more limited range to choose from when buying a car, to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay more to drive your petrol/diesel car, to what extent would you support or oppose it?
Increasing vegetarian and vegan options in public food provisioning	If this policy meant that you personally were not able to eat as many meat and dairy products in these settings, to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay higher taxes to fund this policy, to what extent would you support or oppose it?

Policy	Lifestyle trade-off	Financial trade-off
Higher taxes on red meat and dairy products	If this policy meant that you personally were not able to eat as many meat and dairy products as you do now, to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay more for meat and dairy products, to what extent would you support or oppose it?
Changing product pricing to reflect how environmentally friendly products are	If this policy meant that you personally were not able to buy as much of certain products e.g. single-use plastics as you do now, to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay more for some products, to what extent would you support or oppose it?
Phasing out the sale of gas and coal boilers	If this policy meant that you personally were not able to install a new gas or coal boiler in your home – and had to install an alternative heating system instead – to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally had to pay more to install an alternative heating system in your home, to what extent would you support or oppose it?
Ensuring access to sustainable pension funds	If this policy meant that you personally had to opt out of a sustainable pension fund if you wanted to save in a regular pension fund, to what extent would you support or oppose it?	If this policy meant that you personally may get a smaller return from your pension savings to what extent would you support or oppose it?

END NOTES

End notes

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About the authors

Ipsos and the ESRC-funded Centre for Climate and Social Transformations (CAST) brings together expertise from both organisations to enhance the excellence and impact of the work we do with our climate engagement partnership.

Ipsos

The Energy and Environment and Behavioural Science teams at Ipsos contributed to this report. Our Energy and Environment team works with leading organisations in the UK, Europe and globally across the public, private and not-for-profit sectors. We have a strong track record applying energy and environmental social research, monitoring and evaluation approaches to a diverse range of issues including net zero, climate resilience and the natural environment. Our team includes qualitative and quantitative researchers, evaluators and advisory experts.

Our Behavioural Science team works alongside a wide range of leading market research and social research experts to support organisations to successfully navigate uncertain times, offering skills and tools that deliver positive policy outcomes. Our focus is to understand both people and the systems they operate in, and to reflect that we use behaviour change tool kits that are based on leading academic research alongside an evidence base of delivering sustainable change.

CAST

CAST is a global hub for understanding the systemic and society-wide transformations that are required to address climate change focusing on one overriding question: how can we as a society live differently - and better – in ways that meet the urgent need for rapid and far-reaching emissions reductions? The Centre focuses on people as agents of transformation in areas of everyday life that impact directly on climate change. We work with private-, public-, and third- sector partners across scales (individual, community, organisational, national, and global) to identify and experiment with various routes to achieving lasting change in the challenging areas of mobility, food, material consumption, and heating and cooling. CAST's core partners are Cardiff University, the University of East Anglia, University of Manchester, University of York, University of Bath, and Climate Outreach.

CONTACT US

CONTACT IPSOS

Rachel Brisley
Head of Energy and Environment,
Ipsos UK

rachel.brisley@Ipsos.com
www.ipsos.com/en-uk
@IpsosUK

CONTACT CAST

Lorraine Whitmarsh
Director,
CAST

lw2253@bath.ac.uk
cast.ac.uk
@CAST_Centre

Centre for **Climate Change** and **Social Transformations**

Research by our climate engagement partnership

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