Elections Yet To Come

At the end of last month, the Electoral Commission published "The Shape of Elections to Come", its strategic evaluation report on the experimental methods of voting used in this year's local elections. An important part of the evaluation which fed into the Commission's report was a programme of public opinion research, conducted by MORI, including both quantitative surveys and qualitative research (focus groups).

At the May 2003 elections, the Government approved local authority proposals for 59 pilots of new electoral methods, experimenting with a number of variants of all-postal voting or of e-voting. In all-postal elections, postal voting entirely replaces traditional methods - there are no polling stations, and every registered elector is sent a ballot paper to be returned by mail or left at a council drop-off point. The e-voting experiments included methods as diverse as electronic voting machines in the traditional polling stations, voting by telephone, voting by text message and internet voting.

MORI's quantitative research comprised 29 surveys in pilot areas, measuring the attitudes of voters and non-voters towards new voting arrangements in their area. For each survey, MORI interviewed a quota sample of c.200 residents by telephone in that local authority pilot district between 2 - 12 May 2003. Samples were stratified to ensure 100 interviews with voters and 100 with non-voters in each area. The ten focus groups (two in each of five local authority areas) helped gain a more in-depth understanding of the public's attitudes towards new voting arrangements, especially by giving those group members who had not already voted a direct chance to use the relevant technology. At each of the focus groups in e-voting pilot areas, the technology used during the elections was present during the groups, to allow informed feedback on the actual mechanics of how the pilots worked: in Basingstoke & Deane we had an electronic voting machine, in Stratford-on-Avon group members were able to use the voting website and in Sheffield both the voting website and telephone voting were used.

Overall attitudes to the pilots conducted in May 2003 were broadly positive: just over half (56%) said that they thought the arrangements improved the whole process of voting, while only six per cent said they made them worse. These figures were similar across both postal and e-voting pilots. A third (32%) said that they were, or would have been, encouraged to vote by the new arrangements.

Yet this is not to suggest that we found a strong demand for change from the traditional method of voting in a polling station; indeed, three-quarters say they are satisfied with the current process of voting in elections in the UK. (This is true even though half, 48%, are unaware of the recent change in the law to allow postal voting on demand). The traditional method seems to have very positive associations, a perception of being "tried and tested", as well as strong "romantic" connotations for some people.

However, even in the absence of a strong grassroots demand for change, there is little resistance to it in principle; even supporters of the present system recognise it may have disadvantages for people who work long hours, or who find it difficult to get to a polling station, and there is a clear desire for choice. There is very little evidence that people want to ban new methods of voting - even those who would not choose to use a particular method feel it should be available for others to take advantage of. But the demand for choice cuts both ways: one of the criticisms from the all-postal pilots (even among those who found it a simple and convenient way to vote) was that there should have been the choice to vote in a polling station.

The qualitative research suggests that the convenience factor is the key driver of satisfaction with the pilot schemes, particularly for busy people who want to vote and the elderly or infirm who find it difficult to get to a polling station. Postal voting, and some types of e-voting, are seen as relatively simple, and offer a way to escape the 'unavoidable circumstances' that are the most frequently cited reason for failure to vote.

But this does not make alternative "convenient" voting methods a panacea for low turnouts. The convenience factor seems to work only among those who, during the campaign, already intend to vote, but don't always make it to the polling station on the day. There is a substantial segment of the population who make a decision not to vote for reasons of political disconnection (expressing opinions such as "politicians break their promises", "we never see our elected representative" or "they don't talk about issues important to me"). In other words, they don't vote because they don't want to, not because they can't. In fact, 61% of non-voters in the postal pilots and the 63% in the e-voting pilots said that the new arrangements made no difference to their decision not to vote. Similarly, those who did vote, even if they agreed that the new methods were a spur to vote, claimed that they would have voted anyway.

Yet it's not quite as simple as that. Even though the voters claimed they would have voted anyway, the all-postal method seems to have increased turnout substantially (as was the case in previous years). The e-voting methods, by contrast, seem not to have done (even in Windsor & Maidenhead, where they also experimented with extended voting hours and voting at more convenient locations such as supermarkets and stations).

Both methods seem to have been regarded as an increase in convenience. So why the difference? The most obvious distinction is that e-voting methods leave the initiative with the public - they are told how to vote, but however easy the method they still have to take positive action to do so. With all-postal voting, by contrast, the initiative is taken by the electoral authorities: the ballot paper is put into the electors' hands; all they have to do, in their own time, is fill it in (together with any accompanying forms) and return it.

