Who Still Has An Open Mind On The Euro?

The Irish referendum vote ratifying the Nice treaty opens the way for enlargement of the EU to proceed, possibly leading to radical changes in its nature; yet, according to a Eurobarometer survey conducted in September and just released, half the British public have never even heard about EU enlargement.

In the survey, conducted by EOS Gallup Europe for the European Commission, [europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion], just 51% of Britons said that before the interview began they had already heard of EU enlargement. This is, by a substantial way, the lowest figure in any EU member country: across the EU, 75% of the public had heard of enlargement, and the next lowest national figure was 61%. (Curiously, this was in Greece, where one might have expected the issue to be one of hot political discussion, given that Cyprus and Turkey are both among the candidate countries.) Only 10% of Britons could name three of the candidate countries applying for membership, and three-quarters (74%) couldn't name a single one; though, for that matter, half the public across the EU couldn't name any of the countries involved either. (On the other hand, in Austria two-thirds of adults correctly named three candidate countries, as did 59% in Denmark.)

Support for enlargement was also lower in Britain (48%, with 22% opposed) than in any other member state, though this partly reflected the highest proportion of don't knows (28%), unsurprising as so many were unaware of the issue in the first place. Support was still comfortably more than two-to-one, so there is hardly a potential political crisis here, but across the EU the ratio in favour was almost four-to-one, 68% to 18%.

The distinctiveness of British attitudes, and wide indifference to or ignorance of European affairs, is not of course confined to the issue of EU enlargement. On the rather more immediate issue of the euro, too, Britain stands alone. A separate Eurobarometer survey, also just released, was conducted in May in Sweden, Denmark and the UK, the three EU members not yet in the single currency. In Denmark, 44% of the public knew which two EU countries apart from their own had stayed out of the euro; in Sweden 32% could name both. Here, just 10% could name both, and two-thirds, 68%, couldn't name either.

With so little knowledge and understanding of the basic facts, it is hardly surprising that many of the British public still keep an open mind on future membership of the euro. Nevertheless, most remain instinctively against it. MORI's most recent euro-membership poll for Schroder Salomon Smith Barney [Yes Or No To The Euro?], in mid-September, found 29% would vote "yes" and 56% "no". ICM, polling last week for Goldman Sachs, found 30% in favour and 58% against. Neither poll series has found any significant softening of opposition since the end of last year, despite the confident predictions of euro-supporters that the launch of the new currency, and the chance to use it on the continent during the summer holidays, would transform British attitudes.

So, if the government is to eventually call and win a referendum, whose minds do they have to change? MORI research for the Foreign Policy Centre, published last month, gives some clues.

Since 1996, MORI has been asking an occasional question on the euro which gauges not simply the direction of attitudes but also strength of commitment. The question, which we repeated most recently in an April 2002 post-budget survey for the Financial Times, is:

Q. "Which of the following best describes your own view of British participation in the single currency?",

and offers the alternatives:

A: "I strongly support British participation"

B: "I am generally in favour of British participation, but could be persuaded against it if I thought it would be bad for the British economy"

C: "I am generally opposed to British participation, but could be persuaded to vote in favour of it if I thought it would be good for the British economy"

D: "I strongly oppose British participation".

In April, some 19% are strongly in favour, 29% strongly against. But there are almost as many in between, the "euro-waverers": 46% said they were either "generally for" (24%) or "generally opposed" (22%). (6% had no opinion.) If we take just those who say they can be persuaded one way or the other, these are the battleground of the Euro Referendum.

The maths are these. The solid "noes" outnumber the solid "ayes" 29-to-19, a ten point lead against the euro; all of these will probably vote. Therefore if the vote is to go in favour of the euro, the waverers who vote must vote pro-Euro by an even bigger margin, to cancel out this lead. As the waverers make up a total of 46%, they would have to split better than 28-to-18 in favour, or the euro loses. And if not all the waverers turn out, it is harder still, because proportionally more of those who did vote would have to be in favour to cancel out the "noes" ten-point advantage.

Who, then, are the "waverers"? Geographically they are evenly spread, and men and women are equally likely to be keeping an open mind. However, they are a little younger than average (only a quarter are aged 55-and-over, compared to a third of all adults), slightly more middle class than average and affluent, more likely to be in a two-car household and less likely to have no car than the rest of the population, only one in eight renting from the council or a housing association. Most are in work (reflecting the age profile).

Not all these patterns hold when we break down the waverers into their two composite groups. The key group, clearly, are those who are "generally opposed", whom the government must persuade that the euro would be good for the country. But, just as important to winning the referendum, the government must hang on to those who currently say they "generally support" the idea, but admit themselves potentially vulnerable to the arguments of the eurosceptics. Even remembering to be a little wary of the small sub-sample sizes involved in this further analysis, there are some striking differences which may play an important part in the campaign running up to a referendum.

Perhaps most noticeable is the regional differential - though each region has similar numbers of waverers, they are not all on the same side. The waverers in the Midlands and the South East outside London are at present predominantly opposed to the euro, but in the capital itself there are few to be won over to the single currency while many admit they might swing the other way. Opponents of the Euro could do worse than to target the perception that Londoners will benefit from joining.

Politically, too, there are differences - only to be expected given the way the parties have set out their stalls on European policy. Among those who are currently opposed but might be persuaded, there are almost as many Tories as Labour supporters, but only a third as many Liberal Democrats; but of those who already support the euro, yet may need Tony Blair to stiffen their resolve, Labour has a three-to-one lead over the Tories who are, indeed, outnumbered by Lib Dems. Assuming that these party loyalties are not entirely driven by attitudes to Europe, rather than vice-versa, the parties and their leaders may need to bear in mind these very different profiles as they campaign for votes in the referendum.

Or indeed, in Mr Blair's case, in the calculations he will be making before deciding whether to hold a referendum in the first place. Because, if the public won't give him the answer he wants the first time, there is no guarantee the British public will as tolerant as the Irish were over Nice in letting him have a second go.