Hague's Progress: How Far Have The Tories Come, And Where Are They Going
Two years have now passed since William Hague was elected leader of the Conservative Party, in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 election defeat. It has certainly been a period of considerable change for the Tories, with the organisation having to grapple with the unfamiliar day-to-day role of being a party of opposition rather than of government. At the same time, there has been the urgent need to take stock and consider the implications of Tony Blair's victory, as well as to look at the party's structure and finances.
Time to take stock?
Two years have now passed since William Hague was elected leader of the Conservative Party, in the immediate aftermath of the 1997 election defeat. It has certainly been a period of considerable change for the Tories, with the organisation having to grapple with the unfamiliar day-to-day role of being a party of opposition rather than of government. At the same time, there has been the urgent need to take stock and consider the implications of Tony Blair's victory, as well as to look at the party's structure and finances.
So now seems to be a good time for us to look at what has happened, and offer an interim report on William Hague's progress. In line with modern management practice, we have tried to use performance objectives to assess his progress in this new role. This has involved taking a step back and trying to contemplate what might have been a realistic and achievable set of targets back in the summer of 1997.
Understanding the scale of the task
By 1996-7, they [The Tories] didn't have the answers to the questions any more
Lapsed Conservative, May 1998
In 1997, we were looking for a knight in shining armour, and Blair represented that.
Lapsed Conservative, May 1998
We hardly need to dwell on the difficult task that lay ahead for the new leader when he took office. A party that had been in office for nearly a generation had now suffered its worst general election results ever - in terms of both share of the vote (31%) and seats at Westminster (165). This included the removal of its last MPs from Scotland, Wales and most major cities in England, as well as the psychological blow of having Labour MPs in places like Finchley, Hove and Scarborough. Those Conservatives who had been elected to Westminster were shell-shocked and showing signs of ill-discipline. And the defining characteristic of the Party in the country remained its ageing and declining membership - something of a concern while the Conservatives were in Government; now an urgent priority for a party facing the challenge of winning back so much lost ground.
Setting some intermediate targets
Against this unfavourable background, what targets should William Hague (perhaps with his McKinsey hat on) have set himself to have achieved by the summer of 1999? There is a tension here; in order to achieve real change in large organisations, there is often the need to be ambitious in terms of the goals that are set. But there is also the need for some very cold realism. The Conservatives' defeat was far greater that had been expected and, in the absence of change to the electoral system, any good GCSE psephology student would be likely to have concluded that the Party would need to play the long game, with the real target being the election after next.
We have identified a number a number of intermediate objectives which William Hague's line managers might like to have seen him achieve by the summer of this year. These are guided by three over-riding themes:
Theme One: Rebuilding the party's image, and increasing its Hague's Progress: How Far Have The Tories Come, And Where Are They Going level of support in regular polls.
If they didn't trust each other, how is anybody else supposed to trust them?
Lapsed Conservative, May 1998
No managing director of a high profile business like Tories plc would want to see a position continue where - in the eyes of the public - the party's main characteristics are 'divided' and 'out of touch with ordinary people'. Sustained improvements in regular voting intention polls are a key success factor, both in presenting a message to the media that the Tories are improving, and in boosting party morale.
Theme Two: Developing an image as a strong leader.
William Hague...I don't know enough about him. He doesn't project an image of a leader
Lapsed Conservative, May 1998
It is of course vital for any new leader to make a positive impression. Most voters outside Wales would not have been familiar with William Hague at the time of his election, and few would have had a well-developed appreciation of his qualities or otherwise.
So William Hague will (we assume) have been looking to ensure that, by 1999, he had established a high profile in the country at large. The experience of Paddy Ashdown, little known at the time of his election to leader in 1988, will have provided some useful pointers here. Leading on from this, William Hague will have been looking to take advantage of some of the inherent opportunities of being in opposition. He will certainly have been seeking to leave the negative perceptions of John Major far behind him.
Theme Three: Rebuilding the Party's fortunes at the ballot box.
A great victory... We have stuck a blow for the independence of our country and the future of the pound
The referendums in Scotland and Wales in 1997 suggested that, despite their dramatic victory, New Labour were not necessarily guaranteed ringing endorsements at the ballot box, and the local and European elections of 1999 provided an obvious target for the Conservative Party.
William Hague's Performance Objectives, 1997-99
Taking these three themes as our starting point, we have drawn up seven short-term objectives against which Hague's progress can be measured. These are as follows:
- Restore Central Office morale and functionality
- Re-unite the Party behind him as leader
- Achieve personal public recognition
- Develop his image with the public as leader and potential prime minister
- Re-establish the credibility of the Party as an alternative government
- Achieve concrete success at elections in 1999
- Establish basis for further improvement by 2001
- Find and exploit government weaknesses
- Identify issues for general election campaign
In the section below, we have collated evidence that enables us to assess his performance on each of these objectives. The attached graphs lay out the polling evidence used in more detail.
