'Shoulder to Shoulder'
Produced for: Public Perspective
Do the British like war? The answer appears to be yes, but on two conditions. The first is that the war must be declared and must involve graphic belligerence and the mobilisation of armed forces, as in the British action to regain the Falklands. The second is that it must not seem messy or end in defeat. In other words, public opinion is likely to prove fickle. Since the days of Vietnam, it has said to its commanders, we are right with you -- until you really need us.
During the first few days following September 11, the whole world was glued to their television screens. Hardly an hour went by but that some image of Britain was televised world-wide, from Blair's "shoulder to shoulder" speech to Bush's "no truer friend" response, from the Guards Band playing the Star Spangled Banner outside Buckingham Palace to the Queen and Royal Family at the St Paul's memorial service. The British Establishment was on full parade behind America's sense of loss and desire for retribution.
Does the British Establishment speak for the British people? There is an extensive inter-communion between Britons and Americans, with family and business ties and increasing tourist contact. This was seen in the thousands of flowers placed outside the American embassy in Grosvenor Square and in the some 50,000 signatures in the book of condolences. But was this just London, and Anglo-American London, talking? And how would it talk when shock turned to anger and anger to military response. What would happen when reaction turned to war?
Within a few days the results of opinion polls were published, reporting the public's response. From the outset there was not only support for the American people and government but also for the specific performance of American President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This support has remained strong ever since. Although the disapproval rating for both men appear to double (from a negligible rate) over the first few weeks of the crisis, from around ten per cent to around 25 per cent, it remains low. The approval ratings were not as high as noted in the US by ABC News/Washington Post, but were still comfortably round 70 per cent.
Support for Military Action
Support has been equally high in Britain for the commitment of British troops to what was initially defined as a manhunt. This commitment was unequivocal, in polls conducted in the first week by MORI, ICM and Gallup. It has remained high since the air war began, with strong majorities supporting the bombing campaign against Afghan targets. Seventy one per cent of Britons said they believed it right to join America in bombing, with two thirds believing that the policy of Mr Bush and Mr Blair was helping make the world a safer place early on, and the most recent findings, taken after the easy march through Kabul, shows that the seven in ten level of support has remained pretty steady as has the quarter or so who oppose the war, more or less what ever the question.
Some demographic variations are noticeable. Significantly fewer women (61 per cent) men (77 per cent) support the use of British troops in the most recent measure. The lowest (60%) support is found among the 65 and overs; the highest among the middle aged, 35-44 (75%). There is little difference by social class, but geographically fewer Londoners support the use of troops (51 per cent support, 33 per cent oppose) than elsewhere in the country. While 59 per cent of Liberal Democrats support the use of troops, three quarters of Conservative supporters and 72 per cent of Labour supporters are in favour of British troops being involved.
Elsewhere in Europe polls initially showed markedly lower levels of support. A 30-country Gallup poll at the outset of the conflict showed three-quarters support for military action in France, two thirds of Italians and half of Swedes, Spaniards and Germans. Opposition was in a majority in Austria, Finland, Greece and Russia. Yet when asked specifically if the action should be against the "host country" of terrorism, support fell to 10-15 per cent. Strong opposition was registered everywhere including in Britain to bombing of non-military targets.
As for the threat from terrorism generally, 59 per cent of Britons accepted that terrorist attacks are more likely as a result of British participation in military strikes with 63 per cent worried that terrorists would retaliate against the UK using chemical and biological weapons. But these figures were susceptible to events in the States and coverage in the news media. Nearly half of Britons said they would be prepared to pay more taxes to propagate the war, despite the evidence of a general lack of concern among Britons with taxation as a political issue. The drift from direct to indirect taxes over the past 15 years has been given tacit public support, to such an extent that modest rises in direct taxation no longer seem politically sensitive.
How these results should be interpreted by governments is moot. At the end of the first month, the bombing campaign against Afghanistan had reached much the same point in both Iraq in 1991 and former Yugoslavia in 1999. These were forms of "phoney war", with air bombardment having led to no certain outcome but also having imposed no severe costs on the nation doing the bombing. No Western troops had lost their lives. In all these cases it was the apparent imminence of ground action that was to prove crucial. So it was in Afghanistan.
In the case of Vietnam, Lebanon and Somalia ground troops did lose their lives and the reaction was some marked loss of support back home in the United States. This was less true of the Falklands campaign in Britain, where support remained somewhat lower, in the sixties, but rose steadily throughout except for 'wobbles' following the loss of over 1,000 Argentine sailors in the sinking of the Belgrano, and the loss of the British ship Sheffield. When the war was clearly won, support rose to 89%. But things are less clear in Afghanistan. If Western troops do take significant losses in the end game in Afghanistan, the likelihood is of a loss of domestic support. When democratic governments lose democratic support for overseas military adventures, they tend to lose interest in them.
Immediately following the beginning of the bombing campaign, 71 per cent of the British said they believe that Britain was right to join America in the military strikes. And two thirds, 66 per cent, said they believed the approach of George W Bush and Tony Blair to the crisis is helping to make the world a safer place.
