How Britain voted in the 2024 election

As we have done for every general election since 1979, Ipsos has produced estimates of how the voters voted in the 2024 general election.

The author(s)
  • Gideon Skinner Public Affairs
  • Keiran Pedley Public Affairs
  • Cameron Garrett Public Affairs
  • Ben Roff Public Affairs
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As we have for every general election since 1979, Ipsos has produced estimates of how the voters voted in 2024.  For the first time, we have produced these estimates from a post-election survey carried out on our online random probability Ipsos KnowledgePanel, with participants recruited via random unclustered address-based sampling, the gold standard in UK survey research, weighted to the final outcome.  17,394 interviews were carried out with British adults aged 18+, between 5-8 July 2024.   Previous estimates were derived from aggregating pre-election surveys (in 2019, a mix of telephone and online surveys), and weighting these to the final outcome.

The data was weighted using our normal methodology to be representative of the adult population profile of Great Britain, and then the proportions of voters for each party and non-voters were weighted to the actual results at a regional level. 

Nevertheless, as always, it is important to note that these are estimates only, based on people’s answers to a post-election survey immediately after polling day, and will be subject to a margin of error and other potential sources of error. All figures (except the turnout estimates) are expressed as percentages of those who voted - ie, they exclude those who did not vote.

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Here are nine key findings from How Britain Voted in 2024:

1)    Age continues to be a key dividing line, but the growth of other parties had an impact on both Labour and the Conservatives.  Labour led among every age group except those aged 65+, the oldest crossover point since 1997 when Labour led among all age groups. Labour’s highest share was among 25-34 year olds (47%), while the 43% the Conservatives achieved among those aged 65+ was just over double their vote share among under 65s.  The Conservatives’ vote share fell since 2019 among every age group, but Labour’s share also actually fell 21 points among 18-24 year olds, where the Greens saw a 16pt rise (on the other hand, Labour’s vote share rose among those aged 45+). 

Compared with the performance of the Brexit Party in 2019, Reform UK increased its vote share among every age group, and especially among 45-64 year olds where their support reached 18%.  

2)    The gender gap narrowed between the main parties, mainly due to a large fall in the Conservatives’ vote share among men.  The Conservatives’ vote share fell by 23 points among men and by 17pts among women (Labour rose by 3pts among men, and by 1pt among women). Reform UK did better among men than women, at 17% vs 13% respectively.  Looking at age within gender, the overall age pattern again applied, with Labour doing better among younger and middle-aged men and women, and the Conservatives doing better among older men and women. Labour did slightly better among younger women than younger men (45% vs 36%, mainly due to younger men being slightly more likely to vote for the Greens and smaller parties/independents), while the Conservatives did slightly better among older women than older men (40% vs 35%, mainly due to older men being more prepared to vote for Reform UK, who reached 20% among this group).

3)    The long-term realignment in class continued, with differences by class relatively minor for Labour and the Conservatives.  Reform UK did best among social class C2, reaching a vote share of 25% among this group, matching the Conservatives’ performance.

4)    The Conservatives lost almost half of their 2019 vote, losing voters to both Labour/Liberal Democrats and especially to Reform UK.  The Conservatives only won 53% among their 2019 voters, while this group voted 24% to Reform UK, 12% to Labour and 7% to the Liberal Democrats.  Labour held on to 71% of their 2019 vote, and also made some gains among 2019 Liberal Democrats, although Labour also lost votes in the reverse direction with 9% of their 2019 base voting for the Liberal Democrats and another 9% choosing the Greens.

5)    Labour’s lead among 2016 Remain voters barely changed from 2019. But the Conservatives’ vote share among 2016 Leave voters halved, mainly to the benefit of Reform UK.  Among 2016 Remain voters, Labour led the Conservatives by 46% to 18% (with the Liberal Democrats on 17%) – in 2019, the figures were Labour 48%, Conservatives 20%, Liberal Democrats 21%.  However, while the Conservatives still led among 2016 Leave voters, their share fell from 73% in 2019 to 38% this year.  Labour slightly increased their vote share among Leave voters from 15% to 19%, but Reform UK came second among this group at 29%.  