William Hague: Performance Review 1997-1999
OBJECTIVE | TARGET BY 1999 | RESULTS | COMMENTS |
1. Restore Central Office morale and functionality | a. Restore firm financial footing b. Establish WH's authority as leader c. Improve candidate selection procedures | a. Improvement achieved but over-dependent on large donors. Remains vulnerable to changes in regulations. Ashcroft fall-out may be damaging. b. New leadership election method c. Ethics & Integrity Committee set up (but may be toothless); democratic selections for Euro-elections generally a success | Not measurable by opinion polling - general impression of partial success. |
2. Re-unite the Party behind him as leader | a. Achieve high satisfaction ratings among Conservative supporters b. Convince the public party is united | a. Persistent negative net rating in MORI/ Times series, even among Tories b. 44% pick 'divided' as party attribute Sep 1998, as bad as in 1997 | a. Not achieved b. Not achieved |
3. Achieve personal public recognition | a. Need to be 'the face of the Conservatives' b. Prevent any rivals, e.g. Portillo, being widely accepted as 'leader-in-waiting' | a. MORI/Times poll Aug 1999: 84% recognise WH and know he is Tory leader b. Hague and Portillo rated equally by public as best leader; similar like/dislike ratings |
a. Achieved b. Achieved, though perhaps only in the negative sense of being no worse than any of the alternatives |
4. Develop his image with the public as leader and potential prime minister | a. Positive satisfaction ratings (% satisfied - dissatisfied) in MORI polls b. Reasonable score on 'best PM' polls c. Strengthen positive and weaken negative perceptions on leader image ratings | a. Aug 1999: 20% satisfied, 52% dissatisfied b. Always trailed Ashdown. Sep 1999: Blair 50%, Hague 13%, Kennedy 12% c. Most strongly associated with 'inexperienced', 'out of touch' and 'narrow minded'. | a. Not achieved b. Not achieved c. Not achieved; if anything has made negative progress. |
5. Re-establish the credibility of the Party as an alternative government | a. Achieve at least parity in voting intention polls: no opposition in polling history has been behind at this point in a parliament, not even Michael Foot b. Improve party standing as measured by the Ipsos Excellence Model | a. MORI Aug 1999: 27% Con, 49% Lab, 17% LD b. No change from 1997 on likelihood of voting Tory in future; rating 'if they were in power' unchanged | a. Not achieved b. Not achieved |
6. Achieve concrete success at elections in 1999 | a. Gain 1,000 seats at local elections b. Beat Labour in share of vote in Euro-Elections c. Make progress in Scotland and Wales | a. Gained 1,300 seats b. Euro-elections: 36% Cons, 28% Lab, 13% Lib Dem - but on 23% turnout c. No FPTP members in Scotland, one in Wales, vote shares lower than at general election | Partially achieved: will secure the benefits of victory for party morale, but not by re-establishing among the public the habit of voting Conservative |
7. Establish basis for further improvement by 2001 | a. Find and exploit government weaknesses b. Identify issues on which to fight general election campaign | a. Blair and government satisfaction ratings slipping, but still historically high b. (1) Europe - Tories lead as best party among those who care, but there are too few of them 160160160160(2) Tax - too early to tell impact of new promises | a. Not achieved b. Perhaps too early to judge, but not achieved yet - mustn't be left too late |
Conclusion: A mid-term report
Even against some fairly modest targets, it does seem clear that William Hague's record shows room for improvement. On our reckoning, of the seven short-term objectives set out, he has clearly succeeded on one, and partially succeeded on two others; on the remaining four he has failed. In terms of the wider picture, this means that many of the problems he faced in 1997 are still there, or have become more acute.
Most strikingly, the Party has failed to achieve even the level of support recorded in the 1997 election, and its image in the country shows little sign of improvement. By way of comparison, at this stage of the 1979 Parliament, Michael Foot's Labour Party was well ahead in the polls. Although William Hague is now the face of the Conservatives in this country, he has failed to establish himself in the eyes of the public as a serious contender for Prime Minister. Within three weeks of becoming Lib Dem leader, as many Britons think Charles Kennedy is the most capable Prime Minister as think it of William Hague.
There have been more positive messages on the third key theme of achieving electoral success. The Conservatives have sought to make much from their victories in both the local and European elections. And there is little doubt that, when set against the Party's recent experiences, these are rare highlights. It would certainly be wrong to minimise the effect on party morale of their first electoral victories since 1992. But we know that the local elections were fought against a very low baseline (the Conservatives' disastrous local elections of 1995), and that further retreat from these low levels would have been difficult to contemplate. And, as the graphs show, the European Elections are not quite the Tory victory that the spin doctors would like us to believe, even if it was a genuinely humiliating defeat for Labour. In fact, this was the worst performance by the Conservatives - in terms of the number of electors who actually turned out to vote for them - in any national election since women got the vote.
All of this suggests how limited has been how limited has been the progress that William Hague has made so far, and how much there remains to be done. We see little sign of sustained recovery and little hope for optimism in 2001. Indeed, some Tories have already written off the prospects of victory in two years' time and are, semi-publicly, thinking in terms of the next election but one. What is more, this is against the background of mid-term difficulties for the Blair government. If past experience is anything to go by, it is the party in power, rather than the opposition, which tends to finish a parliament on an upward trend. If this happens over the next couple of years, the prospects for William Hague could look very bleak indeed.
Returning to our performance objectives therefore, we would have to conclude that, if William Hague's salary were to be performance-related, he would be unlikely to benefit from his own proposals to reduce the top rate of income tax; and his performance objectives for the next two years will be tougher still.
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