While the vast majority of Muslims in Britain expressed loyalty to Britain, half disapproved of the way Tony Blair was handling the British response, and only a third approved (n = 319, interviewed 10-14 November, in a survey by MORI for Eastern Eye, the largest selling Asian newspaper in Britain), and while one in five supported the US and British military strikes in Afghanistan, nearly two in three, 64 percent, opposed military action.
The World has changed...
The vast majority of the British, now some eight people in ten, believe that the world has changed forever as a result of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, and as the impact of the aftermath of the attacks and the horror of biological weapons has been in the news, this has grown rather than declined as has the belief of over a third of the British that their own lives will be changed forever.
Following the surprisingly easy conquest of the majority of the territory of the country by the Northern Forces backed up by a comparative handful of Special Forces, Marines and SIS troops, when asked whether or not the British public felt that the approach of George W. Bush and Tony Blair to the crisis is helping to make the world a safer place, nearly two people in three, 64%, agreed, but a quarter, 24%, did not. It remains to be seen whether this will be, and whether Bush and Blair will remain shoulder to shoulder if the next phase of the 'War against Terrorism' is extended past bin Laden, and beyond Afghanistan.
Sir Robert Worcester is Chairman of MORI and Visiting Professor of Government at the London School of Economics and Government; Simon Jenkins is a newspaper columnist and former Editor of the (London) Times.
Analysis of the survey of British Asians, including Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, shows that there are some questions where Asian respondents are significantly more likely to express an opinion to an Asian rather than a Caucasian interviewer. When asked whether they approve of disapprove of the way Tony Blair is handling the response to the terrorist attacks on 11th September, 13% say 'don't know' where the interviewer is Asian compared with 20% where the interview is not Asian. People are more likely to say that they disapprove to an Asian interviewer than a non-Asian interviewer; 40% compared with 31%. This suggests that Asian respondents are more comfortable to give views that may go against national opinion if the interviewer is of the same ethnicity.
The greater tendency to express an opinion to an Asian interviewer is also highlighted when people are asked if they support or oppose the military strikes in Afghanistan in response to the terrorist attacks of 11th September; 11% give a 'don't know' answer to an Asian interviewer compared with 18% giving a 'don't know' answer to a non-Asian interviewer. People also are more likely to say they oppose the strikes if the interviewer is Asian, although the difference here is not significant; 49% compared with 44%.
When asked if race relations have changed as a result of 11th September, there is no significant difference in the answers given to Asian and non-Asian interviewers. That said, analysis shows that when Asians are asked if the events of September 11th have created divisions within the Asian communities of Britain 53% say they agree where the interviewer is Asian compared with 39% where the interviewer is not Asian. This could suggest that Asians are more likely to acknowledge that there are tensions within the communities to an Asian person.
Muslims asked if they think the events following September 11th have made other Asian communities view them differently shows that 68% say that the views of others have not changed where an interviewer is Asian compared with 52% where the interviewer is non-Asian. For the same question, Muslims are more likely to say that other Asian communities view them less favourably to a non-Asian interviewer than an Asian interviewer; 32% compared with 19%. This suggests that Muslims are less comfortable acknowledge they are viewed differently by other Asians if the interviewer is Asian.
Interestingly, when Asians are asked how loyal they are to Britain, there is no significant difference in the answers given to Asian and non-Asian interviewers, although the net figures show that Asians are slightly more likely to say they are loyal to a non-Asian interviewer than to an Asian interviewer +86 compared with +80.
Analysis by ethnicity of interviewer shows that Asians are significantly more likely to say they terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were unjustified to an Asian interviewer than a non-Asian interviewer. This contrasts with the earlier supposition that Asians feel more comfortable giving views that may go against the mood of the general public.
When asked whether the military strikes on Afghanistan are a war against Islam or terrorism, Asians are significantly more likely to say the strikes are a war against terrorism if the interviewer is non-Asian than Asian; 62% compared with 51%. Again, this may suggest that Asians may feel more comfortable and confident about giving more honest opinions to someone of the same ethnic background.
The only other question that highlights differences in the responses given to Asian and non-Asian interviewers is Question 17 -- which asks whether people think that the majority of the British Muslim community have done too much, too little, or about the right about in speaking out against the views of extreme Muslims. Asians are significantly more likely to say they have done the right amount to a non-Asian interviewer than an Asian interviewer; 27% compared with 17%. Interestingly (and in contrast to earlier suppositions) Asians are less likely to give a 'don't know' answer to an Asian interviewer than a non-Asian interviewer: 38% compared with 25%.
Conclusions
It is difficult to draw any hard and fast conclusions on the impact the ethnicity of the interviewer has on the response given. Some analysis shows that Asians are more likely to express an opinion or give an answer that is less in keeping with the perceived 'national mood' (e.g. more likely to disapprove of Tony Blair's response to events of 11th September). On the other hand, some findings of the poll challenge this supposition showing that the ethnicity of the interviewer has no effect. Therefore, it may be the focus of the question that has the greatest impact on the responses people are likely to give rather than the ethnicity of the interviewer.