The e-voting methods may also suffer slightly from resistance to the technology: the possibility of malfunction, and a suspicion of "gimmickry". (One specific variant, e-voting kiosks in public places, had additional drawbacks in that it was seen as involving a lack of privacy, and lacked the key attribute of convenience, which was the strength of telephone, mobile phone and internet voting - one can vote at home or at work, rather than being tied to a particular place.)

But increasing familiarity will probably mute these criticisms, if e-voting is used more widely; there seems to be a common feeling that e-voting is to some extent inevitable, and will become more usual, particularly for those who are used to using such technology. In the long run, e-voting is probably just as acceptable to voters as the more familiar postal vote.

However, one concern that must be addressed, and which applies both to postal and e-voting, is safety of the vote from fraud and abuse. These are not top-of-the-mind concerns for the public, and certainly do not seen to have discouraged anybody from voting, but they are clearly present when the issue is raised.

Concerns about fraud in the e-voting pilots seem to arise from generalised suspicion about technology, and so are more prevalent among older people and those not used to new technology. For those more comfortable with IT, e-voting is often seen to be better protected against fraud than postal voting. These very different perspectives of the "technology literate" and the rest of the population may be an obstacle in themselves.

In the case of postal voting, participants judged it to be more liable to fraud than the traditional method, even if only on further reflection. When discussing the issue, participants in the focus groups seemed to be worried about the possibility of others stealing their vote, or being able to gain extra votes with forged ballot papers. The introduction of extra steps between (the traditional and very simple method of) marking the ballot paper and physically placing the ballot paper in the ballot box also makes participants feel there is more potential for error.

These concerns about security are not overwhelming, as was clear when we discussed changes to the declaration of identity (which under established postal voting rules must be signed, witnessed and returned with the ballot paper). Most seem to feel the advantages of extra simplicity and convenience outweigh any concerns over fraud - particularly as it is felt that the current system is no deterrent against fraud anyway, as people feel it would be easy to forge a witness signature.

But on the whole the voters seem to feel the traditional voting method is in some degree "safer": the perception of polling stations is as "tried and tested", secure, and safe from fraud and abuse - even though under this system personation is possible, and votes can be traced (issues which the vast majority of participants either ignore or are unaware of).

There is an interesting omission here, though, both in the concerns raided in the focus groups and the Electoral Commission's discussion of the issue in their report. The security issue that is most worrying to many theorists is the threat to the secrecy of the ballot. Perhaps this is not so obvious a risk as some of the other concerns, and is therefore not an issue that springs readily to voters' minds. It is often forgotten that the introduction of the secret ballot in the 19th century was aimed not simply at protecting the privacy of those who did not want anyone else to know how they voted, but to thwart anyone who did want someone else to know how they voted, by preventing them from proving it. Once the ballot was secret, the corrupt candidate or agent could no longer bribe or intimidate his way to victory, because he no longer knew who had failed to vote as they promised. It is perhaps a tribute to the success of those measures, and the scrupulous honesty with which the vast majority of British elections are now fought, that the risk of postal voting, or any other form of voting where the voters is not merely guaranteed but forced to accept privacy at the moment they cast their vote, is no longer immediately obvious. But it is a problem of which many politicians are still aware, and one that the Electoral Commission will surely have to address before its recommendations for wider use of postal voting will be accepted.

In fact, this is symptomatic of a wider difficulty the Commission faces in all its reforms and modernisation of electoral procedures. So many of the traditions and regulations that govern British elections have depended on the general acceptance that the conduct of those elections, by officials and competing candidates alike, is almost entirely honest and fair. And, indeed, that has been overwhelmingly true over the years, so that many of the safeguards which would be taken for granted in setting up a new democracy have never been introduced here. For example, observers in polling stations - routine in monitoring elections across the world to prevent abuse - have never been allowed here. There has never been any demand for them, as even candidates bitterly opposed to government have never doubted the integrity of polling station staff and the returning officer's officials. The Commission has now recommended (in its report "Voting for Change", published in June) that observers should be allowed, and Britain will fall in line with the rest of the world. A raft of other changes to protect the security of voting have similarly been proposed. Perhaps it is just as well that all these safeguards should be put in place, even if the effect is only to pre-empt future public concern rather than to assuage existing unease.

MORI's report to the Commission, and the Commission's own report, can both be downloaded from the Electoral Commission's website, www.electoralcommission.gov.uk/about-us/may2003pilots.cfm