6)    Labour had a strong lead among graduates. However, while the Conservatives kept their lead among those with no formal qualifications, this is where they saw the biggest swing to Labour, and also Reform UK’s highest share.  Among graduates, 43% voted Labour and 19% for the Conservatives, only marginally ahead of the Liberal Democrats on 16%.  Among those with no formal qualifications the Conservatives led by 39% to 28% for Labour, but this 11 point lead is a big fall on their 36 pt lead with this group in 2019.  Reform UK also reached a vote share of 18% among those with no qualifications, compared with 7% among graduates.

7)    Labour continues to have a strong lead among ethnic minority voters. However, while among white voters there was a big fall in the Conservative vote share since 2019 (where Labour and Reform increased), Labour’s vote share fell among ethnic minority voters. Among ethnic minority voters, Labour led the Conservatives by 46% to 17%, and among white (including white minority groups) voters by 33% to 26% (turning a 19 pt lead for the Conservatives among white voters in 2019 to an 7pt lead for Labour this year).  However, among ethnic minority voters Labour’s share fell by 18pts since 2019, while the Greens (up 9pts) and minor/independent parties (up 13pts) both increased.   While base sizes for individual ethnic minority groups are small and should be treated as indicative with allowance for a wider margin of error, Labour’s vote share was much higher among voters from a Black ethnic minority background than among voters from an Asian ethnic minority background (by 68% to 39%, while among those of a mixed ethnic background it stood at 50%). 

8)    Since 2019, the Conservatives lost their lead among mortgage holders, while their lead among owner-occupiers was greatly reduced. Labour continued to lead among renters. The Conservative vote share fell among all tenures, while Labour was slightly down among renters but slightly up among mortgage holders and home owners, Among mortgage holders the Conservatives’ 10pt lead in 2019 became a 17 pt Labour lead in 2024, while among owner-occupiers their lead fell from 35pts to 10pts. Reform UK improved among all groups, and pushed the Conservatives into third place among social renters (with 20% supporting Reform and 12% the Conservatives, both behind Labour at 43%).

9)    Turnout estimates should be treated with caution, but show a broadly similar pattern to previous elections in terms of the groups most and least likely to vote.  In fact, turnout fell among some of the groups who are already less likely to vote, particularly young people.  Estimating turnout is one of the hardest challenges when relying solely on survey data, as people may still overclaim whether or not they voted, and polls may still be more likely to interview politically engaged people than disengaged.  Furthermore, it should be noted that our turnout estimates are expressed as a % of all resident adults, not as a % of all those registered (see here for more on our reasons behind this).   This means that these figures are not comparable to the official turnout figures normally used, and within our series are only comparable to figures going back to 2015 (before then a different methodology was used).   On this basis, turnout among those aged 55+ was relatively similar to that in 2019.  However, it fell among under 55s, particularly among 18-24 year olds (from 47% to 37%, back to levels last seen in 2015), and among 25-34 year olds (from 55% to 41%).  Turnout was also lower among social classes C2DE than among ABs (by 47% to 67%), among renters (by 38% to 71% of owner-occupiers), and among ethnic minority voters (by 43% to 56% of white voters). 

Technical Note

  • Base: 17,394 GB adults aged 18+, of whom 15,206 said they voted, interviewed on the online random probability Ipsos KnowledgePanel between 5-8 July 2024. The data was weighted using our normal methodology to be representative of the adult population profile of Great Britain, and then the proportions of voters for each party and non-voters were weighted to the actual results by region. 
  • All polls are subject to a wide range of potential sources of error
The author(s)
  • Gideon Skinner Public Affairs
  • Keiran Pedley Public Affairs
  • Cameron Garrett Public Affairs
  • Ben Roff Public Affairs

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