Electorate Under The Microscope

As the pace of the election build-up has temporarily slowed, let us take the chance to look over the details of the battlefield - that is, the minds of the British electorate.

As the pace of the election build-up has temporarily slowed, let us take the chance to look over the details of the battlefield - that is, the minds of the British electorate.

The table below shows the aggregate results of the voting intention question in MORI's seven Omnibus surveys in the first quarter of 2001. The sample size of nearly 14,000 is large enough to give us a reasonably robust view of quite small subgroups of the population, and the table also indicates both how their voting intentions have changed since the last quarter of last year, and the overall swing since the 1997 General Election.

The first point to note is that Labour has reconsolidated its position, making gains from both the Tories and the Liberal Democrats, since the dip in its popularity which followed the fuel crisis last year. Although these figures are aggregate figures for the entire quarter, and would mask any brief blips in public opinion showing up in only a single poll, in fact the findings have been almost entirely steady since the start of the year; neither the Mandelson controversy nor the Foot and Mouth crisis (so far, at least) have produced any significant change in either direction.

The move to Labour and away from the Tories over the last three months has been remarkably uniform across almost all groups. Labour leads the Tories among every age group and every class, both men and women. Only 45-54 year old men have apparently bucked the trend by not swinging from Conservative to Labour (and that may be a freak of sampling variation, as the difference is not big enough to be statistically significant).

160 Voting Intention 2001 Q1 160 Change since 2000 Q4 160
160 Con Lab L Dem Other Con Lead Con Lab L Dem Swing since 1997 GE
160 % % % % 177% 177% 177% 177% 177%
Total 31 50 14 5 -19 -2 +4 -1 -3.0
Sex
Male 31 50 13 6 -19 -2 +4 -1 -2.5
Female 31 49 15 5 -18 -3 +3 -1 -3.0
Age
18-24 26 52 15 7 -26 -1 +3 0 -2.0
25-34 27 53 13 7 -26 -4 +6 -1 -2.5
35-44 27 54 13 6 -27 -2 +6 -4 -3.5
45-54 31 46 16 7 -15 -1 0 0 -2.5
55-64 35 45 16 4 -10 -1 +3 +1 -3.5
65+ 37 48 11 4 -11 -4 +5 -1 -3.0
Class
AB 39 41 17 3 -2 0 +3 0 -6.0
C1 36 44 14 6 -8 -2 +3 -1 -4.0
C2 28 52 13 7 -24 -4 +4 -1 -0.5
DE 22 61 11 6 -39 -3 +6 -2 -0.5
Standard region
E Ang 43 42 14 1 +1 +2 +4 -3 0.0
E Mids 33 53 12 2 -20 -4 +7 -2 -3.5
London 25 58 12 5 -33 -3 +7 -3 -7.5
North 25 58 14 3 -33 -1 +2 -2 +3.0
N West 27 60 10 3 -33 -3 +6 -5 -3.5
Scot 13 53 5 29 -40 -2 +5 -1 -6.5
S East 39 40 18 3 -1 -2 +1 +2 -5.0
S West 38 37 24 1 +1 -3 +2 +3 -5.0
Wales 22 54 11 13 -32 -8 +4 +3 +1.5
W Mid 37 49 12 2 -12 -1 +4 -2 +1.0
Y & H 31 53 14 2 -22 -1 +4 -3 +1.0
Shareholder
Yes 40 40 16 4 0 -4 +2 +2 n/a
No 27 54 13 6 -27 -2 +5 -2 n/a
Trade union membership
Yes 21 59 14 6 -38 -4 +7 -3 +0.5
No 33 48 14 5 -15 -2 +4 0 -3.5
Men by age and class
18-24 30 50 14 6 -20 0 +3 -1 -2.5
25-34 28 52 12 8 -24 -6 +7 0 -2.5
35-44 26 55 12 7 -29 -2 +5 -3 -3.0
45-54 32 47 15 6 -15 +1 0 -1 +0.5
55-64 33 47 14 6 -14 -2 +4 0 -6.0
65+ 36 50 10 4 -14 -5 +6 -2 -4.0
AB 38 42 16 4 -4 -1 +3 0 -6.0
C1 34 46 13 7 -12 -3 +4 -2 -5.5
C2 27 54 12 7 -27 -6 +4 +1 -1.0
DE 22 61 10 7 -39 -1 +7 -3 +1.0
Women by age and class
15-24 21 55 16 8 -34 -3 +4 +1 -2.5
25-34 25 55 14 6 -30 -3 +4 -1 -4.0
35-44 27 53 14 6 -26 -3 +7 -5 -4.5
45-54 31 46 17 6 -15 -2 +2 0 -5.5
55-64 37 42 17 4 -5 0 +1 0 0.0
65+ 38 46 12 4 -8 -4 +3 0 -2.5
AB 39 40 18 3 -1 -1 +2 0 -7.0
C1 37 43 16 4 -6 -2 +2 0 -3.5
C2 30 50 14 6 -20 -2 +5 -4 -1.0
DE 21 61 12 6 -40 -5 +6 -1 -1.0

Source: MORI/The Times Base: 13,649 British adults aged 18+, Jan-Mar 2001

In terms of the swings since 1997, the position is slightly more interesting. Labour's overall gain of a 3% swing comes predominantly from the middle class ABC1s - who, of course, were less likely to vote Labour in 1997 than their working class counterparts. Mr Blair seems to be winning over those who were initially least supportive of New Labour, while not losing among his core supporters. Other data, however, slightly modifies this conclusion - with working class adults (as well as younger adults and those living in Labour's safer seats) being less sure that they will vote, it seems quite likely that if the election were to be held now Labour would do less well among its core groups than in 1997 but better among its "natural opponents". Similarly, the majority of the population who are not trade union members have swung to Labour since 1997, while union members themselves have not. All the traditional differentials are narrowing. It will be very interesting to see if this pattern is maintained into the election - whenever Mr Blair finally decides to hold it.
20/04/2001

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